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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is concerned with what regulatory strategies can best improve the 
conditions of the growing "precariat" or informal workforce. The growing incidence of 
precarious work is linked with increased inequality and heightened vulnerability. The thesis 
is concerned with the realm of regulation - hard laws, soft initiatives and other institutions 
that shape behaviour. Four case studies of informal work are conducted spanning poor, 
middle income and developed countries. Head load (Mathadi) workers in India, immigrant 
industrial clothing outworkers in Australia, garment workers in Cambodia and workers in 
Bulgaria who rely on a range of home-based work to survive are studied. The cases were 
selected because innovative regulatory schemes have been developed to improve the 
conditions of workers in each country. The schemes have enjoyed varying success, providing 
insights into what works and what doesn't in differing contexts. 
Based on evaluations of these existing innovations an ambitious transnational, networked 
initiative that aims to promote a global living wage and regulate supply chains is canvassed. 
The proposal includes the establishment of an international disputes mechanism for 
enforcement of global remuneration minima, combined with tribunals that operate at 
national levels empowered to hold parties in the supply chain accountable. The approach 
suggests novel tools and incentives for unions and state labour departments to become 
more active in mobilising and regulating this precarious workforce, and for businesses to 
change their behaviour. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The problem 
Limona worked in a large state-based factory in the town of Petrich, Bulgaria for over 20 
years before the transition to "democracy" (as the transition to capitalism Is known locally). 
It wasn't all that interesting, but the hours generally left her free to spend time with friends 
and family in the evenings and weekends. It was secure, it gave her life-long health benefits 
and a pension she could live off when she retired, and lots of her friends worked in the same 
enterprise. 
Now, though, she works from her home conducting "informal" work, 70-80 hours a week, 
every day with no holidays or sick leave. It took a while to put together enough work to 
survive on after the transition and the labour shedding that ensued, but these days she can 
just make do. She takes in sewing jobs when the vastly downsized local clothing factories 
need work done that exceeds their human resource capacity. This normally occurs when an 
international contractor places an order with a tight time-line. In addition, she glues 
together the paper shopping bags that shoppers can be seen swinging after a successful 
visit to a boutique. She also raises goats. The family have over 50 of them now, wandering 
over the family plot of land a little outside town. With the milk from the goats she makes 
feta cheese that is famous in the town. She and her son also buy cigarettes in bulk on the 
black market and locals can often be seen leaving her home with cigarettes and a package 
offeta. 
She has no savings. They were all spent during her late husband's fight with cancer. She 
pays for health insurance, but paying the taxes she would pay if she was registered as "self-
employed" is beyond her financial capacity. When asked if she feels bad about not paying 
taxes she shrugs her shoulders and explains that the government is corrupt anyway. Her 
work sits outside legal regulation: labour inspectors certainly are not coming to check if her 
workplace is healthy and she is being paid enough. Limona has given up looking for a 
"formal" job. She is almost 60: past the official age of retirement for women, and anyway, 
no-one is hiring a woman of her age. 
There are millions of women and men like Limona around the world. They include the self-
employed (such as street vendors), informal entrepreneurs and their employees (in small, 
unregistered retail shops or restaurants), and casual or contract workers who operate 
through subcontractors for formal enterprises (such as branded clothing companies or 
construction companies). Many are the victims of structural changes in the economy that 
resulted in mass labour shedding. Others have never known formal work, and eke out 
livelihoods in traditional crafts or agriculture, that have never been regulated by formal 
laws. These people - known as the precariat - work in what is known as the "informal 
economy" where work is precarious and conditions insecure, but at least there is work to 
be had. 
This dissertation is centrally concerned with what regulatory strategies can best improve 
Limona's working standards. It goes without saying that employment creation policies and 
those that foster industrial growth are crucially important for improving Limona's well-
being. This dissertation is not aimed at addressing these types of policies, however. It is 
concerned with the realm of regulation - hard laws, soft initiatives and other institutions 
that shape behaviour and set incentives in particular directions. 
What types of innovations in regulation can help Limona? Given the extent of the problem, 
it is clear that the deployment of maximum strength levers is required. This dissertation 
draws on regulatory theory and empirical research to develop new models of regulation of 
informal work, including those that can be instituted urgently to improve workers lives in 
the short-term. The dissertation ends by canvassing an ambitious, longer term vision for 
regulating work at international and national levels. 
1.2 Definitions 
The informal economy has become a popular term to define activities that are 'unregulated 
by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are 
regulated' (Portes, Castells et al. 1989). In diverse literature, the workers who toil informally 
are referred to variously as "precarious", "precariat", "contingent", "peripheral", "flexible" 
and so on. 
The term "informality" has a relatively recent history. As Hart, one of the instigators of a 
revival of interest in "informality" in the 1970s explains (Hart 1987): 
The term "informal economy" became current in the 1970s as a label for economic 
activities which take place outside the framework of corporate public and private 
sector establishments. It arose at first in response to the proliferation of self-
employment and casual labour in Third World cities; but later the expression came 
to be used with reference to societies like Britain, where it competed with other 
adjectives describing deindustrialization - the 'hidden', 'underground', 'black' 
economy, and so on. 
In 2003, the 17th Conference of Labour Statisticians adopted guidelines for measuring 
informal employment. The benefit of this definition is that it has allowed for data to be 
collected from a range of countries measuring the extent of informal work. 
l?"" International Conference of Labour Statisticians Guidelines for Measuring Informal 
Employment (2003) 
(a) own-account workers and employers employed in their own informal enterprises; 
(b) members of informal producers' cooperatives (not established as legal entities), if any; 
(c) own-account workers producing goods exclusively for own final use by their household 
(if considered employed given that the production comprises an important contribution to 
the total household consumption and is included in the national definition of employment); 
(d) contributing family workers in formal or informal enterprises; and 
(e) employees holding informal jobs in formal enterprises, informal enterprises, or as paid 
domestic workers employed by households. In line with the international definition, 
countries for which data are shown, define employees holding informal jobs as employees 
not covered by social security as employed persons, or as employees not entitled to other 
employment benefits. 
However, this official statistical definition suffers from certain deficits. Perhaps the biggest 
shortfall is that it defines work of this type as an irregular phenomenon rather than a 
process in which the social form of labour has been reshaped and produced in a particular 
form (Portes, Castells et al. 1989: 11). When the majority of the population is engaged in 
work that is informal, as in India where around 97 per cent of work is "unorganised", it is 
difficult to contend that it is irregular. Labour takes many forms. The fact that the law 
generally only recognises and protects a narrow conception of waged labour does not mean 
that this is the main form in which work occurs, that the form is stable, or that it is 
reproduced across countries and modes of production. 
A further problem with the definition related to its dualism is that workers themselves often 
move between different forms of work. In the Bulgarian case described in this dissertation, 
for example, women sometimes take the same model of shoes they had been sewing in a 
factory under formal conditions during the day home to sew at night. They share this work 
with friends and family who are unemployed or suffering from the underemployment as 
low wages are endemic across the country. The work conducted in the factory is on the 
books, whereas the work conducted at home counts towards the factory's productivity, but 
stays off the employment books.' The same worker conducts work along a continuum of 
formality. 
' The idioms 'under the table' and 'off the books' are typically employed to refer to the informal 
economy in every day speech. The term 'the grey economy' is also in frequent use, whereas the 
'black economy' refers to a specific subset of the informal economy in which contraband is traded. 
The informal economy is generally distinguished from criminal behaviour and organized crime. 
Figure One: Stylised continuum of formal work compared with informal work 
j j - E n g a g e d with formal contracts of 
employment 
- Standardised wage paclcages 
- Regular employment 
- Employment is secure with legal 
protection in the event of dismissal or 
redundany 
- Collective bargaining and representation 
supported by labour relations institutions 
- Access to Social Security Benefits 
- No formal contracts of employment 
- Uncertain and fluctuating wages 
- No standard working schedule and 
hours subject to uncertain hours 
- Uncertain about work and place of work 
- Insecure work 
- No official representation or acces to 
institutions of collective bargaining 
- Generally, no access to Social Security 
The legal status of Limona when she is conducting the work at home rather than in the 
factory Is ambiguous at best. The contributing family workers and friends sit outside the 
category of "wage employment", as standardized and protected by labour law. Self-
employed (or "own account"), agricultural workers, homeworkers, contributing family 
workers, domestic workers and unpaid care workers within the family have traditionally 
represented the largest part of the workforce In the developing countries. These groups 
typically escape the legal categories that determine the applicability of labour law, are 
explicitly excluded by labour law coverage (In whole or In part) or are subject to special 
regulations with lower levels of protection (Tekle 2010: 35). We might say, then, that most 
work occurs on a continuum of formality and Informality (depicted In Figure One). 
Further, the Conference of Labour Statisticians definition doesn't illuminate the capacity of 
workers to demand access to legal entitlements or organise. Enacting new labour 
regulations, or making workers "formal" by expanding legal definitions, will not Improve the 
lot of workers If they have no power of enforcement. Chang argues convincingly that the 
formation of the working class and any standard form of employment is based on power. 
not just legal form (Chang 2009). For this reason, Chang Insists on a different system of 
classification from the ILO and others, which recognises the importance of workers' capacity 
to enjoy their legal entitlements as a determinant of formality. 
Table 1: Chang's Pathways to Informality 
A. Labour In the Informal sector 
Informal self-employed (street vendors, home workers, teleworkers, garbage pickers, shoe 
shiners, non-self-subslstence small scale farmers, artisans), informal employees (family 
business workers, domestic workers, landless agricultural workers), migrant workers 
B. Increasing Informal labour of the formal sector: Atypical labour not protected by 
regulatory framework. 
Contracted workers (Including dally workers), agency or dispatched workers, task-based 
casual workers, formal self-employed, disguised formal self-employed, migrant workers 
C. De-facto informal labour - formal workers In Informallzing (or Informalised) formal 
economy, workers who have no power to enjoy the legal and Institutional regulation and 
standards to which they are entitled 
Contracted workers, agency workers, part-timers, migrant workers, workers In export 
processing zones (EPZ), workers In developing countries with none or few democratic trade 
unions 
Source: (Chang 2009) 
Many workers In Chang's Category B and C continue to be overlooked by existing studies of 
the extent of Informal labour. "De-facto" Informal workers are particularly neglected by 
statistical studies of Informality. This has obvious Implications for their policy visibility. 
Chang's definition Is preferred In this dissertation for Incorporating concepts of power and 
enforcement. 
1.3 Why does informality matter? Policy importance 
Regardless of the porousness of its definition, informality is widely seen as a serious 
problem which requires critical solutions. It is linked with low job quality, inequality and 
poverty. It appears to be growing in many countries rather than shrinking, particularly 
following financial crises. 
1.3.1 Linked causally and empirically to low job quality, inequality and poverty 
Informality is linked with inequality, poverty (Jutting and de Laiglesia 2009:13, Kucera and 
Xenogiani 2009), low job quality (SEED 2003), low productivity (McMillan and Rodrik 2011), 
low revenue for the government, and it shows no signs of disappearing In many countries 
around the world.^ Indeed, in many countries the informal economy has been the main 
source of labour force growth in recent years, particularly in developing and transition 
economies (Bacchetta, Ernst et al. 2009). According to the most recent estimates, non-
agricultural work in the informal economy represents 82 per cent of total employment in 
South Asia, 66 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, 65 per cent in East and South-East Asia 
(excluding China), 51 per cent in Latin America and 10 per cent in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia (International Labour Organization and WEIGO 2012). It was a main source of 
support for many affected by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (Torres 2009). 
In 2015, the ILO's Word Employment Social Outlook revealed a marked shift away from the 
standard employment model, finding that fewer than 40 per cent of wage and salaried 
workers worldwide are employed on a full-time permanent basis - a share that appears to 
be declining (ILO 2015:13). The ILO also reported that, in emerging and developing 
economies, informal employment continues to be common, and very short-term contracts 
and irregular hours are becoming more widespread at the bottom of global supply chains 
(ILO 2015:13). The pervasive trend towards informal work is far more apparent in certain 
regions of the world. In the developed economies and EU, including Central and South-
Eastern Europe and CIS, around eight in ten workers are employees-whereas in South Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa, around 75 per cent of workers are either in own-account work or 
employed as contributing family workers (ILO 2015:28). As this trend toward informal work 
^ The terms 'is linked' or 'is associated with' are used here instead of 'causes' because both 
informality and these other social problems may have the same causes. They may be closely 
associated but one may not cause the other. Still, alleviating one may help to alleviate the other. 
continues, so too do the deleterious consequences of these insecure work arrangements. 
Unsurprisingly, informal employees earn far less than formal wage employees. In 2015, the 
ILO reported that the wages of informal employees are between 43 per cent (Philippines) 
and 64 per cent (Uruguay) lower than wages of formal employees (ILO 2015:41). The ILO 
also reported that poverty disproportionally affects temporary employees, the self-
employed and unemployed (ILO 2015:47). In emerging and developing countries especially, 
the incidence of poverty when the household head is engaged in temporary or informal 
employment is especially high. In Mexico for example, the poverty rate is just under 50 per 
cent when the household head is not permanently employed (compared to around 25 per 
cent when the household head is permanently employed) (ILO 2015:48). 
The persistence of informality is thus seen to be harmful for economic and social 
development. In particular, it hinders labour market development. Where work is informal 
there are insufficient quality jobs being created that are accessible to those who need them 
(Jutting and de Laiglesia 2009:19, Kalleberg 2013). This is important because improved job 
quality can play a critical role in promoting and achieving better development outcomes. 
Higher wages can stimulate higher overall demand. Improved job skills can contribute to 
the development of more technologically advanced forms of work. In well-functioning 
labour markets, all of this, in turn, can play a positive role in the process of industrial 
upgrading, which is critical to development (Lall 2004). Instability and insecurity are 
pervasive in the informal economy (White 1999). High labour turnover in enterprises may 
operate as a disincentive for training and investment and thus further inhibit the economic 
and social development of both the enterprise and the individual worker (White 1999). As 
all the case studies in this dissertation testify, large informal economies hinder the shift to 
more profitable, higher value added and higher technology-based economic activity across 
economies. 
Linked to this low job quality, workers in the informal economy are more frequently 
exposed to workplace hazards and suffer more work-related injuries and illnesses than 
employees in larger workplaces (Lamm and Walters 2004). Informal work tends to take 
place in small or micro enterprises where compliance with occupational health and safety 
regulations is often very limited (Scott 1998). 
Likewise, union density and collective bargaining coverage are typically very limited in 
informal economies (Biagi 1995). Where the deliberative aspects of labour law are not 
available to citizens, this lowers the likelihood that existing standards will be enforced. It 
also reduces the "industrial franchise" of citizens since these are the crucial institutions for 
influence of this type. Citizens have less say over how they conduct their work, under what 
conditions and hours and so forth, since union voice and collective bargaining are generally 
the only strong avenues available for shaping working life. Human development is 
impoverished by the lack of access to industrial relations institutions. Since these 
institutions often act as bridges to other democratic institutions, this diminishes the overall 
franchise of these workers. 
Informal work is associated with various other forms of structural discrimination and 
exploitation. Workers in the informal economy typically experience discrimination in the 
nature of their working conditions; women workers in particular are over-represented in 
informal work (around three-quarters of informal workers are women), and therefore 
suffer both direct and indirect discrimination in the level of their working conditions (Chen 
and United Nations Development Fund for Women. 2005). In most countries for which data 
disaggregated by sex are available, the share of women in informal employment in non-
agricultural activities outnumbers that of men. In sub-Saharan Africa, 74 per cent of 
women's employment (non-agricultural) is informal, in contrast with 61 per cent for men; 
in Latin America and the Caribbean the figures are 54 and 48 per cent; in South Asia, 83 and 
82 per cent; and in urban China, 36 and 30 per cent (International Labour Organization and 
WEIGO 2002, International Labour Organization and WEIGO 2012). This data has several 
features, outlined by Chen (Chen). First, the informal sector is the main source of work for 
women in most developing countries. The majority of economically active women in 
developing countries are engaged in the informal sector. In some countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, virtually all of the female non-agricultural labour force is in the informal sector. For 
example, in India and in Indonesia, the informal sector accounts for nine out of every ten 
women working outside agriculture. In five Latin American and four East Asian countries, 
for which data are available, more than half of the female non-agricultural workforce is in 
the informal sector. Second, the informal sector is a larger source of employment for 
women than for men. The proportion of women workers in the informal sector exceeds that 
of men in most countries. Third, women's share of the total informal workforce outside of 
agriculture is higher than men's share in nine out of twenty-one developing countries for 
which data are available (Chen 2001). A final, and important dimension of the gendered 
nature of informal work, is that women are more likely to be engaged in work from their 
homes (Chen estimates that over 85 per cent of home-based workers in most countries are 
women (Chen; 76)) and in industrial subcontracting chains as outworkers. These factors 
exacerbate their powerlessness and their lack of visibility in statistics and to regulators. 
Most forced labour likely occurs in informal economies (International Labour Office 2005). 
Often children are engaged in forms of work that are linked to the informal economy, 
including in agriculture, mining, fishing and manufacturing (International Labour Office 
2005). 
Social security benefits apply only to formal wage workers in most countries. Although legal 
provisions for informal wage workers exist in some countries, workers rarely access them. 
In Latin America, for example, only 20 per cent of the workers are effectively covered 
(Torres 2009). This leaves most informal economy workers without any form of social 
protection, which includes mechanisms for health, life, disability and unemployment 
insurance, as well as pension schemes, childcare and maternity leave (White 1999). This has 
two consequences. First, informal workers suffer vulnerability to fluctuations in the 
availability of work. They need to smooth income fluctuations in other ways, including social 
networks, taking loans (often at very high interest rates), and so on. Second, they are more 
likely to become trapped in low wage, low condition work, since there is no alternative. 
Informality, then, can hamper the development of what Sen and Nussbaum call human 
capabilities. Human capabilities are directly relevant to people's well-being and freedom, 
while indirectly they have the capacity to influence social change and economic production 
(Sen 1999: 296). In the context of labour, "capacity" refers to the skills, knowledge and 
values of people (workers), and how, in using these skills, they can take advantage of the 
labour market and other "opportunities" available to them. In this sense "labour market 
opportunities" means the alternatives available to people to use their capacities (their skills. 
knowledge and attitudes) as a way in which to gain financial or personal reward (Tipples 
2004). 
Informality and inequality are intertwined. For some time, many economists working in 
the development field believed that poverty mattered but inequality did not: why would 
it matter if the rich are getting richer as long as the poor are getting less poor? Today, 
there is a greater recognition that inequality also presents a significant problem 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2011). This recognition 
comes at a time when although the world is globally richer than ever before, more than 
1.2 billion people still live in extreme poverty. The richest 1 per cent of the world 
population owns about 40 per cent of the world's assets, while the bottom half owns no 
more than 1 per cent (United Nations Development Programme 2013:1). On average — 
and taking into account population size — with-in country income inequality increased 
by 11 per cent in developing countries between 1990 and 2010 (United Nations 
Development Programme 2013: 3). Economic modelling conducted by Sen and others 
indicates that whilst income inequality at very low levels may accelerate growth, income 
inequality at a high level diminishes growth (Sen 1992). 
Inequality has a number of negative social consequences. One of these relates to the 
quality and control of institutions. There is strong empirical support for the proposition 
that inequality impacts negatively upon the quality of institutions (Chong and Gradstein 
2004). Institutions (including labour market regulation) assist in overcoming collective 
action problems. This entails generating the expectation that repeat actions will result in 
the same or similar outcomes distrusted because they are perceived to be predatory or 
are believed only to operate in the Interests of elite groups in society. When this is the 
case, people tend to avoid formal institutions and instead rely upon informal networks. 
For this reason, Bardhan reached the bold conclusion that the 'history of 
underdevelopment suggests that a major stumbling block to beneficial institutional 
change in many poor countries lies in the distributive conflicts and asymmetries in 
bargaining power among social groups' (Bardhan 2005: 512). A high degree of economic 
and political inequality enables elites to resist efforts to reform inefficient institutions 
and to capture rents from existing institutions, contributing to a vicious circle of 
institutional underdevelopment. 
When institutions are performing poorly, informality is more likely. In the field of labour 
regulation, this vicious cycle of institutional underdevelopment is readily apparent. 
When inequality is high, and the w/ages of the majority of workers are low, rich 
companies can more easily pay off labour inspectors. The cost to the company may be 
low relative to net profit. Such is the case in Cambodia, discussed in Chapter 7, where 
labour inspectors frequently do not make it past the administrative office of factories, 
and companies even pay the fuel costs for the labour inspector's visit. This regulatory 
failure in turn contributes to inequality, with breaches of core labour standards 
remaining unchecked in larger companies and labour inspectors unable to visit smaller 
enterprises due to fuel costs and the lack of bribes to augment low wages. 
Although we can say with a great deal of confidence that informal work is most often 
empirically associated with poverty and low productivity, this is not always the case. '[N]ot 
all informal workers are poor, unproductive workers, without access to more productive 
forms of employment' (Jutting and de Laiglesia 2009: 19). This has led some who study 
informality to argue that there are different tiers of informal work (Maloney 2004). 
1.3.2 The Baffling Persistence of Informal Work 
One of the reasons that many countries are struggling to put in place sound regulatory 
responses to informal work is because it is often thought of as an anomaly. For a long time, 
economic theories predicted that as economic development occurred and productivity 
increased, the ratio of informal to formal work within a given economy would shrink. The 
informal economy was viewed as a temporary phenomenon delinked from modern 
societies and economies, and its precise definition remained vague. Informal workers' lives 
were rendered invisible as they were not counted in national labour-force surveys, analysed 
in labour relations scholarship, or considered in state labour policies (Agarwala 2009). 
Thanks to developments in statistical definitions and methods of collection, informality is 
becoming more visible. However, Chen, for example, argues that the informal sector is even 
larger than official statistics suggest. Her argument is based on the fact that much of 
women's paid work, not just their unpaid housework, is not counted in official statistics. If 
the magnitude of women's invisible paid work, particularly home-based remunerative 
work, were to be fully counted, both the share of women and the share of informal workers 
in the work force would increase (Chen 2001: 72). 
1.3.3 Impact of the 2007-12 financial crisis 
As with other financial crises, the current financial crisis has bloated informal economies 
around the world. The ILO estimates that the number of "own-account workers" and unpaid 
family workers increased by 136 million since 2000, with 1.52 billion vulnerable workers of 
this type in 2011 (International Labour Office 2012: 42). The increase in informal work has 
been worst in Sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for nearly 70 per cent of all employment 
growth in the region since 2007 (International Labour Office 2012: 42). 
Evidence from previous financial crises illustrates that, once individuals move to the 
informal sector, it is difficult for them to return to regular employment (Williams and 
Windebank 1998). In some countries, informality returns to pre-crisis levels after two to 
three years, while others experience increased informality levels persisting even after five 
years (Torres 2009). 
Table 2: Increases in Informality following Financial Crises 

















Ecuador, 1998 57.6 0.3 2 years Urban 
Uruguay, 2002 40.8 0.6 2 years National 
Venezuela, 2002 56.3 1.9 2 years National 
Paraguay, 2002 75.1 1.2 3 years National 














Note: Data are sorted in ascending order according to the increase in the 
incidence of informality to peak. 
Source: MLS based on Bacchetta, Ernst and Bustamante, 2009 (Torres 2009). 
1.4 Global search for policy responses 
To answer the question posed in the heading to this section, informality matters because it 
is linked with poverty, inequality, low job quality, harmful health and safety conditions and 
systemic forms of discrimination and exploitation. It also matters because it shows no signs 
of disappearing in many countries around the world. To the contrary, informal economies 
have expanded in many countries in response to structural economic change and the 
financial crises that have rocl<ed the economic South repeatedly over the last few decades, 
and have more recently shaken the economic North. We need to know why this is the case 
in order to do something about it. Flowing from this, we need better regulatory responses 
so as to improve the working and living standards of those who work under informal 
conditions, improve tax revenue for countries in which informal work is high and increase 
productivity. 
Responding to this need, the International Labour Organisation is currently treating 
informality as policy priority, searching for new ways to address it. Reflecting the 
importance of the issue, it has dedicated two years towards this task at the highest 
governing level of the organisation. At its 317th Session (March 2013) the Governing Body 
decided to place a standard-setting item on the agenda of the 103rd Session (June 2014) of 
the Conference on facilitating transitions from the informal to the formal economy, under 
the double discussion procedure, which means that this item was dealt with in the 2014 
session and will again be addressed at the 104th Session of the Conference (2015). The 
findings of this dissertation have the potential to contribute to this process. 
1.4.1 What causes informality? The dynamics of informalisation 
It was expected that informal economies would shrink as economies around the world 
developed. Instead though, in the latter part of the 20"^ century, informal economies 
expanded in many advanced and less developed economies. Our understanding of these 
workers' social and political lives and their work conditions is thin, because relevant 
disciplines including labour law, industrial relations, economic sociology, and economics 
have allowed studies of Informal work to remain in the margins. Despite burgeoning interest 
in the topic, for example, labour law scholars have focused nearly exclusively on formal 
work. As Agarwala observes (Agarwala 2009): 
As a result, insights have been lost as to why the informal labour force continues to 
expand despite urban and industrial modernization; how the informal economy is 
connected to other market structures and to the state; and how these connections 
affect informal workers' unique collective action strategies, networks, and class 
identities. 
Without these insights about the nature of informal work and its determinants, it is difficult 
to design effective regulatory strategies. This study is concerned with closing this gap and 
developing regulatory response that increases citizens' democratic franchise and contribute 
to enhanced well-being and human development. 
There are numerous, sometimes contradictory and contested reasons, given for the 
persistence of informality in disparate literature w/hich are rarely brought together. The 
traditional economic understanding of the cause of informality is provided by the dualist 
model of the economy which understands a "modern" and a "traditional" sector to sit side 
by side. As the modern, capitalist sector develops, it is expected that rural workers will be 
drawn to the city in search of higher paying work. Until the capitalist sector grows 
sufficiently to absorb the traditional sector, a large pool of workers exists in urban areas 
who generate income as self-employed workers providing low skilled services (Lewis 1955). 
Various theories have been offered for why absorption has not occurred to the extent 
expected, including premature exposure to global markets due to ill-timed or badly 
managed liberalisation leading to labour shedding into low productivity areas of the 
economy (McMillan and Rodrik 2011). 
Globalisation is blamed as the culprit in other ways, also. In the search for flexibility and 
lowered costs so as to increase competitiveness, large capitalist firms rely on informal 
labour as a cheap source of labour. Contrary to the dualist conception, informal labour is 
not only to be found in "traditional" low skilled, low productivity agricultural and service 
segments of the labour force. Skilled, high productivity workers linked with international 
supply chains are also working in unregulated conditions (Portes, Castells et al. 1989). 
The finger is also pointed at regulatory and institutional causes for the persistence of 
informal work. For neo-classical economists, the problem is overly restrictive and 
burdensome laws which micro-entrepreneurs evade so as to increase their profitability. For 
other institutionalists such as de Soto (de Soto 2001) and North (North 1993), the problem 
is not rigidity, but the lack of enforceability of rights including contractual and property 
rights. Sometimes this is because good institutions do not exist. At other times, it is because 
the institutions are ill-suited to their environments or untrustworthy. People need to have 
clear and shared understandings of what is required of an entity if that entity is to be 
considered trustworthy (Braithwaite 2004). When institutions are rife with corruption or 
bias, or rules are applied unevenly, people have no reason to trust them. Lack of trust in 
institutions undercuts collective action and collective coordination. A less frequently 
examined consequence of this institutional failure is the corrosive impact on hope. 
Coordination and hope are closely related (Braithw/aite 2004). 
Others focus on governance failures of a different nature. The limited scope of the 
employment relationship eschews the regulation of "non-standard" or "atypical workers" 
(Vosko 2002, ILO 2005, Vosko 2009); and the standards regulating work are sometimes 
inappropriate. Governance deficits borne from global reach and power of business 
outstripping the reach and power of states leading to an inability to enforce existing laws 
(Fenwick, Howe et al. 2008) are also a concern. 
1.5 Approach to studying informality adopted in this dissertation 
Those engaged in debates regarding the causes of informality tend to champion one 
generalised cause over others. De Soto, for example, focussed on legal and institutional 
barriers to starting up formal business. There is no reason, however, why barriers to 
establishing formal businesses operate their own as the basis of informality. In the case of 
Limona described at the beginning of this introduction, for instance, labour shedding 
related to the transition to capitalism in Bulgaria first pushed her into informal work. The 
high costs of registering a business then stopped her from establishing herself as a formal 
micro-entrepreneur. In any case, she is mainly conducting dependent work in global supply 
chains. Further, her identification as a worker, after spending most of her working life as an 
employee of a state owned enterprises, hinders her from imagining herself in these terms. 
She still has the expectation that the state ought to be responsible for economic security, 
and is struggling to find her place in material and ideational terms in the new economic and 
social system. 
To champion one cause over others tends only to operate to confirm an existing policy 
agenda. The approach which drives this dissertation is based on the understanding that 
mapping the causes of informality should be a matter of empirical study. Although 
generalized causes may be found that are common across countries, these will likely 
interact with specific dynamics in individual countries and regions that lead to gaps in 
regulatory reach. It is this interaction of factors that deserves attention if we are to begin 
remedying the social harms associated with informality. 
In sum, the approach in this dissertation is driven by three assumptions: 
1. The process of work moving into unregistered workplaces, hidden from the 
purview of the law is dynamic with multiple causes at different levels - global, 
regional, national, local and individual. 
2. We need to understand the complex dynamics and causes of informality in order 
to design effective and responsive regulation. 
3. Because the workers are especially vulnerable and the causes are of different 
realms - economic, political, legal and psychological - the regulatory techniques 
should also be multiple and dynamic, working at different levels. 
Identifying, interacting and compounding causes of informality is no simple task. Informal 
economic activity is difficult to observe, study, define, and measure. This is because it is 
outside formal registration processes and subject to permanent adaptation to changing 
circumstances. As workers desire to preserve their informal sources of income they adapt 
constantly to changes in regulations and degrees of enforcement and find new ways to 
survive. These factors imply the need to deploy particular field work techniques to gain 
access to, and study these workers. 
The dissertation employs a historical institutionalist approach to studying changes in the 
context in which labour regulation has occurred over time, reform of labour regulation and 
the proliferation of forms of work. Historical institutionalism is more an approach than a 
method or discipline, implying that different methods should be used to study changes in 
institutions and their effect. The dynamic nature of informality, together with its mixed 
causes, indicates that different disciplines and methods will provide important, distinct 
insights to its causes and possible pathways out. This dissertation thus takes a multi-
disciplinary approach to the study of the causes of informality, drawing on different 
literatures and employing various methodologies for empirical work. Stories of political and 
institutional change are assembled to examine the macro causes of informality in each case. 
Ethnographic methods are used to study worker's experience of regulation and informality. 
The end purpose of the study is to put together a "responsive" regulatory approach to 
informality. The use of "responsive" regulatory approaches is seen to be of benefit where 
traditional "command and control" regulatory practices are failing. Proponents of 
responsive regulation argue that it is worth experimenting with different methods of 
standard setting and enforcement given the negative consequences of non-compliance 
with the law in relation to the enjoyment of human rights, well-being and human 
development. 
The key argument (or "emergent theory") of this dissertation is that when new regulatory 
techniques are being considered, we first need to ask what the regulation is responding to. 
How do we understand the social relations and dynamics that require shaping? 
In broad terms, the dissertation addresses the following questions: 
1. What is the same and different about the dynamics of informalisation in different 
countries/settings? 
2. What regulatory strategies have been implemented to address informality in each 
case study? 
3. What has worked/has not worked? How much have the regulations addressed the 
dynamics identified? 
4. What does this tell us about regulatory strategies for formalization? 
5. How can we provide local pathways out of informal work and global strategies for 
addressing the causes of informality? 
1.5.1 Structure of the dissertation 
The subsequent two chapters of this dissertation expand on the approach adopted in this 
dissertation. Chapter 2 discusses on the literature that most informs the framework of 
analysis, including regulatory theory and global supply chain governance. Chapter 3 
develops the methodology and provides details of the field work conducted. 
The main body of the dissertation discusses four case studies of informal work and the 
regulatory innovations that have been developed in each country to reduce informality: 
Chapter 4 - Transport workers in Maharashtra, India, Chapter 5 - Home-based workers in 
the textile industry in Australia, Chapter 6 - Light industry workers in Bulgaria, and Chapter 
7 - Garment workers in Cambodia. Each case study is addressed In two stages. The dynamic 
causes of informality are first explored. 
The method applied is outlined further in the methodology section, but some explanation 
is warranted in this introductory chapter. 
The first part of each case study builds a story about why and how informal economies grew 
in the individual case. The primary approach is political economic. Political economy might 
be defined as an interdisciplinary study drawing upon economics, law and political science 
to explain how political institutions, the political environment, and the economic system 
influence each other. Economic and political narrative histories are delved into to explain 
why economies and systems of governance and regulation have evolved in particular ways 
(Abbott 2001). What were the contextual features that were relevant to the development 
of informality? What causal processes - either social or economic - may have contributed to 
the growth of the informal economy? This approach seeks to build a hermeneutic 
understanding of informality and actors interaction with systems of governance: why did 
the economy develop in this way? Why do actors behave as they do in relation to systems 
of governance? It also seeks a causal explanation: what social, economic and political 
processes contributed to informality? 
Each chapter moves from describing national development to narratives of individual and 
community experiences of informality. Political economy approaches are useful for 
constructing the "larger picture", and for situating individual experience, but not for telling 
individual stories and exploring individual's experience of work, business and regulation. 
For this, ethnographic methods are employed. Where possible, interviews and non-
participant observations are drawn on here. Where such field work was not possible, or 
where other's empirical research can be drawn on, this is used to augment findings. 
The second part of each case study chapter describes a regulatory development that has 
emerged to address informality. The chapters not only describe the functional features of 
these developments, they also seek to understand how such developments were possible. 
The inquiry is driven by a desire to understand how purposeful institutional change occurs. 
Each chapter ends with an assessment of the regulatory innovation in light of the 
understanding of the dynamics of informalisation described in the first part of the chapter. 
The aim here is to assess whether and to what extent the innovation is responding to and 
addressing these dynamics. 
The final two substantive chapters draw lessons and propose short term and long term 
regulatory solutions to informality. Chapter 8 contrasts the responses in the case studies, 
drawing out strategies that can be deployed in the immediate term by those seeking reduce 
informality. It compares the way that institutional change has been achieved in each case. 
Chapter 9 canvasses a longer term vision for regulatory reform. The chapter puts forward 
three interrelated regulatory pathways out of informality. First, the promotion of 
International Living Wages through an international Instrument such as an ILO Convention 
or Human Rights Council treaty which would also establish an International Living Wage 
disputes mechanism for enforcement of these minima; second, the setting up of National 
Supply Chain Tribunals empowered to hear disputes concerning non-payment of living 
wages due to supply chain dynamics, and to hold parties in the supply chain responsible for 
non-payment; third, the fostering of local pathways out of informality. It hoped that this 
study will contribute to the search for new pathways out of informality and towards high 
labour conditions for vulnerable workers. 
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the conceptual framework for this dissertation. 
Informal work Is understood in this study as a regulatory problem or conundrum. The end 
purpose of the study is to design a "responsive" regulatory approach to informality. The 
case studies which make up the body of this study seek to understand the way that global 
and regional economic and governance dynamics interact with existing labour regulations 
to produce informality in each country studied and in relation to specific populations of 
informal workers researched. These case studies then provide the building blocks for the 
novel approaches to regulating work canvassed at the end of the study. This chapter 
explores the insights and concepts from the regulatory literature in order reflect upon why 
labour regulation is failing so many workers around the world, leaving them stranded in a 
state of informality. Having established the problem, it then draws on various literatures to 
set up the conceptual framework for examining how institutional change could occur so 
that a more responsive labour regulation could be generated. The labour law and industrial 
relations literature, where most writing about informality occurs, tends not to provide an 
account of how change occurs. It also tends to be nationally focussed. The conceptual 
framework outlined in this chapter seeks to stop these gaps by drawing on other literatures. 
Labour laws, labour relations institutions and labour market regulations, are the core 
institutions governing labour markets. (Labour market regulation is generally taken to 
include not only labour laws, but also pension (also known as superannuation) laws, social 
security laws and other associated regulations that impact on the rights and conditions of 
workers (Deakin and Wilkinson 2005).) Collectively, these are referred to as "labour 
regulation" in this dissertation. A myriad of other institutions also impact and shape the 
social structure and nature of labour markets, but it is safe to say that these are the core 
institutions deployed to regulate work. It is an assumption underlying this study that state-
based labour regulation is failing because it is not responsive to the problem it seeks to 
address and shape. The literatures suggests, first, it is not responding the various/orms of 
ivorfcthat have proliferated in recent years. Labour regulation tends to assume that workers 
are employees working as professionals or in the traditional jobs of the proletariat. 
However, the explosion different types of self-employed workers and precarious workers 
of various ilk has placed great strain on the definition of employee, with most forms of work 
sitting outside it. Second, it is not responding to advances in the structures of productior) 
and relations of distribution that work occurs within. Labour regulation is inclined to assume 
that work occurs within integrated enterprises. Today, work frequently occurs within 
complex supply chains and other economic arrangements. Third, it is not employing tools 
that are appropriate to or effective in regulating new working relationships. Labour 
regulation has a tendency to issue fines or issue orders that assume an ongoing and stable 
working relationship between employees and employers. So for example, a standard 
remedy in employment law is either to reinstate a worker or require payment in lieu of 
reinstatement. Where working relations are not ongoing or more unstable, such tools are 
inappropriate. Further, penalties which are standard in labour regulation, including the 
payment of fines, appear not to be effective in changing behaviour. This is because, fourthly, 
and relatedly, it is not creating incentives for compliance which overcome the 
countervailing disincentives which arise from private and informal regulation, culture and 
informal institutions. 
These four categories of unresponsiveness will be considered in greater detail following a 
brief outline of insights from the regulatory literature which helps to elucidate the concept 
of responsiveness. First, though, the chapter provides a brief description of regulation and 
why it matters. 
2.2 What Is regulation? 
A useful definition of regulation is 'the intentional activity of attempting to control, order 
or influence the behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes' (Black 
2002). This definition recognizes that the state is not the only actor with power to achieve 
policy goals. It also recognises that regulation is a process involving the regulator-the State 
or other regulatory body - and the regulated community. 
There is a great deal of overlap between the literature that deals with governance and that 
concerned with regulation, so what is the difference between the two? "Governance" is 
understood to be a broader term than "regulation". Braithwaite, Coglianese and Levi-Faur 
define the two terms in relation to each other as follows (Braithwaite, Coglianese et al. 
2007:3); 
Governments and governance are about providing, distributing and regulating. 
Regulation can be conceived of as that large subset of governance that is about the 
steering of the flow of events and behavior, as opposed to providing and 
distributing. Of course, when regulators regulate, they often steer the providing and 
distributing that regulated actors undertake as well. 
Governance and regulation can be local in scope, national, regional, international and 
global. 
Why does regulation matter, and therefore, why is the study of regulation important? As 
Braithwaite, Coglianese and Levi-Faur see it, put simply, regulation matters because it 
affects peoples' lives (Braithwaite, Coglianese et al. 2007: 4): 
Bad regulation, after all, can do terrible damage to people. Good regulation can 
control problems that might otherwise lead to bankruptcy and war, and can 
emancipate the lives of ordinary people. Mediocre, unimaginative regulation that 
occupies the space between good and bad regulation leads to results that are 
correspondingly between the extremes of good and bad. 
Using a broad concept of "regulation" opens up the space for states and other bodies 
concerned with shaping the behaviour of other parties to design new regulatory strategies. 
They may be hybrid or a form of co-regulation: state regulation can work alongside - and in 
some cases coordinate - other forms of regulation, including some types of private and self-
regulation. This form of regulation is also known in some literatures as New Governance 
(Abbott and Sindal 2006). They may be multi-faceted, using a number of different strategies 
simultaneously or sequentially as in the case of networked regulation; and they may be 
indirect (Black 2002: 8-9). 
A broad definition of regulation also allows to us to take into account the impact of informal 
norms on formal rules. All economic behaviour, whether governed by formal rules or not, 
is regulated in some way. Informal economic activity may not be in compliance with the 
law, but it is still a deeply embedded phenomena (Granovetter 1985, Jessop 2001). Workers 
are socially and political embedded in the meaning they attach to their labour, the social 
networks that determine their life chances and their collective action efforts (Agarwala 
2009). Structures, networks, and political institutions intertwine informal workers with the 
formal economy, society and the state. 
2.3 What does it mean to say that regulation is responsive? 
Based on these insights about what regulation is, what does it mean to say that regulation 
is responsive? Responsive regulation is a normative proposal which has different elements. 
In any given regulatory ecosystem, regulation may need to respond to various factors or 
features of the regulatory target and their environment. This section briefly describes what 
things the literature proposes regulation should be responsive to. 
First, literature suggests that regulation should be responsive to the conduct of those they 
seek to regulate (Braithwaite 2006: 886). Baldwin and Black propose that this entails being 
sensitive to the operating and cognitive frameworks of the target, and to their attitudinal 
settings (Baldwin and Black 2008:94). "Micro" - level theories of regulatory compliance and 
institutional design emphasise the importance of going beyond formal-legal aspects of 
institutional design to encompass concern for "living institutions" and behavioural practices 
(Olsen 1997, Reichman 1998). This involves developing an understanding of and responding 
to informal norms and regulations 
Second, Selnick suggests, regulation should be sensitive to the broader institutional 
environment and to changes in dynamics in which the regulation is embedded (Selznick 
1994: 336). Likewise, Baldwin and Black propose that (Baldwin and Black 2008': 94): 
Regulation is really responsive when it knows its regulates and its institutional 
environments, when it is capable of deploying different and new regulatory logics 
coherently, when it is performance sensitive and when it grasps what its shifting 
challenges are. 
This entails developing a detailed understanding of the institutional environment and 
performance of the regulatory regime. Regulations sit within larger institutional complexes. 
Institutional complexes are local, national, regional and international in scope. 
Thirdly, regulation should be sensitive to existing power dynom/cs. On this view, compliance 
depends not only on rules or incentives specified in formal mechanisms, but also on the 
powers and motivations of social actors who may follow or resist them (Snider 2009). Some 
scholars emphasise processes of normative diffusion (or in many cases normative 
contestation or co-option) as important determinants of sustained changes in regulatory 
target's compliance or resistance to regulatory processes (Peerenboom, Petersen et al. 
2006). 
Finally, responsiveness suggests flexibility and agility in designing enforcement approaches. 
The responsive regulation approach pervades all the different tasks of regulatory activity: 
detecting undesirable or non-compliant behaviour; developing tools and strategies for 
responding to that behaviour; enforcing those tools and strategies; assessing their success 
or failure; and modifying them accordingly. A regulator must be prepared to use a wide 
range of techniques to achieve its policy goals, and also to constantly review and assess the 
effectiveness of its policy approach. Ayers and Braithwaite propose that regulators enforce 
in the first instance by compliance strategies, such as persuasion and education, but apply 
more punitive deterrent responses - escalating up a pyramid of such responses - when the 
regulated firm fails to behave as desired. This model of enforcement was depicted by Ayers 
and Braithwaite as a regulatory pyramid (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), seen in Figure 1 as a 
ratcheting up from self-regulation to non-discretionary punishment. 
F i g u r e 1 - P y r a m i d of E n f o r c e m e n t S t r a t e g i e s 
Command Regulation with 
discretionary punishment 
Z Enforced Self-Regulation z Self-Regulation 
Different combinations of instruments and actors may have the greatest chance of building 
on the strengths of individual mechanisms, while compensating for their weaknesses. The 
task is to work out which are the best combinations (Cunningham and Grabosky 1998: 499). 
Based on these views from the literature, the case study chapters of this dissertation are 
framed around an assessment of the specific ways that old regulatory practices failed to 
respond to the types of dynamics outlined here, and the ways that the regulatory 
innovations studied find new ways to build on the strength of existing regulatory institutions 
and compensate for their weaknesses by bringing in new instruments and actors. 
2.4 The failure of state-based labour regulation to respond to changes in the nature 
of work 
Incorporating these insights from regulatory theory, we return now tothe various ways that 
the state-based regulation has failed to respond to realities and changes in the nature of 
work, with the result that a great deal of work occurs informally, outside legal regulation. 
Capitalism (understood as a distinctive institutional system of production, exchange and 
accumulation) is constantly being reinvented. Businesses respond to competitive pressures 
with technological advances by reorganising the way that production occurs, developing 
new patterns of accumulation and wealth generation. Nation-states vie for competitive 
advantage by reforming the rules and institutions governing markets in various domains, 
including international trade and investment. Such rules and institutions operate at the 
national, regional and transnational level. Those with power attempt to ensure that these 
rules enhance competitive advantage. Those without the power to set these rules adapt. 
Businesses, in turn, respond to these new arrangements by making further changes to the 
way that production is organised. Workers find new niches and novel ways to survive. 
Additional forms of work are devised. And so, the world of work is in constant flux. 
While capitalism may make important contributions to the realisation of social justice 
norms via its generation of economic growth, the unequalising tendencies that are 
produced through processes of accumulation and wealth generation have - throughout the 
history of capitalism - given rise to the demand for a range of regulatory and redistributive 
interventions to constrain and compensate for the more negative consequences of the 
system (O'Riain 2000). Such embedding of the capitalist market economy in both formal 
and informal regulatory norms is claimed to contribute both to stability and legitimacy 
within the capitalist system - both enhancing its efficiency and countering its more 
exploitative and commodifying tendencies (Polanyi 1944, Jessop 2001). 
The past few decades have seen particularly swift and far reaching economic reform, 
resulting in massive changes in the way work occurs. Observers point to a period of 
"neoliberalism", regarded as extending roughly from the early 1970s to the present - or at 
least until its stride was interrupted by the still unfolding "global financial crisis" of 
2008/2009 (see (Ruggie 1982, Krippner, Granovetter et al. 2004, Wade 2008).^ One feature 
of this disembedding of markets is the failure of labour regulations to be reformulated in 
response to economic and social change. Although it has the potential to be an adaptive 
' Some accounts, including many rooted in the French regulation school of political economy, add 
to this distinction a related one between "Fordism" and "post-Fordism": Harvey, D. (2006). The 
Spaces of Global Capitalism. London, New York, Verso. 
model of regulation (Deakin and Wilkinson 2005), labour regulation displays a certain 
resistance to change which makes the innovations examined in the case study chapters 
remarkable. 
A common characteristic shared by labour regulations in almost all countries of the world 
is the link to the employment relationship (International Labour Organization 2003, 
International labour Organization 2005, Engels 2010). Most labour rights and protections 
flow from being employed, which assumes a stable employer (Davies and Freedland 2005). 
It is well established that the labour law of the 20"^ century was based on the assumption 
that the subject of regulation was a full time, male breadwinner who worked in a Fordist, 
vertically integrated enterprise (Davies 2004: 94). 
There have been some recent expansions to labour law so as to regulate "atypical" work. 
For instance, labour law in Australia recognizes part time work, and a statutory "casual" 
category was added with much controversy in the 1980s. However, these categories still 
assume that work is paid and that there is supervising employer. A consequence of this is 
that a great deal of work - probably the vast majority - sits outside the reach of labour 
regulation (Supiot, Meadows et al. 2001). For the majority of workers around the world -
especially those in the Economic South - work is not given out by a continuous employer. 
Feminised, domestic, caring work is perhaps furthest from the reach of labour regulation 
(Ramirez-Machado 2003). Yet, broader reform has been slow coming. 
There are various reasons for this institutional inertia that have been explained thoroughly 
elsewhere (Davidov 2006, Tekle 2010). Labour regulation is embedded within a larger set 
of institutions. Changing one set of rules can and often does have implications for others; 
therefore, there is likely to be significant resistance to change on the part of those who are 
advantaged in the broader context (Steinmo 2008). Institutions can become locked in 
because people invest in learning the rules. Changing rules can invoke significant up-front 
costs and be resisted by those who do not want to bear any new costs. Labour laws' link to 
the employment relationship enjoys strong normative legitimacy thanks in part to the 
United Nation's International Labour Organization. Although, more recently, the ILO has 
emphasised "work" not "employment" rights and protections, many of the earlier 
conventions were based on the employment relationship. Despite the small size of their 
industrial sectors, many newly independent countries adopted traditional labour laws or 
expanded the labour laws inherited from colonial regimes, because of the seeming 
universality of the ILO's conventions (Tekle 2010). 
The defensive posture that labour unions have been forced into during the neo-liberal 
period has often hindered them from demanding that laws reflect new working relations, 
despite the fact that this undercuts their membership base. In the Economic North, for 
instance, unions have bled members, as workers move from stable employment conditions 
to contract-based relations or become freelance. Yet at the same time, labour market 
institutions lend labour unions legitimacy as bargaining agents and representatives of 
labour, and give them access to resources. The centrality of unions to the institution 
provides them with status, and this reduces their desire to act as agents of institutional 
change (Podolny 1993). In any case, changing the rules can have long-term effects that may 
be difficult or impossible to predict (Steinmo 2008). For existing unions, continuing with the 
current rules - even if they are not necessarily optimal - may be safer than encouraging a 
wholesale reform of labour regulation in a political context which is hostile to market 
intervention of this type. For this, and various other reasons, labour market regulation 
remains largely wedded to the employment contract in most countries. 
The institutional stickiness of traditional forms of labour regulation at a time of sweeping 
economic and social changes has left labour regulation unresponsive in a number of 
respects. This section outlines the broad observations in the literature. The case studies 
seek to build on this literature with more specific observations of the dynamics in each 
country researched. 
2.4.1 Failure to respond to the proliferation of forms of work 
Work is organised in a myriad of different ways and the structural standing of the individuals 
and collectives conducting the work varies greatly. There is a radical global heterogeneity 
in the characteristics of labour relations (Munck 2013: 756). Some forms of work are related 
to particular traditions and social relations in specific localities and countries, whereas 
others forms of work are related to more recent trends in economic and social change, and 
are found across many countries. A major challenge for the design of labour regulation is 
how it can regulate diverse forms of work. A related question is whether the same 
obligations, rights and protections should be afforded to all workers, or whether 
differentiated obligations, rights and protections should be offered depending on the 
nature of the work, the social relations or the risks assumed by the worker compared with 
those giving them the work or supervising them. 
There are various schemas for understanding or labelling different types of workers. One 
particularly helpful one is that offered by Guy Standing. Standing's schema is broad and 
does not take into account local or specific social relations. However, it helps us to think 
about the diverse nature of work and the differentiated vulnerabilities and risks associated 
with different forms of work. Labour law tends to assume that workers are employees who 
are either "salariat" (as Standing refers to them as), or proletariat (Standing 2011). Salariat 
are professionals with strong employment security who enjoy labour rights. Along-side the 
salariat, in terms of having similar incomes, is a growing group of self-employed consultants 
and entrepreneurial project-oriented types (referred to by Standing as "proficians"), who 
tend to be mainly outside labour regulation. Below this is the old proletariat, who standard 
labour regulation is designed to protect. The great social pacts of the mid-20"' century were 
developed with this class in mind. "Proleterianization" meant being disciplined and 
habituated to stable labour. Instead of growing in number, as was expected with 
widespread Industrialisation, this class of workers is shrinking in most countries of the 
world, in inverse proportion with the new "precarlat"." 
The "precariat" who are the main subject of this dissertation, have insecure labour, being 
in and out of jobs, without long-term employment contracts: 'the modal situation for the 
precariat may be described as precariatization, habituation to a life of unstable labour and 
unstable living' (Standing 2011: 969). Unlike the proletariat, the precariat do not yet have a 
stable occupation identity, being expected to be flexible in terms of type of labour. (Another 
way of conceptualising this is as an Increasing multiplicity of the proletariat (Hardt and Negri 
2011: 27).) They experience both employment insecurity and job insecurity, meaning that 
they both do not enjoy continuing work with a single person or business giving them work. 
" The term precarite was developed in the French socioeconomic literature around the changing 
patterns of work since the 1980s: Munck, R. (2013). "The Precariat: a view from the South." Third 
World Quarterly 34(5): 747-762. 
and they often have to change the types of work they conduct. The precariat have no 
control over time. They also have chronic income insecurity, experiencing volatile earnings. 
Because they do not attract social protections, they rely almost entirely on money income. 
"Precarity" has always been the norm in the global South (Munck 2013) and it has increased 
in the North in recent years. Standing's description of the precariat is apt for all four groups 
of workers examined in the case studies before the regulatory innovations had impact: 
immigrant home-based workers toiling in Australia's apparel industry, head-load workers in 
India, home-based workers in Bulgaria putting together different forms of light industry and 
agricultural work, and young female factory workers in Cambodia. Each of the groups of 
workers lived with employment and job insecurity. They did not know if they would have 
work the next week. Indian head load workers, for example, travelled around the cities in 
search of work at ports and markets. Australian and Bulgarian home-based workers did not 
know if they would need to work 16 hour days, or whether they would be without work. 
They had little control over their time. They relied solely on their earnings, and did not enjoy 
the benefits of welfare apparatuses. Their precariat status as workers meant that absolute 
flexibility was required of them. They had to arrange their lives entirely around whatever 
work opportunities came up. 
2.4.2 Failure to respond to new patterns of production and control 
A further reason that labour regulation is floundering is because it has failed to respond to 
new patterns of production and control, which in turn produce new social relations and 
forms of work. State capacity to regulate work around the world has been weakened by 
increased intricacy of post-Fordist processes of capitalist development - the shift from 
large-scale mass-production methods pioneered by Henry Ford towards the use of small 
flexible manufacturing units (Harvey 1990). Much writing about "disembedding" and state 
failure In the post-Fordlst phase has focussed on the challenges associated with regulating 
transnational business transactions and multinational corporations (MacDonald and 
Marshall 2010). Yet the case studies show that the complexity of arrangements within a 
single jurisdiction also makes regulation difficult because of the pluralisation of the actors 
involved In driving the relevant economic relationships and outcomes. 
A new arrangement thats has become increasingly common is the organisation of 
production through supply chains (also called value chains). Supply chains take many 
different forms: they involve assorted and often fluctuating numbers of parties, have 
diverse governance structures and span distinct geographical and political spaces. The 
structuring of supply chains in organisationally complex and pluralised ways can make it 
very difficult for state-based regulators to identify a clear locus of power and control, and 
thus to determine appropriate regulatory subjects and agents. Who should be held 
responsible for the poor conditions of workers, when so many parties are involved in 
passing work down the supply chain? Where production occurs in integrated supply chains, 
control is wielded in a diffuse, multipolar manner. This is a consequence of a number of 
characteristics of integrated supply chains: 
a. Spatial dispersion 
Lead firms in supply chains source components from geographically dispersed locations. 
Sometimes this dispersion is global in reach. At other times, as in the Australian case study 
of garment production studied, the dispersion is across suburban homes. 
b. Functional specialisation 
One reason for geographic dispersion is regional specialisation in production. Such 
specialisation occurs across nations and internationally. In the case of some of the triangular 
garment production studied in the Bulgaria case, for example, design and textile production 
occurs in Italy, cutting occurs in Greece and sewing occurs in Bulgaria. In relation to the 
production of iPhones, for example, Germany and Taiwan supply the advanced 
semiconductors, Korea and Japan supply the memory, Korea and Taiwan provide the display 
panels and circuitry, Europe provides the chipsets, and Africa and Asia supply the rare 
metals (Parella 2014: 759). Specialisation is often the result of national industrial policies 
(or lack thereof) or as businesses refine their competitive capacities (Boyd, Spekman et al. 
2007: 341). One of the consequences of functional specialisation is that the supply chain 
relationships, pressures and incentives faced by different parties vary. High levels of 
specialisation mean that the technical knowledge required to effectively regulate work is 
far greater than would otherwise be the case. 
c. Separation of ownership and control 
Tine vertical disintegration of production has also resulted in the separation of control and 
ownership. Labour law has generally assumed the coupling of control and ownership. 
Although retailers and brands may no longer own the means of production, this does not 
mean that they have entirely relinquished control over the governance of value chains. 
Rather, control is shared with other parties. 
d. Asymmetries in information 
A consequence of the spatial diffusion of production, functional specialisation and the 
separation of ownership and control is that the buyer is often unaware of the choices and 
conduct of its supplier, or of the true costs of production. The supplier is unaware of the 
amount paid to competitors or the amount that can reasonably be bargained for. Isolated 
workers such as home-based workers rely on contractors for information about the amount 
other workers receive and have little information about the nature of the supply chain they 
work within. States have difficulty tracking or comprehending the complexity of 
arrangements (Beck 1998; 15). 
e. Responsiveness to international and national institutional arrangements 
Supply chain structures and governance respond to international and national institutional 
settings. They do not operate in a vacuum or only in accordance with market principles. 
Those with power in supply chains seek to gain competitive advantages from existing 
institutional arrangements, and also seek to change institutional arrangements to their 
advantage. As we shall see in later chapters, vertical disintegration and the increased use of 
home-based labour in the Australian apparel industry in the 1980s and 1990s was a 
response to Australia opening up to import penetration by reducing tariffs and non-tariff 
protections. Triangular subcontracting proliferated in Bulgaria in the 1990s in response to 
Europe Agreements which encouraged outsourcing to Central and Eastern European 
Countries. These arrangements benefitted Western European brands most, encouraging 
de-industrialisation and specialisation in "outward processing trade" (OPT) in Bulgaria. 
These five factors necessitate new regulatory strategies aimed at targeting diffuse, 
geographically disparate and shifting locuses of control. Regulations need to: 
• respond to the structural standing of different parties, depending on their place 
and functional role in the supply chain; 
• recognise the separation of control and ownership; 
• bridge asymmetries in information between parties; and 
• address or respond to international and national institutional complexes. 
2.4.3 Failure to respond to informal regulations and norms which shape incentives and 
behaviour 
A further reason that labour regulations are failing to regulate a great deal of work is 
because it is neglecting to respond to the informal norms and regulations that shape 
incentives and behaviour of regulatory targets. 
Labour law is a special area of the law because it seeks to regulate the exercise of "control" 
and "subjugation" by an employer over an employee. In this sense, it is concerned with the 
exercise of "private and informal regulation" and asymmetries in power between labour 
and capital. Tests of control are used to determine the scope of regulation: whether the 
employer exercises sufficient control or whether the worker directs his or her own work 
and provides the tools of the trade (Kahn-Freund 1951, Colins 1990, Organisation 2006, 
Creighton and Stewart 2010). In contrast, the relationships that occur within supply chains 
are understood by the law to be "market based relationships". The legal consequence is 
that special intervention to address issues of fairness or inequality of bargaining power is 
not seen to be required in most jurisdictions. 
That there is little regulation of the exercise of private and informal regulation outside of 
labour law is a consequence of the influence of classical economic traditions within most 
jurisdictions. This tradition views the freedom to contract as a fundamental liberal principle. 
The role of the law is seen to be to enforce the will of the parties, but not to determine the 
terms upon which the bargain was set. In order to have a well-functioning market system, 
parties should be free to arrange agreements between each other, which they negotiate 
freely. This tradition juxtaposes "the market" where parties bargain freely, and "the firm" 
where bureaucratic power is wielded. 
The problem with this basis for regulation is that "market power" and "bureaucratic power" 
or "private and informal regulation" do not function separately. The regulatory 
consequence is that if business relations occur outside the firm, where a subjugating 
employer is not readily evident, the powerful party is free of the constraints of labour law 
that require them to bargain in accordance with certain principles, and adhere to various 
rules regarding payment and so forth. 
It is axiomatic that in supply chain arrangements the core business exercises a substantial 
degree of market power. What is not recognized in most legal systems, however, is that 
market power brings with it the capacity in the core business to exercise the kind of private 
arid informal regulation which may be said to typically characterise relations between 
employers and employees. 
Various factors increase dependence by suppliers on powerful players in supply chains. 
Where there Is high market capture by particular players - brands, retailers or large agents 
(lead firms) - this increases their market power, and in turn their private regulatory power. 
Where there is a growth in the number of suppliers, also, this this generates heightening 
competitive pressure for entry and maintenance of supplier relations (Gereffi 1996). The 
desire to maintain a long-term relationship with a powerful player in a supply chain acts as 
an effective enforcement mechanism. The ability of a core business to keep or discard a 
supplier has a significant disciplining effect on suppliers which may allow core businesses to 
specify a great deal of detail about the products they wish to buy from a supplier. 
There are various reasons why it is beneficial for powerful, lead businesses to wield effective 
private regulation. Brands, retailers and agents are particularly concerned to ensure that 
they receive the number of units ordered, that the products meet the required quality 
standards and are supplied in the time required. That is, they are particularly concerned to 
ensure that they have control over outcomes (Coase 1988; Coase, 1960 #4922). Empirical 
work on inter-firm relations by Commodity Chain theorists suggests that authority relations 
are used to control outcomes in business between firms in order to reduce transaction costs 
and risks (Kaplinsky 2000). The more risks to which lead businesses are exposed as a result 
of potential supplier failures, the more they will directly intervene to coordinate and 
monitor the supply chain. Indeed, there are vast volumes of literature in the field of supply 
chain management that provide advice about how/ to conduct coordination.^ 
Control over outcomes may be secured through a variety of mechanisms. Quality assurance 
is carried out once supplies reach the lead businesses, and pieces which do not meet the 
standards required w/ill be rejected and, in general, not paid for. This provides a strong 
incentive for getting it right the first time. In addition to the threat of discarding the supplier, 
elaborate performance tests and penalties for poor performance are applied. Retailers may 
rate suppliers based on a number of key performance indicators which form the basis of 
decisions for ongoing contracts. In some industries, core firms give suppliers scorecards for 
their performance and annual awards are presented to the best suppliers. Penalties, in the 
form of fines may also be applied where suppliers are late or where the products do not 
meet the required standards. 
Control over price is another important aspect of private supply chain regulation. Price is 
usually treated as a variable determined in the market. However, it is frequently the case 
that powerful businesses (particularly those competing more on price than, for example, 
product quality) insist that their suppliers meet certain prices per unit in order to maintain 
ongoing contracts. 
It follows, then, that in exercising extensive private and informal regulation over non-core 
businesses, the lead business in supply chain arrangements must as a matter of logic, impact 
upon the employees of those non-core businesses. But in what manner and to what degree 
do the core businesses control employment and work systems in those non-core 
enterprises? 
The nature of control over the employees of suppliers by lead businesses may be direct or 
indirect. Where a lead business intervenes in the work processes of a supplier, control over 
employee work systems is direct. Other aspects of control over supplier employees by lead 
businesses are less direct. Most of these aspects might be characterised as outcome-based 
^ See, for example, the large number of articles in the International Journal of Logistics Management 
and International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management. Graham C. Stevens, 
(1989) "Integrating the Supply Chain", International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics 
Management, Vol. 19 Iss; 8, pp.3 - 8, is an early example of this type of article. 
control. Where the market power of a buyer means that they are able to determine the 
price of units, this will have a strong controlling effect on the remuneration of workers. 
However, this may not be entirely determinative of their remuneration. 
Suppliers/employers and other Intermediaries still decide how much of profit to take before 
paying workers. 
The periodic and Inconsistent nature of orders from lead businesses also has an Indirect 
Influence on the employment of supplier employees. This Is related to the high levels of 
dependency of suppliers on core businesses. If a buyer orders a large amount of units In a 
short amount of time, workers will have to work over-time and work at a fast rate to 
produce the specified units within the time demanded by the buyer. On the other hand, at 
times when the core business has placed no orders because they have no requirement for 
the product or because they are sourcing from another supplier, workers will have no work 
to carry out. 
The supplier must determine how to deal with the periodic and Inconsistent nature of 
orders from core businesses from an employment perspective. Most commonly, the 
supplier deals with the problem of Inconsistency In orders by extending numerical flexibility. 
They may employ a small core (permanent) workforce and call upon a peripheral 
(casual/outworker) workforce at times when orders are heavy. Some suppliers also 
experiment with a shorter working year and other systems In order to deal with the periodic 
nature of orders. In any case, whilst suppliers may ultimately determine working hours and 
working arrangements, the broader conditions are set by the core business because they 
determine the amount of units and the time that they must be produced within. The 
supplier must determine how to respond to these Important parameters, however, the 
buyer's demands are strongly determinative of hours of work and security of work for 
workers. 
The inconsistent nature of orders from core businesses also has an Indirect Influence on 
occupational health and safety. Suppliers may provide the premises In which workers 
conduct production, thus determining the occupational, health and safety standards under 
which the workers labour. Where suppliers respond to Infrequent or Inconsistent orders by 
using a peripheral workforce, they may not provide workplaces. This still has a considerable 
effect on the OHS standards that workers experience. A study comparing the OHS 
experience of factory-based workers and outworkers in the clothing industry found that 
outworkers suffered three times the level of injuries experienced by factory-based workers. 
The two main reasons for the differences in injury rates were the use of piecework payment 
system and the long hours worked by outworkers (Mayhew and Quinlan 1998, Johnstone, 
Mayhew et al. 2001, Quinlan, Mayhew et al. 2001). 
The extent to which the private and informal regulation is exercised over suppliers by lead 
businesses is determinative of employment and work systems will depend upon the specific 
relations between the core business and the supplier. At the very least, where core 
businesses have strong market power and are therefore able to exercise bureaucratic 
control, they set the parameters in which suppliers must make decisions over the 
management of workers. In some cases, that influence goes beyond determining the 
parameters and is direct. The lead business has a measure of bureaucratic control for the 
purpose of coordination over the entire workforce or productive entities (Collins 1990). 
It can be said, therefore, that powerful parties in supply chains and suppliers often at least 
jointly determine the conditions of workers. However, labour regulation has generally failed 
to recognise this broad exercise of control or private and informal regulation beyond the 
direct employer-employee relationship. In most labour regulation schemas around the 
world, the brand, for instance, does not have an affirmative duty of care towards its 
supplier's workers because the brand and workers lack an employer-employee relationship 
and the brand's involvement in the supplier's operations likely does not meet the "control" 
standard for joint-employer liability (Farrell 2013: 1508). This means that its regulatory 
reach is limited - it is not able to respond to the core causes of worker vulnerability and 
precariousness. It is unable to respond to significant dynamics shaping the behaviour of 
regulatory targets. As we saw in the section on responsive regulation, compliance depends 
not only on rules or incentives specified in formal mechanisms, but also on the powers and 
motivations of social actors who may follow or resist them (Snider 2009). If labour 
regulation is unable to regulate the private and informal regulation wielded throughout 
supply chains, it is incapable of addressing the powers and motivations of the social actors 
that shape working conditions. 
2.4.4 Failure to deploy responsive enforcement tools 
Labour relations institutions tiave tlie potential to act reflexively and deploy responsive 
enforcement tools. However, by failing to negotiate and enforce agreed norms against the 
parties who have power in production arrangements, and by deploying a restricted range 
of penalties and incentives, such institutions are failing to act as responsively as their 
potential would suggest. 
Labour relations institutions which take the form of social dialogue institutions, labour 
tribunals and so on are reflexive institutions. They are highly responsive, networked forms 
of governance that bring together affected individuals, collectives and their representatives 
to negotiate norms and rules. Industrial relations institutions such as tribunals are generally 
forums in which bargaining occurs over outcomes. Where an agreement cannot be reached, 
tribunal members make orders or determinations which take into account the arguments 
and views of the parties. Such forums not only take into account the interests and wishes 
of affected parties, they allow for ongoing revision of rules. In this sense, industrial relations 
institutions avoid many of the failings levelled at "command and control" rule setting and 
enforcement typical of state-based systems (Cooney, Howe et al. 2006, Howe 2006, Howe, 
Marshall etal. 2009). 
Where such institutions fall short of responsiveness is by engaging a limited range of parties, 
and deploying a limited range of penalties and incentives. The parties engaged by such 
industrial relations are generally employer organisations and trade unions. Sometimes 
other interested parties, such as other industry bodies, will also be invited to negotiations. 
Recognised parties tend to be those directly involved in the employment relationship. This 
means that other powerful parties such as brands, retailers and agents, who the previous 
sections of this chapter have shown to shape work conditions, are excluded from 
negotiations and are omitted as regulatory targets. 
Industrial relations institutions and regulators such as state inspectorates are limited to 
their national jurisdictions, resulting in a mismatch in scale (Sabel, O'Rourke et al. 2000:13). 
Additionally, the monitoring techniques favoured by labour inspectorates and unions alike 
have difficulty locating and extending protections to workers outside medium and large 
sized factories. The consequence is that precariat, informal workers such as home-based 
workers rarely benefit from labour laws, the negotiated collective agreements of labour 
tribunals, or inspection efforts. 
The types of penalties exacted by such institutions are also limited in their responsiveness 
to the private regulatory pressures faced by parties that shape work conditions. The typical 
penalty issued by industrial relations institutions is a fine. However, for a large and powerful 
transnational business, a fine may not act as a strong disincentive to due to the small size 
of the fine in relation to overall company assets and income. For medium and small sized 
businesses who supply a large brand, and whose future depends on securing contracts with 
buyers, paying a fine may be less detrimental in economic terms than losing the work of a 
large buyer. There is a growing body of evidence that shows that, as rule takers, small and 
medium suppliers are being forced to bear the cost of ethical supply chain requirements 
(Knudsen 2013). This indicates a need to find more effective incentive setting and 
enforcement tools. The uneven distribution of risk and the particular interests of different 
parties throughout the supply chain suggests that enforcement tools should be more alive 
to the structural place of parties in supply chains. 
One of the goals of this study is to find new, more powerful penalties and incentives. The 
case studies have been selected for their use of novel penalties and incentives, including 
market based inducements such as labelling and other methods of influencing the 
behaviour of regulatory targets. The final substantive chapter of this study (Chapter 9) 
brings these finding to fruition in a novel regulatory scheme. 
2.5 Labour regulation and the dynamics of institutional change 
Because of the problems with labour regulation identified in the previous section of this 
chapter, wide agreement over the need to reform the personal scope of the application of 
labour law has emerged at a national and supranational level (Countouris 2007). In June 
2006 the International Labour Organisation released a Recommendation on the 
Employment Relationship, R-198, and the European Commission released, in November 
2006, its Green Paper called 'Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st 
century' (European Commission 2006). A number of important and influential volumes have 
come out in recent years which propose new models of labour law. These include most 
notably Alain Supiot's 2001 edited volume 'Beyond Employment. Changes in Work and the 
Future of Labour Law in Europe' (Supiot, Meadows et al. 2001) or what has become widely 
known as 'The Supiot Report' and 'Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law' edited by 
Davidov and Langille (Davidov and Langille 2006, Countouris 2007). These and other 
intelligent and sound models for broad labour law reform to provide protection for 
dependent, semi-dependent and non-waged types of work are now circulating and being 
debated. 
Great ideas are only the beginning of any law reform process, however. A significant 
question driving this dissertation is how institutional change can occur in the area of labour 
regulation. What drives change? Each of the case study chapters are concerned with 
exploring this question. This dissertation understands change to be a dynamic process in 
which agents of social change struggle for reform within shifting political and economic 
conditions. Informalisation (the process by which work becomes informal) and 
formalisation (the process by which work becomes formal) are dynamic processes. 
The puzzle of how institutional change occurs has absorbed regulatory and institutional 
theorists for some time. This dissertation draws on various literatures to describe the way 
that purposeful institutional change occurs. One body of work is that generated by Kathleen 
Thelen to understand patterns of institutional change (Thelen 1999, Thelen 2003, Streeck 
and Thelen 2005, Thelen 2006, Hall and Thelen 2007, Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Thelen, 
with others, has identified five main methods of institutional change: layering, 
displacement, drift, conversion and exhaustion. The concepts of layering and displacement, 
in particular, are used to describe the methods of institutional change seen in the case 
studies. For Mahoney and Thelen, layering occurs when new rules are attached to existing 
ones, thereby changing the ways in which the original rules structure behaviour (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010: 16). The Australian and Cambodian regulatory innovations studied are 
examples of layering. Displacement occurs when existing rules are replaced by new ones. 
Often, displacement occurs when there is a revolution or regime change (Collier and Collier 
1991). The Mathadi boards examined in Chapter 4, for instance, were developed in the 
wake of Indian independence and with the threat of communism looming. It was a time of 
social disruption and the end of the British colonial regime. This social turmoil allowed a 
group of workers to mobilise for a new system of labour regulation which displaced the 
existing system (though its coverage was limited to this particular population of head lead 
workers). 
Because, in each of the case studies, institutional change - the formalisation of work, 
entailing the reform or labour institutions and/or the creation of new institutions - has 
occurred following significant mobilisation efforts on behalf of particular social agents, 
insights into the way that social mobilisation and influence occurs is drawn from the social 
change and transnational mobilisation literature. In more complex and dynamic processes 
of social change, actions and interactions between actors intersect, such that actions and 
strategies of any given actor will shift power resources available to other actors. This 
interactive quality of patterns of social action and effect, combined with the complex, path 
dependent and often unpredictable currents of complex social processes, can lead many 
forms of influence to be highly indirect, and difficult to tightly control or predict. Analysing 
influence thus requires that we take account of path dependent and structural patterns of 
causality beyond the direct intention or control of individual actors. 
Existing theories of transnational political action (including both theories of transnational 
advocacy and those relating to transnational policy or governance processes) have 
emphasised varying combinations of material leverage and normative suasion as key 
sources and channels of transnational influence over political decision making processes at 
national and sub-national levels. For example. Keck and Sikkink's (Keck and Sikkink: 16) 
account of the influence of advocacy networks over political decisions placed central 
emphasis on processes of "persuasion and socialization", but recognised that such 
processes 'often involve not just reasoning with opponents, but also bringing pressure, arm-
twisting, encouraging sanctions and shaming'. Such methods are often seen in labour justice 
campaigns, where, for example, "naming and shaming" is a commonly deployed tactic. 
Likewise, Risse (Risse: 118) highlights the capacity of agents of change to directly induce or 
prevent targeted actors from acting as they otherwise wished to, through a combination of 
"moral" and "material" mechanisms. An example of a combined moral and material action 
in the field of labour justice campaigns is the call to boycott a particular brand. 
Traditional theories of institutional change posit that change comes about when powerful 
actors have the will and ability to change institutions in favour of new ideas (Steinmo 2008). 
But what about when the agents of social change are not powerful? Here, the idea of 
network power is useful. An emphasis on networks need not be understood as an 
alternative account of power or leverage to those accounts persuasion and socialisation. 
Rather, networks can be understood as providing channels for transmission of both material 
and ideational resources and influence. The case studies conducted in this dissertation show 
the way that networked dynamics interact with, shape and constrain influencing dynamics 
of these broader kinds. 
Braithwaite has proposed that such networks are particularly useful in third world settings 
(Braithwaite 2006). Network structures and processes enable participating actors to 
contribute to processes of social influence over targeted decisions and outcomes through a 
number of mechanisms. A number of network functions seem to play particularly important 
roles in helping to achieve institutional change in the case studies undertaken in this 
dissertation. 
2.5.1 Conduits for normative or material resources 
Networks can help to address the problem of weak actors influencing strong targets 
through their role in enabling the transfer of power resources between actors. This 
possibility has been acknowledged clearly in some existing work on regulatory networks, 
such as Drahos and Braithwaite's notion of "networking around capacity deficits" 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 1999, Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). In the Bulgarian and 
Cambodian cases, for example, the transnational NGOs play an important role in diffusing 
information or other resources required to support the mobilization capacity of local worker 
groups. American labour organisations have been particularly important in providing 
support of various types for Cambodian unions, for example, including training, technical 
advice in lobbying for reform or labour laws, and so on. 
Figure One: Networks as mechanisms for transferring resources 
The case studies show that the effects of such support are often cumulative, as a number 
of networks involving relatively weak actors contribute to snowballing pressure on a 
structurally more powerful decision making target. Such snowballing dynamics are evident 
in all the case studies, where it is not clear which particular strategy was most influential or 
was the tipping point that brought about institutional change. Multiple strategies and forms 
of mobilization can interact in a reinforcing manner, "concatenating" into dynamic 
processes of influence, in the language of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (McAdam, Tarrow et 
al. 2001). Even where they are not clearly coordinated, the exercise of pressure within 
multiple networks and coalitions can generate "webs of influence" (Braithwaite and Drahos 
1999, Braithwaite and Drahos 2000) which chip away in multiple, albeit marginal ways at 
different nodes of influence within a contested and pluralist domestic political arena (Cerny 
2006, Cerny 2007). 
Importantly, however, such dynamics can cut both ways. "Countervailing networks" resist 
network building efforts of worker groups, as has emerged in a variety of forms across the 
case studies. In the Australian case study, for instance, countervailing networks of 
employers and manufacturers have run concerted campaigns to have laws that provide 
special protections for industrial outworkers repealed. More recent lobbying efforts have 
succeeded in defunding the market based Ethical Clothing Australia initiative. 
2.5.2 Infrastructures that constitute and enable cooperative interactions 
Networks can also be understood as the scaffolding or Infrastructure for cooperative 
learning and sharing of norms. Networks may serve In a sense like minl-publlcs, or 
communicative Infrastructures In which processes of deliberation and socialisation of 
values and norms occur. Some networks structure and facilitate these more normative 
patterns of Influence more directly than others. 








Connections with the right kinds of local networks and coalitions Is key In ensuring that 
socialisation processes draw In the Important actors, and can be sustained under often 
rapidly evolving local conditions. The case studies observe reconstituting coalitions of 
actors, with new actors being recruited to networks through various means. Sometimes this 
entails recruitment of obvious allies. Trade Unions in Cambodia, for Instance, have recruited 
global trade union bodies in their fight for higher minimum wages. Also, though, 
engagement with "countervailing coalitions" Is vital In enhancing Influence. If networks with 
apparently conflicting alms can be effectively drawn Into dialogue this can be useful in 
supporting wider socialisation processes. The Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of 
Australia has used this tactic particularly powerfully. It has recruited well-known Australian 
brands, such as Cue, who champion Ethical Clothing Australia and defend the system of 
labour regulation which has been put In place to protect Industrial homeworkers In 
Australia. Where networks are able to recruit multiple parties within a countervailing 
network a type of normative crowding occurs which can make it more difficult or costly for 
dissident parties to publicly disagree. 
Interactions between normative and material leverage importantly underpin influencing 
dynamics of these kinds. Leverage can play an important role in keeping key groupings of 
actors "at the table", thereby enabling processes of socialisation and learning through 
which normative change can occur. Such dynamics have also been important in the 
Australian case where the relevant union has used the threat of suing companies for breach 
of labour laws as a way to induce them into negotiations over broader changes in sourcing 
practices. 
2.5.3 Bridges to access multiple and diverse targets 
Networks can also act as bridges to access multiple and diverse targets, thereby helping to 
overcome the challenge of dispersed authority and distant targets. Dynamics of interaction 
between multiple networks and coalitions that are constituted at different scales, relatively 
autonomously from one another, and that involve distinct yet sometimes overlapping 
groupings of actors. 
Pluralist distributions of authority or decision making power over particular contested 
outcomes often shift over time. In this sense, an important capacity of networks is not only 
the ability for them to help reach relevant targets at multiple sites. It is also their capacity 
to be able to adapt and respond to these shifts. Relationships between different, diverse 
networks can be important in this respect, to facilitate rapid shifts in strategy and targets 
(at least more rapid than the time frames over which network infrastructures and relevant 
forms of knowledge and expertise can be built). The importance of both national and 
international networks in the Cambodian example is here relevant. American labour groups 
have been able to recruit important players such as Hilary Clinton to bring pressure to bear 
on the Cambodian government to stop reforms to the Labour Code which would weaken 
freedom of association. At the same time, the grass roots membership of unions in 
Cambodia have recruited support in the villages that they grew up in. 
There is perhaps a kind of "strength of weak ties" (Granovetter 1985) logic to this dynamic. 
This speaks to the value of multi-layered networks, and the fact that networks don't always 
need strong coordination and lil<eness of participants. IVloreover, it highlights the dynamism 
of networl<s. Once targets are identified, the network structures and resources can be 
moved around to be directed at appropriate targets and new relationships and connections 
can be built cumulatively over time to generate new capacities. 
2.5.4 Conduits for the leakage of pressures between political environments 
The case studies also show networks acting as conduits at a more macro scale - importing 
established norms and material incentive structures between differently configured 
political environments. The transfer of norms and market pressure between companies 
linked within transnational supply chains, in response to market pressures associated with 
campaigns targeting consumers and investors, is an example of how such leakage of societal 
norms and associated material leverage can be transferred between political contexts. Such 
dynamics have been particularly important in Cambodia where a grouping of international 
brands has supported Better Factories Cambodia financially and normatively and at times 
pressured the Cambodian government over its harsh crackdowns on labour activists. These 
brands originally adopted corporate responsibility policies in response to the pressure of 
consumer campaigns in the economic North. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In her seminal work on the topic, Sassen wrote that the informal economy's 'expansion 
invites us to focus on the broader fact of a growing set of problems in the relationship 
between new economic trends and old regulatory frameworks' (Sassen 1994).. The 
conceptual framework set up in this chapter shows that the process of informalisation is 
dynamic with multiple causes at different levels - global, regional, national, local and 
individual. We need to understand the complex dynamics and causes of informality in order 
to design effective and responsive regulation. This chapter has addressed some of the broad 
- cross-case - causes of informality related to changes in the nature of production and the 
inertia surrounding the reform of labour regulation. More specific dynamics are explored in 
the case study chapters. The aim of the case studies is to build contextually specific stories 
of why work became informal and why the precariat grew in number. This analysis is 
followed, In each case, by tracking how the reform of labour regulation occurred. Each case 
study chapter follows the dynamic process by which agents of change formed networks to 
Influence the shape of the key Institutions regulating work. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the conceptual framework for this dissertation. This chapter 
describes the methodology. 
In broad terms, the dissertation addresses the following five questions: 
1. What is the same and different about the dynamics of informalisation in different 
countries/settings? 
2. What regulatory strategies have been implemented to address informality in each 
case study? 
3. What has worked/has not worked? How much have the regulations addressed the 
dynamics identified? 
4. What does this tell us about regulatory strategies for formalization? 
5. How can we provide local pathways out of informal work and global strategies for 
addressing the causes of informality? 
The end purpose of the study is to put together a "responsive" regulatory approach to 
informality. The framework for this responsive approach was described in Chapter Two. This 
restricts the scope of the dissertation. The aim is not to design exhaustive policy approaches 
addressing informality, but just to focus on regulatory responses. For instance, the 
dissertation is not concerned with designing new approaches to governance that might 
include policies for material provision or distribution (Braithwaite, Coglianese et al. 2007: 
3). It is limited to mechanisms that steer "the flow of events and behavior" (Braithwaite, 
Coglianese et al. 2007: 3), acknowledging that when regulators regulate, they often steer 
the providing and distributing that regulated actors undertake as well. 
This dissertation develops new models for the regulation of work of two types. The first 
type is those that can be instituted to improve workers' lives in the short-term. The second 
type is a more ambitious, longer term vision for regulating work at international and 
national levels, orchestrated by the International Labour Organisation. Both are informed 
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by case studies which examine the development of novel forms of regulation of work, aimed 
at re-regulating informal work. This chapter describes the methods used in conducting 
these case studies. 
This chapter is structured as follows: the first section describes the overarching case study 
methodology. The second section describes the primary approach deployed in the case 
studies: historical institutionalism. The third section describes additional methods and 
disciplines used to put together stories that span macro and micro scales. 
3.2 Case study methodology 
A case study method is employed to examine four different populations of informal workers 
and innovative regulatory schemes in this dissertation. There are three attributes of case 
study research that make it attractive as a method for this dissertation (Willis 2007: 240): 
1. It allows for the gathering of rich, detailed data in an authentic setting. 
2. It is holistic and thus supports the idea that much of what we can know about human 
behavior is best understand as lived experience in the social context. 
3. Unlike experimental research, it can be done without predetermined hypotheses, 
and goals. 
Used within an interpretive framework, 'researchers do not seek to find universals in their 
case studies. They seek, instead, a full, rich understanding (verstehen) of the context they 
are studying' (Willis 2007: 240). The approach is inductive and heuristic, and involves thick 
descriptive data. They commonly rely on inductive reasoning '[and] illuminate the reader's 
understanding of the phenomenon under study' (Willis 2007: 239). 
Stake (Stake 2005) differentiates between three types of case study: the intrinsic, the 
instrumental and the multiple or collective. Each of the case studies in this dissertation 
might be described as instrumental because the intention is not to focus on the individuals 
involved, but on the insights into an issue they provide, the possibilities for generalisation 
and the identification of improved practice in the regulation of informal workers. The 
combination of the four case studies can be viewed as a multiple or collective instrumental 
case study because it is hoped that this will lead to 'better understanding, and perhaps 
better theorizing, about a still larger collection of cases' (Stake 2005: 446). 
3.2.1 Case study selection 
The cases in this study were chosen primarily because of the innovative regulatory 
measures developed in each country for the regulation of work. In other words, the case 
studies were chosen for theoretical and not statistical reasons (Eisenhardt 2002: 12). Such 
a selection method can be contrasted with traditional within-experlment hypothesis testing 
studies that rely on statistical sampling, in which researchers randomly select the sample 
from a population. In this type of study, the goal of the sampling process is to obtain 
accurate statistical evidence on the distributions of variables within the population. Here, 
instead, case studies have been chosen so as to allow for the comparison different 
regulatory responses. Each regulatory scheme provides a different model for regulating 
informal labour, with varying levels of success providing opportunities to study what works, 
what doesn't work and why. This approach accepts that there may be a certain level of 
incommensurability between the case studies, but the value of observing the operation of 
different methods of regulating work was privileged over the benefits of commensurability. 
Each of the regulatory innovations takes place in vastly different settings. Divergences 
between the cases allow different causes of informality to be observed across diverse types 
of economies and governmental structures. Australia is an advanced liberal market 
economy, Bulgaria and Cambodia are transitioning from socialism to capitalism and India is 
a liberalising middle income country with very poor populations. The countries also have 
differing legal traditions. India and Australia each have common law legal traditions, 
whereas Bulgaria and Cambodia have socialist/civil law traditions. The periods of growth in 
informal work also differ across the cases. Bulgaria had an active black or shadow market 
(or an informal economy of types) priorto the transition to capitalism In the late 1980s, but 
full, formal employment. In Australia, informality has grown markedly over the last 30 or so 
years. India and Cambodia have longer and more persistent traditions of informal work. 
These differences provide opportunities for understanding the dynamics of informality in 
contrasting settings. The inclusion of Australia, for instance, allows for the comparison of 
informal work in a developed economy context compared with poorer country contexts. 
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Research on informal work is most extensive in developing regions where informal 
employment itself is most extensive. The inclusion of Australia seeks to fill a gap in the 
literature on informality. 
Table 1: Differences in case study settings 
m Bulgaria India Australia Cambodia 
Development Transitional Developing Advanced Poor and 
transitional 
Law Civil Common Common Civil 
Region Europe Asia Australasia Asia 
Labour law Extended to Limited 
coverage homeworkers coverage 







Advanced Maturing None 
Within-case analysis is conducted in separate chapters. Each case study chapter follows a 
similar structure: the first part of the chapters examine the causes of informality, employing 
a historical institutionalist approach described in the next section of this chapter. Possible 
causal mechanisms are treated as competing narratives. The second part of each case study 
then describes the process of mobilisation and social change that lead to the enactment of 
institutional innovation. An assessment of the responsiveness of these advances, based on 
the conceptual framew/ork provided in the previous chapter, is then carried out. 
Cross case analysis is conducted in the final chapters. Here, the emphasis is on examining 
the dynamics of regulatory change and comparing how/ innovative methods of regulating 
w/ork were developed. 
3.3 Primary case study approach: Historical institutionalism 
If we accept that informal w/ork proliferates under conditions of regulatory or institutional 
failure, then the study of institutions is a vital aspect of understanding the increasing 
incidence of precarious work worldwide. This dissertation employs a historical intuitionalist 
approach to studying changes in the context in which labour regulations operate, changes 
to labour regulation itself, and changes in the nature of work in each case study country. 
Historical institutionalism was selected as the primary method for the empirical study 
presented in this dissertation as it pays attention to the ways in which institutions structure 
and shape political behaviour and outcomes over time. It is a way of exploring causal 
mechanisms behind observed empirical patterns (Thelen 1999: 372). We know, empirically 
speaking, that the incidence of informal work has increased in a number of parts of the 
world over the past two decades. (The data was summarised in Chapter One.) This approach 
provides a way to explore what has caused this increase. Each case study examines the 
contextual features that were relevant to the expansion of informality. Various dynamics -
either social or economic - that may have contributed to the growth of the precariat are 
teased out. This approach seeks to provide hermeneutic understanding of informality. Why 
do actors behave as they do in relation to systems of governance? It also seeks a causal 
explanation: what social, economic and political processes contributed to informality? 
Historical institutionalists do not accept that history necessarily develops in a 
straightforward, linear fashion. Instead, they examine the conditions under which a 
particular trajectory was followed and not others. For historical institutionalists, political 
events happen within a historical context, which has a direct consequence on decisions or 
events (Steinmo 2008): 
Historical institutionalists understand that behaviour, attitudes and strategic 
choices take place inside particular social, political, economic and even cultural 
contexts. Rather than treating all political action as if it is fundamentally the same 
irrespective of time, place or context, historical institutionalists explicitly and 
intentionally attempt to situate their variables in the appropriate context. Thus, by 
deepening and enriching their understanding of the historical moment and the 
actors w/ithin it, they are able to offer more accurate explanations for the specific 
events that they explore than had they treated their variables outside the temporal 
dimension. 
Acknowledging the importance of history suggests an explicit aw/areness that important 
variables can and often do shape one another. Historical institutionalists, more than 
political scientists in some other traditions, are explicitly interested in these interactive 
effects; on the interdependence of multiple causal variables (Steinmo 2008). It is for this 
reason that the case studies examine the interaction and compounding nature of various 
factors to explain informality and subsequent reforms to labour regulation. Regrettably, the 
accounts in the case studies can sometimes seem choppy, as they seek to provide narratives 
of the unfolding and impact of seemingly unrelated events. This choppiness is a 
consequence of avoiding a functionalist account of institutional change. As Kathleen Thelen, 
one of the foremost contemporary proponents of historical institutionalism acknowledges, 
'the various pieces do not necessarily fit together into a coherent, self-reinforcing, let alone 
functional, whole' (Thelen 1999: 382). 
The case studies do not solely provide accounts of the history of labour laws or labour 
policies. They provide a broad account of the factors that have put pressure on or changed 
the nature of the labour market. This is because 'change comes from the interactions of 
different institutional orders within a society' (Thelen 1999: 383). For instance, the mass 
labour shedding in Bulgaria explored in Chapter Six that left workers stranded in informal 
work was partly a result of its economic dependence on the USSR and the specialisation of 
production required under the rules of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance prior to 
the transition to capitalism. This dependence and specialisation set the country up 
particularly badly for integration into world markets, where there was little demand for 
Bulgaria's products. Later, the rules of the Europe Agreements encouraged concentration 
in outward processing that led to further specialisation in lower value added economic 
activities where informal labour could flourish. The interaction of the Council for Mutual 
55 
Economic Assistance and, later, the Europe Agreements with existing labour market 
institutions are vitally important to the story of the growth of informal work in Bulgaria. 
Because the case studies are primarily concerned with the interaction of institutions and 
factors - with their dynamic relationship - the case studies do not attempt to place a value 
on the importance of each factor. The point is not to fix a single decisive factor. Change in 
one arena affects other ongoing processes, which is what drives institutional evolution 
(Thelen 1999: 383). Institutions interact in self-reinforcing feedback (Krasner 1988: 83) that 
produce different effects. 
The factors that are examined in each case occur at different scales. The cases track 
processes at the domestic level, the regional level and the international as they unfold in 
relation to one another. Taking up the Bulgarian example, again, domestic institutional 
changes such as the privatisation of state owned corporations were undertaken after they 
had occurred in other countries in the region. Thus, the selling off of state owned companies 
to international bidders in Bulgaria occurred after the finite supply of foreign investment 
had already been largely absorbed by earlier privatisers, closer to Western European 
markets. This put in train a set of events whereby newly privatised companies lacked the 
capital to allow them to adapt to new circumstances, leading to the mass failure and folding 
of these major employers. Workers were left without any alternative except informal work. 
In this example, the regional scale of the transition to capitalism interacts with domestic 
political decisions, which in turn impact on the micro context of company level employment 
relations. Each case study examines the compounding impact of institutional changes at 
different points and scales. 
Scale and temporality interact in each story (Thelen and Streeck 2005). The accounts are 
not just interested in "what " but also "when" (Thelen 2000). The mobilisation of Mathadi 
(headload) workers in the Indian case study (Chapter 4) provides a further example of the 
importance of timing. This group of workers mobilised shortly after independence when the 
anti-Brahmin movement had the greatest purchase. The workers hailed primarily from 
western Maharashtra and claimed Maratha warrior heritage. The power of their demand 
for specialist labour regulation was bolstered by the "Maratha-isation" and anti-
Brahminisation of the ruling Congress Party in the Indian state of Maharashtra. Had their 
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mobilisation occurred earlier or later, their demands would likely not have enjoyed the 
same political leverage. The timing and sequence of events shape political processes 
(Fioretos 2011: 371). It is for this reason that each case study attempts to provide a 
sequential story of the unfolding of events that shape informality and subsequent 
regulatory innovations. 
Timing shapes the calculations and constraints of political actors. Fioretos offers that 
(Fioretos 2011:371): 
The calculations of political actors (for example, their understanding of their stakes 
in the current setting), and the nature of the constraints under w/hich they operate 
(for example, some options may not really exist due to the sequence of prior events) 
may change significantly over time. 
The political period in w/hich the Mathadi mobilisation occurred explains a great deal about 
why this group of workers did not call for the expansion in the scope of existing labour laws 
in the same manner as demanded by Bulgarian home-based workers or Australian industrial 
outworkers. The mobilisation of Mathadi workers occurred some 30 years before the ILO's 
Homework Convention (C177), for instance, which recommended the expansion of the 
scope of labour law. In some ways the demand for a separate system of labour regulation 
is more audacious, reflecting the emboldening of Mathadi workers by the courting of 
political parties. Situating the choices made by the workers and their supporters examined 
in each case study in their broader historical context provides a richer understanding of 
institutional change. 
Each case study throws a wide analytical net in the hope of gathering a broad range of 
factors causing informality. Regardless of this wide net, there is no doubt that the accounts 
are far from comprehensive. Putting aside this unavoidable limitation, it is hoped that the 
adoption of historical instltutionalism has allowed for original accounts to be assembled in 
each case. 
3.4 Other disciplines and methods 
The historical instititonalist approach is just that, an approach rather than a method. Thus, 
this dissertation draws on other methods to study the evolution of informality and the 
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development of new initiatives for regulating work. Why is this helpful? If we accept that 
diverse variables shape one another, then we need a way to study or understand variables 
that have different forms and characters. Take economic causes for instance. Although 
economic factors are often treated as if they are disembedded from social causes, the 
economic is social. This is particularly true of labour markets. Labour markets are social 
institutions: social structure impacts economic outcome and social structures affect the 
efficiency of transactions (Uzzi 1997: 37). The labour market is a socially constructed and 
politically mediated structure of conflict and accommodation among contending forces. 
Various non-economic factors influence the behaviour of workers in labour markets, and 
thus the labour market as a whole. In the context of agricultural India, for example, where 
work is a non-commodified aspect of family life, social structures. Into which worker is 
integrated, affect the choices of the worker (Dube 1955). Particular castes specialise in 
doing certain work. Caste and other markers of social identification and categorisation are 
especially evident in the Indian case study in this dissertation. In this context, we can readily 
see that work opportunities and decisions are determined by family, caste, village, religion, 
outlook, and not simply those factors accounted for in the field of economics. The same is 
no less true of other societies, and a consequence, we need ways to understand the 
interaction of different factors. 
So as to better understand the specific factors shaping labour markets, this dissertation 
draws on different disciplines. Various approaches, literatures and methods are mined in 
the course of each case study to attempt to better explain the causes of informality. 
3.4.1 Political Economy 
One approach is drawn from political economy. Political economy is in itself multi-
disciplinary. It pulls from the fields of economics, law and political science to explain how 
political institutions, the political environment, and the economic system influence each 
other. In the course of the case studies, economic and political narrative histories are delved 
into to explain why economies and systems of governance and regulation have evolved in 
particular ways (Abbott 2001). 
Each case study moves from describing national development to narratives of individual 
and community experiences of informality. Political economy approaches are useful for 
constructing the "larger picture", and for situating individual experience, but not for telling 
individual stories and exploring individual's experience of w/ork, business and regulation. 
For this, ethnographic methods are employed. Interviews, observations and the collection 
of data from secondary sources were all employed for the case studies for this dissertation 
(Eisenhardt 2002: 13). 
3.4.2 Ethnography 
The studies employ ethnographic methods to study the phenomenon of informality 
amongst specific populations. Ideas about what ethnography is have developed in recent 
years. Although sociologists once defined ethnography as the direct observation of the 
activity of members of a particular social group - normally by anthropologists - and the 
description and evaluation of such activity, this definition has evolved over time 
(Abercrombie, Hill et al. 2000). A more recent definition is: 
an umbrella term for fieldwork, interviewing and other means of gathering data in 
authentic (e.g. real world) environments...[that] puts the researcher in the setting 
that he or she wants to study. The research is conducted in the natural environment 
rather than in an artificially contrived setting (Willis 2007: 237). 
The type of ethnography conducted in this dissertation is what might be called "analytic 
ethnography". An Investigator: (a) attempts to provide generic propositional answers to 
questions about social life and organisation, (b) strives to pursue such in a spirit of 
unfettered or naturalistic inquiry, (c) utilizes data based on familiarity with a social setting 
or situation that is gained by personal participation or an approximation of it, (d) strives to 
present data and analysis that are true, (e) seeks to provide data and analysis that are new; 
and (f) presents an analysis that is developed in the senses of being conceptually 
elaborated, descriptively detailed and concept-data interpenetrated (Lofland 2002:137-8). 
The primary method of ethnographic research utilised was the interviewing of informal 
workers, organisers of workers, business managers, bureaucrats, politicians and others 
about their experience of informal work, their interaction with regulatory systems and their 
ideas about how things could or had changed. Altogether, around 140 interviews were 
conducted across the cases, documented in Appendix One to this chapter. The style of 
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interviewing used approximated narrative interviewing. The interview questions were 
'semi-structured'. My aim was to cover a certain number of standard questions across each 
case, but also to allow flexibility for tangents and follow up questions as personal stories 
unfolded. In the Australian case study, questions were particularly standardised due to the 
similarity in work conducted across workers. An appendix is attached to the Australian 
chapter which reports this standardised information. 
Most interviews took between one and one and half hours. Most interviews were 
conducted on with an individual respondent, with the assistance of an interpreter. 
Sometimes, however, interviews were with a family or conducted in group. Where the 
interview was with a group or family this has been indicated in Appendix One which 
provides a list of respondents and dates of interview. 
Most interviews were recorded, with the permission of the respondent. In some cases, 
however, respondents requested that no recording be made, or I judged that the 
respondent was too nervous to request recording or that it may hinder the interview in 
some way. Interview transcripts were then transcribed by professional transcribers or by 
the author. I took notes during each interview, which have been retained. 
Kohler Riessman describes narrative interviewing as having the following distinctive 
features (Kohler Reissman 2006: 189-190): 
Participants engage in an evolving conversation; narrator and listener/questioner, 
collaboratively produce and make meaning of events that the narrator reports... The 
'facilitating' interviewer and the vessel-like 'respondent' are replaced by two active 
participants who jointly produce meaning. Narrative interviewing has more in 
common with contemporary ethnography than with mainstream political science 
interviewing practice that relies on discrete, open-ended and/or fixed-response 
questions. 
Kohler recommends this method because participants will not always devolve the full story 
upon initial questioning. They may require further prompting and following up. They may 
also require time for a full story to unfold (Kohler Reissman 2006: 190): 
Some investigators, after introductions, invite participants to 'tell your story' - how 
an illness began, for example. But experience always exceeds its description and 
narrativization; events may be fleetingly summarized and given little significance. 
Only with further questioning can participants recall the details, turning points and 
other shifts in cognition, emotion and action. 
In addition to interviews, I also spent time observing work and in less formal conversation 
with respondents. In the course of my study of Bulgarian informal workers, for instance, I 
spent many hours with the workers, sometimes one-on-one, sometimes in groups. The 
most interesting conversations occurred outside the formal interview process, often when 
the participants were arguing about answers earlier provided, or insisting that one or the 
other tell me more about what really happened in their life. 
In all of the cases, the role of the interpreters was crucial. I sat next to the interpreter across 
from the interviewee. Interpreters were needed for the field work conducted in each 
country, including Australia. I asked a question, the interpreter translated this question for 
the interviewee, and would then translate after each phrase spoken by the interviewee so 
I had a chance to interrupt and ask for clarification as the answer to the question unfolded. 
As the interview progressed, a rhythm would develop with the interviewee learning to 
pause after short bursts of speak to allow for verbal translation. 
Trust-building with interviewees depended greatly on the skills and personality of the 
interpreter. In Bulgaria, one interpreter began aggressively challenging the participant 
about their answers and their attitude and a new interpreter had to be found. Though the 
attitude of the interpreter harmed the relationship with the interviewee, it also provided 
insights into debates and points of conflict about informal work in Bulgaria. Also in Bulgaria, 
one of the leaders of a homeworker association became resentful about the amount I was 
paying the interpreter compared with the low wages she received for the piece work she 
conducted at home. We had long conversations about the ethics of not paying the 
interpreter legal wages, regardless of the pay inequity that resulted between the 
interpreter and the interviewees, again providing insights into the nature of inequality and 
the social fragmentation caused when some people are employed formally and others are 
not. 
Often, interviews with home-based workers had to be conducted while the participants 
continued to work, as they could not spare time away from the order in front of them. This 
provided an opportunity to observe the nature of work and discuss the challenges entailed 
sewing or constructing a particular item. It also allowed me to validate claims made by the 
workers and their representatives about the nature of work, size of the orders, nature of 
the paperwork, brands being made, and so on. Where work was conducted with family 
members, interviews were conducted with multiple workers at once. 
In addition to these interviews, focus groups were at times carried out with groups of 
workers or other categories of interviewees. In India, for example, a round table of labour 
academics was put brought together by an intermediary. In Bulgaria, in 2004, days were 
spent with the main organisers of the homeworker association in Petrich mapping supply 
chains and the geography of home-based work in the region. 
Non-participant observation was also a significant method used. In Bulgaria, I observed the 
work of Jane Tate of Homenet while she trained the Petrich group in mapping and 
organising techniques. In India, I observed a two day conference of labour and employer 
representatives in Mumbai as they debated the laws governing contractors and the threat 
entailed in the increasing prevalence of outsourcing from India to regional countries. In 
Australia, participant observation has been conducted over a period of 20 years entailing 
attending FairWear meetings, observing court cases, Senate Enquiries and so on. Individual 
instances of participant observation are only noted when they are directly relevant. 
Otherwise, they provide the background to the analysis in each case. 
The ethnographic methods used in each case study do not exactly mirror each other. 
Opportunities for interviewing key respondents depended a great deal on the connections 
of intermediaries who helped organise interviews in each case. Intermediaries in Bulgaria 
had vast political and business connections, leading to a greater number of interviews with 
participants of this type. The period of mobilisation of Mathadi workers in India was the 
1960s. Most potential respondents, who had been active in that mobilisation, had passed 
away by the time I conducted my empirical research. The number of interviewees for the 
Indian case study who were directly involved in institutional change is therefore lower than 
the other case studies. Opportunities for non-participant and participant observation were 
far greater in Australia, where I have mainly resided over the period of research, than for 
other countries. In all cases, secondary sources were mined extensively to make up for gaps 
in primary ethnographic methods. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The combination of metliods used in the case studies allows for the assemblage of rich 
analyses of changes in the context in which labour regulations operate, changes to labour 
regulation itself and changes in the nature of work. The cases selected afford the study of 
four different schemes for the regulation of work. The different contexts in which these 
schemes were devised provides an opportunity for understanding their operation in 
particular social and economic contexts. The historical institutionalist approach offers a way 
to examine the particular trajectories of reform pursued and the ways each scheme respond 
to their particular contexts. The case studies track the interaction and compounding nature 
of factors at different scales and historical moments. By deepening and enriching our 
understanding of how and why informal work expanded, the case study chapters are better 
able to assess the responsiveness of the labour regulation initiatives developed. The 
ethnographic methods used - including interviews, focus groups and participant 
observation - provide the basis for fertile descriptions of the nature of informal work and 
its causes. These accounts incorporate personal narratives and experiences. They provide 
new understandings of the ways that attitudes to work structure labour markets and 
interactions with regulators. Together, these methods provide the basis for fruitful insights 
into ways that the regulation of work can be more responsive and redress the negative 
social and economic effects of informal work. This analysis informs later proposals for novel 
regulation, coordinated across different political and geographic scales. 
A p p e n d i x One: Table of Interviews 
Note: w h e r e requested, only the first name of the interviewee has been provided or their name has been omitted. 









Y Pervomai J u 1-04 
2 Bulgaria Margarita Worker Home-based 
worker 
Y Petrich Jul-04 
3 Bulgaria Anita and Ivan Worker Home-based 
worker 
Y Petrich Jul-04 
4 Bulgaria Elanora Worker Home-based 
worker 
Y Petrich Jul-04 
5 Bulgaria Bojidar 
Podolinski 
Business Manager, Boil 
Shoe Company 
Y Petrich Jul-04 
6 Bulgaria Mariana Business Manager, 
Nickmar2000 
Shoe Factory 
Y Petrich Jul-04 
7 Bulgaria Nikolai Kitanov Business Manager, Bella 
Style, Clothing 
Factory 
Y Petrich Jul-04 
8 Bulgaria Milka Business Manager, 
Knitwear 
workshop 
Y Petrich Jul-04 
9 Bulgaria Christina Business Manager, 
Clothing 
workshop 
Y Petrich Jul-04 
10 Bulgaria Assem Ivanok Business Owner, Diom 
clothing factory 
Y Petrich Jul-04 
11 Bulgaria Bob and 
Krasimir 
Business Managers, 
Coopers and Roe 
Knitwear Factory 
Y Petrich Jul-04 









Y Petrich Jul-04 
13 Bulgaria Rozalina Worker Home-based 
worker, 
Organiser Kaolin 
Y Petrich Jul-04 
14 Bulgaria Lyben Tomev Union Director, 
Institute for 
Social and Trade 
Union Studies 
"Y Sofia Sep-10 










Y Sofia Sep-10 





N Sofia Sep-10 





Y Sofia Sep-10 
18 Bulgaria Rosica Worker Home-based 
worker 
Y Sofia Sep-10 
19 Bulgaria Tony Worker Home-based 
worker 
Y Sofia Sep-10 
20 Bulgaria Katia Worker Home-based 
worker 
Y Sofia Sep-10 














Y Sofia Sep-10 






Y Sofia Sep-10 
24 Bulgaria Petar Stoyanov Employer 
Association 





Y Sofia Sep-10 
25 Bulgaria Magda 
Asenova 
Journalist Reporter Y Sofia Sep-10 
26 Bulgaria Krasto Petkov Academic Professor of 
Sociology, 
President of the 
Confederation of 
Unions 
Mixed Sofia Sep-10 




Y Petrich Sep-10 
28 Bulgaria Georgi Stankov Union Federation of 
Light Industries 
Y Petrich Sep-10 




Y Pervomai Sep-10 
30 Bulgaria Margarita Worker Home-based 
worker 
Y Petrich Sep-10 
31 Bulgaria Anita and Ivan Worker Home-based 
worker 
Y Petrich Sep-10 
32 Bulgaria Elanora Worker Home-based 
worker 
Y Petrich Sep-10 
33 Bulgaria Rozalina Worker Home-based 
worker, 
Organiser Kaolin 
Y Petrich Sep-10 






Y Vlidin Sep-10 










Y Sofia Sep-10 
36 Bulgaria Swetanka Worker Homebased 
worker 
Y Pernik Sep-10 
37 Bulgaria Natasha Worker Homebased 
worker 
Y Pernik Sep-10 
38 Bulgaria Svetlana Worker Homebased 
worker 
Y Pernik Sep-10 






Y Pernik Sep-10 











Y Sofia Sep-10 
41 Bulgaria Krassimir 
Popov 






N Sofia Sep-10 





Y Sofia Sep-10 






Y Petrich Sep-10 
44 Bulgaria Galina Gosova Business Manager, Gogovi 
Footwear 
Factory 
Y Petrich Sep-10 
45 Bulgaria Margarita Worker Home-based 
worker 
Y Petrich Sep-10 






Y Petrich Sep-10 





Y Petrich Sep-10 
48 Bulgaria Velichka Worker Homeworker Y Petrich Sep-10 
49 Bulgaria Tania Worker Tapestry 
homeworker 
Y Petrich Sep-10 
50 Bulgaria Rumiana Worker Homeworker Y Petrich Sep-10 
51 Bulgaria Slavinka and 
family 
Worker Homeworkers Y Petrich Sep-10 











Y Petrich Sep-10 




Y Petrich Sep-10 







N Mumbai Mar-11 
General Kamgar 
Union 
55 India Mr. Arun S. 
Ranjane 







N Mumbai Mar-11 






N Mumbai Mar-11 
57 India Mr. Manohar 
Gajare 





N Mumbai Mar-11 
58 India Dr. B.R. 
Rairikar, 




N Mumbai Apr-11 





N Melbourne Aug-11 
60 Australia Linda Cabaero NGO Coordinator, 
Asian Women at 
Work 
N Sydney Aug-11 
61 Australia Debbie Castors NGO Founder, Asian 
Women at Work 
N Sydney Aug-11 





N Melbourne Aug-11 
63 Australia Homeworker 1 Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
64 Australia Homeworker 2 Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
65 Australia Homeworker 3 Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
66 Australia Homeworker 4 Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
67 Australia Homeworker 5 Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
68 Australia Homeworker 6 Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
69 Australia Homeworker 7 Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
70 Australia Homeworker 8 Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
71 Australia Homeworker 9 Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
72 Australia Homeworker 
10 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
73 Australia Homeworker 
11 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
74 Australia Homeworker 
12 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
75 Australia Homeworker 
13 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
76 Australia Homeworker 
14 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
77 Australia Homeworker 
15 
Worker Homeworker N Melbourne Nov-11 
78 Australia Homeworker 
16 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
79 Australia Homeworker 
17 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
80 Australia Homeworker 
18 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
81 Australia Homeworker 
19 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
82 Australia Homeworker 
20 
Worker Homeworker "Y Melbourne Nov-11 
83 Australia Homeworker 
21 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
84 Australia Homeworker 
22 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
85 Australia Homeworker 
23 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
86 Australia Homeworker 
24 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
87 Australia Homeworker 
25 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
88 Australia Homeworker 
26 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
89 Australia Homeworker 
27 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
90 Australia Homeworker 
28 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
91 Australia Homeworker 
29 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
92 Australia Homeworker 
30 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 
93 Australia Homeworker 
31 
Worker Homeworker Y Melbourne Nov-11 





N Melbourne Nov-11 
95 Australia Jo Kellock Employer 
Association 




N Melbourne Dec-11 
96 Australia Pamela 
McGraw 
Business Ella Fashion N Melbourne May-12 
97 India Rakhi Seghal Union Activist, Trade 
Union 
N New Delhi Dec-13 
98 India Ajit Ghose Academic Professor, 
Cambridge 
University 
N New Delhi Dec-13 





(ISID), New Delhi 
N New Delhi Dec-13 






(ISID), New Delhi 
ID 
N New Delhi Dec-13 







N New Delhi Dec-13 




N New Delhi Dec-13 








N New Delhi Dec-13 
104 India Alakh Sharma Business Manager, Apollo 
Tires 
N New Delhi Dec-13 
105 India Justice AP 
Shah, 
Law Judge, Supreme 
Court India 
N New Delhi Dec-13 





N New Delhi Dec-13 
Planning and 
Administration 
107 India Sukti Dasgupta NGO Senior 
Economist. ILO 
Regional Office 
for Asia and the 
Pacific 
N New Delhi Dec-13 
108 India Shalini Sinha NGO WEIGO N New Delhi Dec-13 








N New Delhi Dec-13 
110 India Coen Kompier 
(group 
interview) 
NGO ILO Subregional 
Office for South 
Asia 
N New Delhi Dec-13 





N New Delhi Dec-13 
112 India Praveen Jha 
(group 
interview) 





N New Delhi Dec-13 









N New Delhi Dec-13 
7S 




Delhi School of 
Economics 
N New Delhi Dec-13 








N New Delhi Dec-13 
lie India Kamala 
Sankaran 
Academic Professor, Law*, 
Delhi University 
N New Delhi Dec-13 
117 Cambodia Ing Sothy Legal Expert Labor Arbitrator Y Phnom Pehn Mar-14 






N Phnom Pehn Mar-14 
119 Cambodia David Welsh NGO Organiser, 
Solidarity Center 
(Cambodia) 
N Phnom Pehn Mar-14 




Y Phnom Pehn Mar-14 






N Phnom Pehn 18-Mar 
122 Cambodia Chea Sophal NGO Program 
Manager, ILO 
N Phnom Pehn 19-Mar 
Better Factory 
Cambodia (ILO) 




Textile Union of 
Cambodia 
(NIFTUC) 
Y Phnom Pehn 20-Mar-
14 




of Kingdom of 
Cambodia 
(FTUWKC) 
Y Phnom Pehn 20-Mar-
14 









N Phnom Pehn 21-Mar-
14 
126 Cambodia Anonymous Union UNICAM Y Phnom Pehn 21-Mar-
14 














l 4 - M a r -
14 
128 Cambodia Oung Sarom 
129 Cambodia Tor Bon Tliorn Government Regulator/ 
Inspector, 
Ministry of Labor 





















N Phnom Pehn 24-Mar-
14 
131 Cambodia Buth Rithy Legal Expert API N Phnom Pehn 25-Mar-
14 
132 Jill Tucker NGO Director, ILO 
Better Factory 
Cambodia (ILO) 
N Phnom Pehn 25-Mar-
14 
133 Cambodia Ann Nan Legal Expert Labor Arbitrator 
and Advisor, 




N Phnom Pehn 26-Mar-
14 





Y Phnom Pehn 26-Mar-
14 




N Phnom Pehn 26-Mar-
14 







Trading Far East 
Limited 
N Phnom Pehn 27-Mar-
14 
137 Cambodia Tola Moun NGO Community 
Legal Education 
Center(CLEC) 
N Phnom Pehn 27-Mar-
14 





Y Phnom Pehn 2yMar -
14 
139 Cambodia Ann Vireak Legal Expert Labor Arbitrator N Phnom Pehn 28-Mar-
14 
140 Cambodia Tola Moun NGO Community 
Legal Education 
Center(CLEC) 
N Hong Kong 01-Nov-
14 






N Hong Kong Nov-14 
4 MATHADl WORKERS IN MAHARASHTRA, INDIA 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter tracks the creation of a highly successful model for regulating the performance 
of headload work in the Indian state of Maharashtra.® Such work is known locally as mathadi 
and hamal work. "Matha" means "headload" in many Indian languages. Hamal means 
'porter' from the Arabic "hamala": to carry. Both types of workers conduct similar work, 
and this chapter will mainly use the term "Mathadi workers" to describe both varieties of 
work for the sake of simplicity, though this is not strictly accurate. A Mathadi worker is 
defined by the Indian National Commission on Labour (INCL) as a worker who carries a load 
on his head, back, neck or shoulders. The work normally consists of loading, unloading, 
carrying, shifting, weighing, tapping, building and stacking goods. This is harsh physical 
labour, often undertaken in extreme heat. In 1999, Deshpande estimated that there were 
more than 500,000 Mathadi workers across the state of Maharashtra, around 10,000 of 
them female (Deshpande 1999: L-29). Today, the number of mathadis has increased, 
though various factors now threaten this type of work. 
Following a concerted campaign in the 1960s, a tripartite regulatory system was introduced 
to overcome many of the problems historically faced by the Mathadi workers, such as a lack 
of job security and access to social security. The Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers 
(Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 {'Mathadi Act') was the first regulatory 
' The author is indebted to Praveen Rao for his assistance with research in Maharashtra, India. 
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method of its type in India to develop a method 'to secure basic protective social security 
for the unorganised w/orkers by 'regularising' their intermittently available continuous work' 
{Datta 1998: L-2). (The term "unorganised" is preferred to "informal" in India.) The Act 
provides a comprehensive regulatory system for the Mathadi workers. 
In order to assess the responsiveness of the Mathadi boards to the conditions which they 
aim to improve, a central regulatory question for this study is what specific causes and 
conditions of informality the boards are responding to. Why was unorganised, informal 
work so prominent at the time the Mathadi Boards were conceived, despite Bombay's 
prominence as an industrial and trading hub? What circumstances produced a large 
"circulating" class of workers who had migrated from the country-side to the city in search 
of work? The chapter tracks the ways that the institutions of colonisation and features of 
the independence movement converged to produce both this massive informal workforce, 
but also the conditions which would allow one group of workers to demand a novel 
regulatory system for the betterment of their working conditions. 
This study contrasts with the Australian and Bulgarian case studies for a variety of reasons. 
India's informal economy constitutes the overwhelming bulk of the country's workforce. In 
this sense, it is more similar to Cambodia. Whereas Australia is an industrialised economy, 
and Bulgaria a transitional economy. India remains a developing economy despite its rapid 
growth. According to the Indian Ministry of Labour and Employment (IMLE), informal 
workers comprise 94.33 per cent of the workforce and contribute about 60 per cent of GDP 
(Pellissery 2007). Out of the total workforce of 45.9 crore workers, the unorganised sector 
comprises 43.3 crore workers (1 crore = 10 million) (Government of India 2010). Unlike 
Bulgaria, where the subjects of the study had enjoyed secure, full time employment under 
the state socialist regime, most workers in India have never experienced formal 
employment of this type. 
The Indian case study is not only useful for its comparisons with the Australian, Cambodian 
and Bulgarian case studies. The study is a fruitful site of regulatory learning because India's 
legislatures have been more active in regulating informal work, particularly in the domain 
of providing social security, than perhaps anywhere else in the world. The Indian state has 
used various mechanism to do this, the most well-documented of which are the Welfare 
Boards of Kerala. In contrast to the Welfare Boards, there is very little written about the 
Mathadi Boards of Maharashtra which have a broader regulatory reach. In addition to 
providing a mechanism for collecting social security for informal workers, the Mathadi 
Boards also provide a way of effectively regulating wages by acting as a tripartite 
employment agency. Labour users can only hire mathadi workers through the Boards, which 
are overseen by government, representatives of management and unions.^ The Mathadi 
Boards therefore provide a regulatory alternative to the supply chain regulation of 
Australia, and the ILO Better Factories project in Cambodia. 
This chapter describes the regulatory and social dynamics established by British colonial 
powers and the newly independent government in India that contributed to the creation of 
a landless or land-poor class who migrated to urban cities in search of work. This chapter 
shows that the dynamics of labour circulation from the country to the city were highly 
' The term "labour user" is used in favour of "employer" throughout this chapter where the 
employee-employer relationship is in question. 
influenced by social arrangements. The informalisation of Mathadi work was determined 
by complex identity-based and class relations such as caste, village affiliations, and access 
to land. Workers are recruited through, and work within, work groups called "tolli". They 
are the mode through which workers are drawn to the city, and through which they are 
recruited and organised. Informal norms and social relations shape the supply of labour and 
influence the behaviour of workers. Thus, any new regulatory structures attempting to 
formalise the sector needed to take into account these informal regulatory dynamics. 
4.1.1 Field work described in this chapter 
The field work described in this chapter was conducted over two periods. The first was in 
2011 when a small handful of interviews was conducted with interviewees who had a long 
term involvement in the Mathadi Boards. The aim was to collect information about the 
period - in the 1960s - when mobilisation first began, and about how they were established. 
A local Mumbai based social researcher, Praveen Rao, assisted with recruitment and 
conduct of interviews. I could not have identified key players with long term experience 
without his help. Due to the length of time since the Mathadi Act was first enacted, only a 
small number of interviewees were able to be identified with sufficient knowledge of this 
period. Most of the main protagonists have passed away. In 2013 a second set of interviews 
was conducted in India with labour historians, sociologists and labour lawyers to gain a 
better understanding of the dynamics of informality in India. Through these interviews, I 
was introduced to the idea of "labour circulation" and the importance of land-based factors 
in the creation of surplus labour in India. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Part 1 charts the creation of an informal and 
unorganised workforce in the urban centres of Maharashstra, and describes the working 
conditions of the Mathadi workers prior to formalisation. It then explores various social 
causes of informality, and the legal dynamics which created this class of unregulated and 
unstable workers. 
Part 2 tracks the dynamics of formalization, including the development of the Mathadi Act, 
discussing the various factors that contributed to the unusual political support enjoyed by 
this group of informal workers. It outlines the functioning of the Mathadi Boards, explaining 
how they address the various causes of informality explored in Part 1. The chapter 
concludes by analysing the success of the Mathadi Boards and their influence in India. 
4.2 Part 1: Dynamics of Informalisation 
4.2.1 Mathadi Workers' Conditions of Work Prior to Formalisation 
This section describes Mathadi workers' conditions of work before the Mathadi Act. As is 
the case today, Mathadi workers mainly toiled in ports & docks, godowns, market yards, 
transport companies, wholesale markets, retail merchants. According to one interviewee, 
Baburao Ramisthe, General Secretary of the Akhil Bharatiya Mathadi Transport & General 
Kamgar Union, there were approximately 200,000 such workers in the city of Mumbai alone 
in around 1974 (Interview with Baburao Ramisthe). Unloading work was dispersed 
throughout the more than 200 urban markets, around 3,000 public and private godowns, 
more than a 100 railway stations and around 400 ST stands across the state (Deshpande 
1999: L-19). 
Mathadi workers migrated from rural areas of the Maharashtra state to Mumbai and other 
urban centres in search of work. Upon arrival in urban areas, they either stayed with 
relatives in makeshift housing (slums) or at the godowns (warehouses) with the permission 
of those who hired them - merchants, market traders and so on. These living conditions 
were rough and provided no privacy. Work was mainly undertaken outside, exposed to 
Maharashtra's tropical and humid climate. The heat builds before the monsoon, when it 
rains for two to three months. Work continued regardless of the weather. 
The work consisted mainly of carrying great weights. Ramesh Data describes the nature of 
the work as follows (Datta 1998: L-4): 
His (sic) work is mainly of physical labour and he is expected to be strong and sturdy 
to withstand serious physical weights and carrying it to considerable height for 
stacking. His (sic) work normally consists of loading, unloading, carrying, shifting, 
weighing, taping, bending and stacking. 
Despite the limit placed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) of a maximum of 50 
kg weight to be carried on the back, in Indian markets goods were usually packed in 100 kg 
gunny bags (Deshpande 1999: L-20). Workers suffered from back problems which were 
debilitating over time. They were rarely able to continue their work for more than 15 to 20 
years (Deshpande 1999: L-20). 
In addition to the work of loading and unloading of goods, other types of work was expected 
by labour users, including sweeping and cleaning shops and godowns, tending to cattle and 
even domestic work at traders' houses. These tasks were not accounted for in the wages, 
which were determined on a piece-rate basis depending on the number of items or gunny 
bags carried (Deshpande 1999: L-9). 
Before Mathadi work became regulated in 1974, work was highly irregular, with no fixed 
hours of work, overtime payment, holidays or leave. There was no single fixed employer or 
fixed employment. The availability of the work was dependent on the arrival, availability 
and departure of ships, trains, goods trucks or customers. It was extremely difficult to 
predict the time and volume of worl<. As a result, work was spread over the day and across 
the city (Datta 1998: L-4). Tolli groups often worked for different labour users on in given 
day traveling the city in search of work. In the 2009 decision of the Supreme Court of India 
regarding the MathadiAct, Justice Sirpurkar described the conditions before the enactment 
of the Mathadi Act in the following dismal terms {Bhuwalka Steel Indus. Ltd vs Bombay Iron 
& Steel Labour Bd. & Anr on 17 December, 2009 at para 43): 
They were mostly dependent upon the toliwalas and mukdams. They were not 
certain that if they would get the work every day. They were also not sure that they 
would work only for one employer in a day. Every day was a challenge to these poor 
workmen. 
As migrant workers, Mathadi workers also suffered from health problems associated with 
the lack of availability of affordable and healthy food in urban centres, as they were 
removed from their families who might otherwise cook for them. There were unable to 
follow a fixed routine of work which would enable them to make permanent arrangements 
for their meals (Deshpande 1999). As a result, many workers lived off Indian varieties of 
what could be termed "fast food", carrying limited nutritional value and the risk of 
contracting foodborne illnesses. 
The work was also isolating - away from the familial ties of the village. Men who became 
Mathadi workers often left the village at a young age, and did not return until their bodies 
were ruined. This made them bad prospects for marriage. When arranging marriages, 
families typically preferred to have their daughters married to agricultural labourers who 
remained in the village (Awchat 1976). 
Interviewees also reported numerous instances of torture and victimisation of Mathadi 
workers prior to 1974. Such victimisation was made possible by the immense power 
differentials between the labour users and the workers. There were also sporadic clashes 
between workers and labour users on issues of loading/unloading of goods and wage 
settlements leading to severe law and order problems. It was clear that regulation was 
needed, not just to improve the conditions of these workers, but also to restore industrial 
peace. 
4.2.2 Social dynamics of informality 
Patterns of social and geographic migration, circulation and fragmentation reinforced 
vulnerability and contributed to the informality of work in various w/ays. Patterns of internal 
migration were shaped by colonial geography and Mumbai's place in the system of colonial 
extraction. Mumbai's evolution as a key seaport and business centre owed a great deal to 
British colonial planning (Sharma 2010; 72). Mumbai was the second biggest colonial city. 
Unlike Kolkata, though, where trade and industry was overwhelmingly dominated by 
Europeans, Indians played a much greater role as businessmen in Mumbai. Bombay was the 
premier Indian industrial city (Omvedt 1973: 729). The merchant classes joined forces with 
Europeans with something closer to equality in the extraction of goods from India to 
elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Businessmen, including the mill-owners and managers, 
were overwhelmingly Gurati-speakers, including Parsis, Gujarati vanis (merchant classes) 
and Muslim business minority communities (Omvedt 1973: 730). Educated and professional 
classes, in contrast, were dominated by Marathi-speakers. Brahman dominance within 
Mumbai was not as strong as outside the city (Omvedt 1973: 730). 
The creation of wealth in Mumbai was dependent on the abundance of cheap labour from 
the regions surrounding the city. The merchant-capitalists who are famous for building 
Mumbai's thriving sea-ports, competitive textile industry and finance sectors relied on the 
constant presence of these workers in their patterns of accumulation and expansion 
(Sharma 2010: 73). 
Migrant communities settled in Mumbai along the lines of their caste, regional or religious 
affiliations. Dependent members of the household mainly stayed in the village. Though 
housing was sometimes provided to factory workers in India - such as the housing for mill 
workers in Mumbai, no such housing was provided for informal Mathadi workers. 
Neighbourhoods were further differentiated in terms of economic status. Slum settlements 
were constructed close to hubs of work - next to the dock and near textile mills. In the 
1970s, the share of the slum population was around half of the total population of Mumbai 
(Sharma 2010: 77). 
As with much migration from rural to urban areas across India, labour brokers acting on 
behalf of labour users, formed a link in the chain of circulation for migrant workers (Breman 
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2010: 4). These labour brokers are most commonly referred to as "Mukadams". Mukadam 
literally means supervisor (Pellissery 2007:12), although Mukadams are described variously 
as "gang leaders", "jobbers", "labour-brokers", "labour-agent". The reason for these 
different names is that their responsibilities extend beyond that of a supervisor. Mukadams 
are generally people w/ith particular leadership skills within a village. They have a good 
knowledge of each household within a village (Pellissery 2007: 12). Mukadam engaged 
labourers from their own village or from nearby villages. Their caste composition was 
almost exactly equivalent to that of the workers. Typically, it was the role of the Mukadam 
to supervise the conditions of the Mathadi workers. For instance, it would be the 
Mukadam's responsibility to get the Mathadi workers to jobs, handle, measure work output 
and dispel any disputes that may arise from payment. 
Owing to their considerable authority over the labour-force, Mukadams often had a 
significant impact on the livelihoods of the workers. The structure of labour procurement 
and regulation has been described by Datta as follows (Datta 1998: L-4): 
All this work was performed in a 'gang' or 'tolli' system. All the workers in a tolli 
belonged to the same village and often, related to each other. According to their 
convenience some of them used to go to their native places, and some others, 
mostly their relatives used to come and take their place in the tolli. The tolli workers 
used to work under a head known as 'mukadam', who actually used to arrange for 
the work, was responsible to the employer, got the labour charges from the 
employers, and distributed the wages among the workers. 
Priortothe introduction of the Mathadi Act, workers in a tolli were substantially controlled 
by a Mukadam. Mukadams made contacts for Mathadi to borrow money and frequently 
loaned it themselves. Mukadams acted as middle people between labour users and 
Mathadi and were implicated in their mistreatment: 'Many a time, the mukadam, by 
conniving with the employer, exploited tolli workers' (Datta 1998: L-4). Their position gave 
them tremendous social power and income derived in large part from taking a cut of the 
income of the workers (Omvedt 1973: 751). 
Rather than operating solely through market dynamics of supply and demand, then, the 
conditions of informality for Mathadi were socially embedded in village and caste relations 
(which we can think of as informal or private regulations) in which Mukadams played a key 
role. Links with Mukadams determined where Mathadi worked, and this, in turn, impacted 
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on the level of pay they receive and the security of their w/ork. The Mukadam's gang, ortolli, 
followed him from one job to another. Not only were the Mukadams involved in the 
exploitation of the workers, their role as intermediaries also explains why the Mathadi 
workers seldom had access to other jobs. The workers' strict association with individual 
Mukadams reduced their labour mobility. Furthermore, the presence of intermediaries in 
the labour market posed a challenge for the application of labour laws, which is ordinarily 
conceived of as the regulation of the relationship between the employer and employee. 
Mathadi workers left (and continue to leave) their villages at a young age, returning for 
visits and settling again in their place of origin when they were worn out. This is an enduring, 
widespread feature of the workforce in India. The National Commission on Rural Labour 
calculated in its 1991 report than about 10 million rural workers went out in search of work. 
This tally included 4.5 million interstate rural migrants and around 6 million intra- or inter-
dlstrict rural migrant workers temporarily employed inside or outside agriculture 
(Government of India 1991). Others believe the figures are much higher, and have 
continued to grow (Breman 2010). In this sense, the Mathadi workers share much in 
common with other migrant workers across India. 
However, there are demographic features of these particular workers that shaped their 
specific patterns of migration and the subsequent dynamics of formalisation and 
informallsatlon. Mathadi workers migrated mainly from Western Maharasthtra (Deshpande 
1999: L-9). In a survey of hamal panchayat (association) members in Pune conducted in 
1985-86 by Vasant Deshpande it was noted that more than half of the hamals had migrated 
to the city from the surrounding rural areas of western Maharashtra (Deshpande 1999: L-
9). A large number of them were from the drought prone districts of the Marathwada 
region. These families had migrated to Pune during the 1970s. More than half of the 
surveyed hamals were Marathas. Along with marathas, Muslims and Dalits had also entered 
this occupation. Though the hamals hailed from economically poor families, among the 
Marathas they enjoyed a relatively high social status within the caste hierarchy and 
continued land tenure in the home village. The survey found that more than 75 per cent of 
the workers reported owning agricultural land In their native villages (Deshpande 1999: L-
9). Their social status and traditional occupational pattern helped them retain their ties with 
the villages, unlike many other migrant social groups. 
Though informal labour- the precariat (Standing 2011) - is frequently characterised by 
fragmentation amongst workers, a number of additional factors allowed the Mathadi 
workers to cultivate a sense of social cohesion. Normally, ongoing labour circulation and 
lack of representation reinforce each other in a vicious circle. The constant movement in 
and out of the workforce undermines the cohesion and mutual trust that workers require 
to engage in collective action. Keeping the workforce in a constant state of flux by instant 
hire and fire procedures stops the creation of solidarity between workers. It is often the 
case in such conditions that workers compete against each other in the narrow bargaining 
space left to them. Yet, as we shall see in the next part of this chapter, the Maratha status 
of workers and their relative privilege within village hierarchies, promoted a level of social 
cohesion which later allowed for the development of a strong labour movement. 
4.2.3 Legal dynamics of informality 
The dynamics of colonial and post-colonial law making played a strong role in the creation 
of patterns of migration in Maharashtra in the 50s and 60s; patterns which continue today. 
This section shows how state action contributed towards the growth of the informal 
workforce (Mohapatra 2005). Legal frameworks that contour patterns of land use, labour 
and credit markets shape the dynamics of labour supply and demand. These close linkages 
between land, credit markets and labour are one of the reasons that efforts to expand 
labour regulation in India to a wider group of workers has not reduced informality (Pellissery 
2007). Labour laws are unable to address the dynamics of labour circulation necessitated 
by land shortages. One of the few points of common agreement among historians is the 
significance of agrarian relations in the structure of Indian society (Washbrook 1981: 650, 
lliopoulou 2001). The land is, overwhelmingly, the single most important source of wealth 
and the basis of production in India. As a consequence, laws that shape agrarian relations 
shape the accumulation of wealth, production and social relations across India. 
Agrarian relations continue to be shaped by patterns established by colonial law making. 
The imposition of colonial law had various subtle conservative implications for the 
development of Indian society (Washbrook 1981: 653). Much of colonial law making sought 
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to keep society in the structure of relations in which the colonial authority had found it, and 
enforce "customary" and religious norms (Washbrook 1981: 653). In the area of private law, 
courts looked to the scriptures for guidance on domestic and social norms. These 
interpretations reflected a Brahminical view of society. With the support of British power, 
Hindu law expanded its authority across large areas of society which had not known it 
before or which had possessed their own localised customs. This is, according to 
Washbrook, one of many developments which made the nineteenth century the Brahmin 
century in Indian history (Washbrook 1981: 653). It also helps to explain why the twentieth 
century was to be the anti-Brahmin century - a tendency that provided the Mathadi 
movement with the legitimacy and momentum to push for the special system of regulation 
described in the second part of this chapter. 
Land laws 
The revenue collection methods of the British administration reinforced feudal land tenure 
patterns. To extract revenue from its colony, the British implemented two major land tax 
systems and fundamentally altered the nature of existing property rights in India. In some 
regions, property rights and taxes were assigned to zamindars or landlords whereas in 
others - including Maharashstra - they were assigned to ryotwars or cultivators (Alavi 1980: 
372). The introduction of sole proprietary ownership by the British further altered the rights 
of property previously held by lower castes, including varying overlapping rights to 
occupancy and rights to shares of crops as defined by local custom and kinship (Kapur and 
Kim 2006: 2). Peasants were now "free" of to sell their labour and were given land to till at 
the discretion of the landlord (Alavi 1980). 
In the wake of India's independence, land reforms were carried out in keeping with 
promises by the national leadership in its efforts to mobilise the peasantry for the struggle 
against colonial rule. The architects of the post-colonial era envisaged an agricultural 
economy of self-cultivating owners. Though the revenue collection pattern of British India 
was replaced with a new bureaucratic system of land administration, land reform was 
halfhearted. One of the reasons for this was because land reform was undertaken at the 
state level, where the power of landowners was greater than at the national level. The 
resulting legislation was implemented by a bureaucracy which was often captured by the 
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interests of the landowning classes. Though Maharashtra had a relatively good record with 
land reform in formal terms, various means were used to evade the intent of land reforms 
(Lai 1969: A-209), including legal appeals by chieftains and administrative confusion 
(Editorial 1975). Those segments of the rural workforce who had little or no land did not 
benefit greatly from the redistribution of agrarian capital. In their directives, the planners 
seemed to have ignored the existence across much of the country of a vast population with 
little or no land ownership. 
Breman argues that their exclusion at this critical moment of restructuring ownership of 
resources explains why a large segment of the workforce remained marginal to the flurry 
of socio-economic development that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century 
(Breman 2010; 11). Surplus land acquired by the rural poor was less than 2 per cent of the 
total cultivated land. Furthermore, the National Commission on Rural Labour reported that 
there was hardly any attempt to influence the land market in favour of the rural poor by 
advancing long-term loans to them for purchase of land (Government of India 1991: v-vi). 
Instead, the land poor and landless were told that a better future would come their way 
outside agriculture, as mill hands and workers in the city (Breman 2010: 11). Though 
Mathadi workers often retained rights to small plots of land, land reform left them without 
sufficient land to support their families. Like millions of others, land laws played a significant 
role in their migration to urban centres in search of work. 
Labour laws 
Prior to the enactment of the Mathadi Act, Mathadi workers were not protected by labour 
laws of any type. The characteristics of their work were not captured by any of the various 
laws that aimed to protect workers. They fell outside the Minimum Wages Act (1948), which 
set the rate of pay for various industries in Greater Mumbai. Because they were neither 
wholly nor principally employed by any one employer, the benefits under the Bombay Shops 
and Establishments Act, 1948 were also not available to Mathadi workers. These benefits 
included rights to of overtime, paid weekly holiday, leave, and so on. They were also 
eschewed from the application of the Factories Act (1948), the Employees' Provident Funds 
Act, (1952) and the Employees' State Insurance Act (1948), as their work was not considered 
continuous or for any consecutive number of days for the same labour user (Datta 1998: L-
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4). With regard to compensation payments to the workers for any physical injury or death, 
which was a frequent occurrence during course of their loading and unloading work, their 
work fell outside the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (1923). Labour users 
evaded responsibility for such payments by arguing that their dealings were only with the 
Mukadam (Datta 1998: L-4). According to some commentators, the traders were also 
careful to keep the numbers of workers below the number that would see them covered by 
the Factories Act (1948) (Awchat 1976): 
The hamals work under a large number of traders. By keeping eight to ten hamals 
under him, the trader evades the Shops Act and the Factories Act. Even in the railway 
yard there is no single boss answerable for the hamals' condition. 
In summary, Mathadi workers were treated as casual, unskilled workers and meant that 
they were deprived of statutory protection regarding their hours of work, remuneration 
and other service conditions. 
The restricted coverage of labour laws flowed in part from the colonial deployment of 
labour laws to secure a supply of labour, and partly due to the post-colonial association of 
labour with industry. According to Noronha, the earliest attempt in India to regulate 
employment consisted of enactments which were concerned more with providing a steady 
labour force, rather than with the protection of workers' interests (Noronha 2001: 4851, 
Mohapatra 2005). Later revisions to labour law purposefully restricted the scope of 
protection. The Royal Commission on Labour, appointed in 1928 (known as the Whitley 
Commission) for example, determined that welfare should only be extended to a small 
proportion of workers, so as not to burden employers at the early stage of India's 
development. By depriving workers of employment security and social security, this would 
encourage workers to come to urban centres for periods of employment but return to 
villages between bouts of work and in retirement (Inteview with Prabhu Mohaptra 2013). 
For the architects of post-colonial India, the "worker" worked in the modern economy. 
Policy makers were captured by the idea that the rural-agrarian order would soon be 
replaced by an urban-industrial one. The National Planning Committee, established in 1940 
and chaired by Jawaharlal Nehru focussed primarily on industrial relations. The regulations 
it proposed were modelled on those already implemented in the industrialised world 
(Breman 2010:131). 
The barriers to thinking more broadly about the regulation of work were not just 
conceptual, but also political. The industrial sector had an established and influential trade 
union movement, and the Indian independence movement was intricately intertwined with 
this labour movement (Agarwala 2009). This labour movement grew exponentially with 
independence. In 1929, the number of registered trade unions in India was 29; in 1951 it 
was 3987 (Ornati 1955: xi) Although the unions cared for the interests of only a tiny minority 
of the labouring classes, that minority was its most vocal segment. The fear of the 
radicalisation of the factory proletariat was high, and labour laws were designed to stifle 
unrest. 
At the start of India's independence era industrial labourers formed less than 6 per cent of 
the total workforce (Ornati 1955: 9). Despite its small size, the future of India's prosperity 
and growth was seen to hinge on this group of workers. The implicit assumption was that a 
social system would eventually emerge which would mirror that of the industrialised West. 
Breman argues that little thought was given to the way in which local and historical 
conditions in India had shaped the working class and the ways that India's historical 
conditions differed from advanced economies (Breman 2010:133). 
In sum, the worker that labour law sought to regulate was more an "ideal type" than a 
reflection of the characteristics of most workers in India. The restricted purview of labour 
laws, combined with the limited scope of land reform, combined to create a mass of 
workers who circulated from the country-side to urban centres in search of work. The work 
they found was precarious and insecure. 
4.3 Part 2: Dynamics of formalisation 
This part of the paper explores the dynamics of formalisation and describes the Mathadi 
Act and its impact on the workers whose conditions it regulates. Though patterns of 
circulation and migration contributed to the informality of Mathadi work, there were other 
factors which strengthened their power relative to other migrant workers. This part of the 
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chapter argues that the timing of IVlathadi migration and their distinct identities and ties 
allowed Mathadi workers to create "webs of influence" (Braithwaite and Drahos 1999, 
Braithwaite and Drahos 2000) which chipped away in multiple, albeit marginal ways at 
different nodes of influence within the contested and pluralist domestic political arena of 
the period immediately after independence. 
4.3.1 Maratha identity 
The Hamals in Pune were among the first migrant families coming to the city after 
independence (Deshpande 1999: L-9). This gave them comparatively easier access to the 
labour market. Further, the Maratha identity of the Mathadis and Hamals, migrating 
predominantly from Western Maharashtra, made them important for Congress politics in 
the state during the independence and post-colonial period. (Congress was the political 
party that led the independence movement and dominated national politics over the 60 
years following independence.) The term "Maratha" included all Marathi-speaking non-
Brahman castes except untouchables (Omvedt 1973: 751). In the colonial period it signalled 
a warrior heritage: a historical polity that resisted Mughal expansion into the Deccan in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Deshpande 2004: 7).® In the independence period, 
it distinguished a lower-caste movement against the preponderance of Brahmans in the 
nationalist middle classes and the colonial order in Maharashtra (Deshpande 2004: 14). 
Non-Brahmin movements pointed to the re-inscription of Brahman social and ritual power 
under the colonial order through privileged access to western education and employment 
in the colonial government. These groups invoked the Maratha warrior past in their protests 
against Brahman dominance, debunking the tacit assumption of Brahman leadership in 
many nationalist narratives (Deshpande 2004: 14). They put forward their own versions of 
Maharashtra history and traditions, and in doing so created a powerful political grouping in 
the post-colonial period which Mathadis and Hamals, hailing from Western Maharashtra, 
were able to network with. The assassination of Gandhi by a Chitpavan Brahman in 1948 
® The category also reflected the colonial bureaucracy's obsession with indexing patterns of 
behaviour which was fuelled by the colonial state's desire to predict and anticipate its subject 
population's actions, and was associated with theories of race and ethnology which were influential 
at the time: Deshpande, P. (2004). "Caste as Maratha: Social categories, colonial policy and identity 
in early twentieth-century Maharashtra." Indian Economic & Social History Review 41(1): 7-32. 
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boosted anti-Brahman feelings throughout western India. Brahman homes and estates 
were burned and families and individuals attacked in several places in western 
Maharashtra, Pune and the Nagpur region. The "Maratha-isation" of the Congress Party in 
Maharashtra contributed to burgeoning Mathadi and Hamal political power. 
4.3.2 Unionisation 
The long standing tradition of industrial conflict in Mumbai also played a significant role in 
the Mathadi workers' quest for formalisation. Labour unrest increased each year in the 
1960s and early 70s, reaching a peak in 1974 before subsiding (Singh 1983). As one labour 
historian put it, '[t]here have been more labour disputes in the Bombay cotton textile 
industry and they have been of greater intensity than any other place in the country' (Morris 
David Morris cited in (Omvedt 1973: 752)). There was a tenacity in these strikes not seen 
elsewhere in the country. The Mathadi movement was able to form ties with, and ride on 
the influence of this existing labour movement. The existing labour movement provided the 
scaffolding or infrastructure for cooperative learning and sharing of norms and provided 
powerful leverage in negotiations in accordance with the conceptual framework set out in 
Chapter Two. 
The Indian trade union movement had its birth in Mumbai with the organising of textile 
workers (Omvedt 1973, Joshi and Moore 2000: 39). Mumbai was rivalled only by Kolkata as 
the centre of trade union based Marxist politics in India in the 1950s and 60s. This strong 
labour movement aided the development of Mathadi and Hamal associations. Communist 
ideology had taken hold of the working class (Omvedt 1973; 755), and a number of 
influential social reformers were involved in organising workers. Mathadis and Hamals were 
assisted by some of the most significant public figures of the time: Anna Sahib Patil threw 
his efforts behind the organising of Mathadis in the late 1950s in Mumbai; Baba Adhav 
helped workers in Pune to form their own associations, and in Dhule Paranjpe helped to 
organise the Mathadis (Datta 1998: L-4). 
The Hamal organisation (Panchayat) was formed in 1955 in Pune. The story, as Anil Awchat 
(Awchat 1976: 942) told it in 1975, goes that, one day as some Hamals were sitting outside 
a restaurant drinking tea in Pune, they saw the sweeper women arrive in new clothes. The 
women told them that they had got the clothes from the municipal corporation in response 
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to their demands. The Hamals thought, 'these women have made gains through forming 
themselves into a union. W e are men, we don't have any organisation to fight for our rights'. 
Thus, the Hamals decided to form a union. The first meeting was held in a temple. 
The Hamals then approached Baba Adhav, a social reformer and Rashtriya Seva Dal leader 
(Seva Dal Is the grassroots front organization of the Congress party), and a doctor with a 
flourishing practice. Adhav saw the category of manual labourers ("kashtakari", 
"angamehanati kamgar") as a focus point for political mobilisation of the lower class and 
castes. In addition to his efforts at mobilising unorganised workers, Adhav led a number of 
social movements targeting caste, class and gender inequalities (Deshpande 1999: L-25). 
Adhav worked hard to build up the organisation. The Panchayat organised its first successful 
strike in 1968 with more than 3,000 Hamals participating (Deshpande 1999: L-20). This 
culminated in a contract signed between the Panchayat and the "Poona Merchant's 
Chamber". The contract resulted in 15 rules and regulations for load carrying work and fixed 
rates for as many as 45 different tasks performed by Hamals. Such contracts became a 
regular feature of the work of the Panchayat (Deshpande 1999: L-20). Over the next 20 
years, the Panchayat organised half a dozen strikes, transforming the lives of the Hamals in 
Pune (Awchat 1976: 942). By 1976 the Hamal Panchayat had 3,800 members in Pune 
(Awchat 1976: 942). The most popular slogan amongst the Hamal workers in the early years 
was 'I own my back'. 
Annasaheb Patil, a wel l -known labour organiser and committed Congress party leader 
(Deshpande 1999: L-25), who came from a farmer's family in rural Maharashtra, also took 
up the considerable task of mobilising and unionising Mathadi workers in Mumbai in the 
early 1950s. (Today, there is a public holiday in Maharashtra on the day of Patil's death.) 
Patil began collecting information about the problems of these workers. Armed with data 
about the Mathadi workers, together with the Mathadi Kamgar Union and the Hamal 
Panchayat, he approached the Maharashtra State Government and demanded statutory 
protection. 
In 1962, they demanded an independent inquiry into the conditions of Mathadi and Hamal 
workers. Three committee reports over a 3 year period were submitted to the government 
of Maharashtra: (a) Report of the Mathadi Labour Enquiry Committee, Greater Bombay -
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1965, (b) Report of the Lokhandi Jatha Kamgar Enquiry Committee, 1965, and (c) Report of 
the Committee for Unprotected Labour, 1967 (Datta 1998: L-4). The committees suggested 
a separate law rather than amending the definitions of employer and employee in existing 
labour laws (Deshpande 1999: L-21). The reports were submitted by the Committee to the 
Maharashtra Government on 17 November 1967 (subsequently published in the 
National Commission on Labour, 1967 (Government of India 1967). 
We can see, then, that the interaction between the anti-Brahmin movement and the fear 
of industrial unrest that prevailed in Maharashtra at the time strengthened the impact of 
collective action for regulatory reform in a reinforcing manner, "concatenating" into 
dynamic processes of influence, in the language of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (McAdam, 
Tarrow et al. 2001).® In 1969, the legislative assembly passed the Mathadi Act, which came 
into force in 1974 (Government of India 2002). 
4.3.3 The Mathadi Act 
This section of the paper describes in some detail the functioning of the Mathadi Act and 
the ways it contributed to the formalisation of this group of workers. Labour law 
traditionally sets standards and establishes institutions for enforcing their compliance, but 
intervenes only minimally in market interactions of supply and demand. The tripartite 
Mathadi Boards not only set standards, they also act as labour hire agencies. Under the Act, 
both workers and labour users must register with the Boards in order to operate in the 
industry. Payment for work takes place through the Boards, and the levies collected from 
labour users contribute to pensions, workers compensation insurance, hospitals, education 
and so on — benefits most informal, precarious workers in India never receive. 
One of the factors that makes this legislation notable is its comprehensive regulatory 
purposes. It covers a range of benefits such as the standard pay and conditions as well as 
provident (pension) funds, gratuities, ex gratia payments, bonuses, leave wages, medical 
' Mathadis continue to be courted by political parties in Maharashtra for their votes, because of 
their large numbers and active role in politics. See the report at 
http://dnasyndication.eom/dna/article/DNMUM148200. 
benefits and compensation for injury. It is lil<e a labour law system in itself. The broad 
purposes set out in the objects of the Act are (Section 3(2) of MathadiAct, 1969): 
• to regulate the employment of unprotected workers such as Mathadi workers 
• to make better provision for their terms and conditions of employment 
• to provide for their health, safety and welfare 
• to ensure an adequate supply and proper utilization of such workers, and 
• to prevent avoidable unemployment for these workers. 
The Act had two additional purposes that are not listed in the objects, but, according to 
interviewees were in the minds of its drafters. The first was industrial peace. The second 
was a revived and expansive role for trade unions in the regulation of welfare activities. 
4.3.4 The Functioning of Mathadi Boards 
The greatest innovation of the Mathadi Act was the establishment of the tripartite Mathadi 
Boards. The Boards are constituted under Section 6 of the Act. Each Board is responsible for 
a whole district or two adjoining districts. The tripartite Board acts as the regulator for the 
demand and supply of labour. The workers and labour users register with the Board, and 
the Board sends the worker to the labour user, who then pays the Board rather than the 
individual worker (Jhabvala 2005: 2230). 
The Act provides for the establishment of Boards in Mumbai and in regional centres in the 
state of Maharashtra, such as Raigad, Pune, Sangli, etcetera. Though the Mathadi Act was 
to be implemented across the entire state, it took some years to set up the infrastructure 
and implementation outside of Mumbai and Pune. Currently, there are 30 Boards operating 
across Maharashtra. Out of the 30 Boards across the state, 10 boards are located in Mumbai 
with estimated registrations of 50,000 workers (Government of India 2002). 
Table 1: Tripartite Mathadi Boards Operating in Mumbai 
1. Goods Transport Labour Board 
2. The Khokha Making & Timber Market Labour Board 
3. The Railway Goods and Forwarding Labour Board 
4. Grocery Markets & Shops Labour Board 
5. Mumbai Vegetable Market Labour Board 
6. The Cloth Markets or Shops Board 
7. The Clearing & Forwarding Unprotected Dock Labour Board 
8. Metal & Paper Market and Shop Labour Board 
9. Cotton Market Labour Board 
10. The Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board 
Each of these Boards consists of equal representatives from the government, labour users 
and the unions. The board has separate Advisory Committees. The Labour Commissioner, a 
government representative, heads the Committee. 
When the labour users or unprotected workers fail to nominate their representatives to the 
Board or for any other reason the State Government is unable to constitute the Board, the 
State Government may (by Notification in Official Gazette) appoint a person to hold the 
Office till the Board is properly constituted. 
Labour users and workers must register themselves with one of the Boards when they wish 
to hire workers (in the case of labour users) or work as Mathadi (in the case of workers). 
Sections 14 & 31 of the Act prohibit labour users from employing any worker directly, and 
specifies that labour users can employ only registered workers of the Mathadi board. 
Registered workers are assigned to various labour users depending on the volume of work. 
Wage rates are fixed by the Boards, and the labour users must deposit the workers' wages 
along with an additional levy of up to 41 percent of the wages paid for social security and 
other benefits with the boards. The exact percentage of levy varies slightly between the 
Boards. An additional contribution of Rs. 600 every year is collected from each worker 
towards medical facilities. The levy amount varies with different boards. The boards 
disburse the wages to the workers periodically according to the wage periods. 
Mathadi workers are employed on piece-rate basis and they work on the principle of "No 
Work No Wages". As a consequence, the Boards do not directly address the issue of security 
of work. Seniority is considered only when selecting the Mukadam and wage rates are the 
same for all the workers in the board. According to the Joint General Secretary of the Akhil 
Bharatiya Mathadi Transport & General Kamgar Union, Mr. Arun Ranjane, wages range from 
as a little as Rs. 3,000/- to as much as Rs. 40,000 per month. The average wage is around 
Rs. 12,000 to Rs. 15,000 per month. 
The Board's staff are paid from the levy raised from the labour uses, which is negotiated 
every 3 - 4 years. The day to day work of the Boards is primarily to negotiate between 
labour users and the unions, to register labour users and workers, to distribute wages and 
implement welfare schemes. 
In case of a dispute, there are mutual meetings held between the employer/management 
and Union representatives. If the dispute is not solved amicably it is referred to the Mathadi 
board. Further if necessary cases are filled in the Industrial/High Court or even Supreme 
Court. Hence there is no fixed period of the litigation. 
Board oversight 
Under the Act, the Boards are overseen by the Mathadi desk at the Labour Commission. 
The Mathadi desk conducts tasks such as receiving monthly returns from the Boards, 
receiving complaints from the workers, citizens and labour users, receiving the annual 
audit reports from boards, reconstituting of boards, appointment of auditors for the 
boards, monitoring the budgets of the boards, and so on. 
Social insurance 
Various benefits such as a pension fund, gratuity, worker's compensation, free medical care 
for the worker and members of the worker's family, as well as educational assistance for 
the registered Mathadi workers are also provided through the Boards. In this way, the 
Board's operation pays heed to the sentiment expressed by one interviewee, 'you can't 
simply make informal workers formal. You have to ameliorate the effects of informality' 
(Interview with Coen Kompier 2013). Social security at a basic level is a critical factor in the 
formalisation process (Interview with Coen Kompier 2013). Although the types of benefits 
are the same from Board to Board, there is variation in wage rates and quantum of social 
security benefits. According to interviewees, this is because the type of work differs, and 
each Board decides the wage rates and levy contribution through its Advisory Committees. 
Retirement funds are provided for by the Mathadi board system. The Provident Fund is 
managed by the board and not by the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO), 
which is the usual practice in India. Interviewees generally regarded these funds to have 
been satisfactorily managed, though there have been isolated instances of corruption and 
mismanagement. 
Health care provision through the boards 
Establishing accessible and high quality health care has been one of the major achievements 
of the Mathadi workers. This is particularly important as Mathadi workers are excluded 
from the Employees' State Insurance Scheme of India (ESIS) on the basis that they are not 
"wage workers" who receive a monthly salary. In 1976, Anna Patil started a dispensary 
under a trust on part time basis. By 1978 it was working full time. As of late 1990s there 
were two hospitals with an annual budget of Rs 2 crore. In addition, there were 12 
pharmaceutical dispensaries (Datta 1998: L-5). Together, the hospitals have 75 beds 
facilities. These hospitals provide diagnostic services (radiology, pathology and sonography) 
for around 40,000 workers and their families. Workers are given access to a number of 
speciality units, including dental, orthopaedics, general surgery, skin, and cardiology units. 
There are 35 medical officers, 35 specialists, 60 paramedics, and 30 non-medical staff in the 
hospitals. Everyday around 2,500 workers receive treatment. Around 5 surgeries are 
conducted on average (Datta 1998: L-5). The hospitals also organise various educational 
programs and exhibitions at workplace sites, including family planning and Aids awareness 
(Deshpande 1999: L-20). 
Almost 80 to 90 per cent of workers come to the hospitals with fractures, spondylitis, hernia 
and other similar problems. According to the chief medical officer, most of these workers 
suffer from osteoarthritis (degeneration of all joints), and prolapsed inter-vertibrate discs 
(Datta 1998: L-5). These diseases are primarily due to physical stress. Another major cause 
of death in the 1970s was tetanus. An anti-tetanus vaccination campaign was undertaken 
in 1976 and 1982 to prevent these deaths. Deshpande (Deshpande 1999) reports that not 
a single casualty has taken place during the last 30 years due to this precaution. As of 2011, 
the two hospitals continued to be run by six Mathadi Boards across the state. During the 
last few years, some of the Mathadi Boards have obtained insurance against accident, 
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injuries and death. There is no financial contribution to these boards nor to the hospital 
trust by the government (Government of India 2002). They are independent and financially 
sustainable. 
For Manohar Gajare, Retired Joint Labour Commissioner, the present health of the workers 
itself is evidence of success of the MathadiAct (Interview with Manohar Gajare 2011). 
Food 
In order to address the problem of low levels of nutrition amongst Hamal workers, the 
Hamal Panchayat set up community kitchens for Hamals known as "Kastachi Bhakar" 
(Earned Bread) (Deshpande 1999: L-22). This is one of the Panchayat's most successful 
programs. Initially, there were five women employees working under this scheme. By the 
late 1990s there were in all 13 centres run under the scheme with around 150 employees 
among whom around 120 are women. These women are drawn mostly from families of 
Hamal workers. These employees enjoy benefits prescribed by the government including 
the provident fund. Kastachi Bhakar had an annual turnover of about Rs 50 lakh during 
1997-98 (Deshpande 1999: L-22). Apart from the land offered by the government on lease, 
the scheme is completely self- sufficient. It is run on a no profit, no loss basis and is managed 
by a committee of the Panchayat appointed for these purposes. Its benefits are not 
restricted to Hamals, but to all poor people (Deshpande 1999: L-22). 
Reducing exploitative role of Mukadam 
One of the benefits of the Mathadi Boards is that they have overcome many of the problems 
cause by the tolli system. As described earlier in this chapter, one of the barriers to Mathadi 
workers being considered employees under various statutory benefit schemes was the 
intermediation of Mukadams. Labour users had claimed that Mukadam were the 
employers, so as to avoid employment responsibilities. By circumventing the generalised 
system of employment law, the Mathadi Act a\/o\ded questions of "control" which are a key 
aspect of determining who is responsible for the conditions of workers. Previously, 
Mukadams were implicated in the exploitation of workers by taking excessive cuts of 
payments. Under the operation of the MathadiAct, the hourly rate is not negotiable and is 
transparent, so the space for exploitation by mukadam is greatly reduced. 
Today, Mathadi continue to be tightly organised through tolli, though some social factors 
are undermining the strength of this system. Each tolli consists of between 2 to 100 workers. 
The workers in a tolli still tend to belong to the same village and are often related to each 
other. It is common practice that when workers from a tolli return to their village, other 
villagers or relatives come and take their place in the tolli (Government of India 2002). One 
interviewee reported that it is tradition for registered workers to resign in order to make 
room in a tolli for their son, brother or son-in-law (Interview with Manohar Gajare 2011). 
Likewise, a Mathadi union leader reported that, if a worker wants to retire, the normal 
practice for him to be replaced by a blood relation (Interview with R.S. Dhumal 2011). When 
a new member is to be inducted into an existing tolli, it is generally necessary for him to 
obtain a recommendation from two thirds of the tolli members. 
Interviewees provided conflicting information about whether Mukadam continue to act as 
wage collectors. In practice, the Boards collect a form from the labour user which specifies 
the quantum of daily work conducted by the worker, along with another form which gives 
details of his or her attendance at work. The Boards then issue a slip containing details along 
with the wages which are paid through a bank. Some interviewees reported that wages 
accumulate In the bank and workers access their pay as they wish. Other interviews 
reported that the Mukadam collects the cheques of all the tolli members and distributes 
them at the workplace. 
4.3.5 Assessment 
This section and the conclusion to this chapter address the question of how much the 
Mathadi Boards redress dynamics of informalisation described in Part One of this chapter, 
and further, how much they respond to the experiences of workers and the deficits in 
working conditions. Is this response adequate to the task of improving the conditions of 
informal Mathadi workers in Maharashtra and/or acting as a model for addressing 
informality more broadly? 
Official government reviews generally regard the Mathadi Boards as a great success. In 
1967, the First National Commission on Labour recommended that '[w]here employment 
of unprotected labour is of some magnitude, legislation on the lines of the [Mathadi Act] 
may be considered by other State Governments for enactment' (Government of India 
104 
1967: 278). 
By the mid-1970s, Mathadi work was much sought after in comparison to other varieties 
of migrant labour. In 1976 Awchat, described how unusual and valued hamal work was 
(Awchat 1976); 
With the rate of migration from the villages to the cities having gone up, landless 
and poor peasant youths abound in the city and their condition is really bad. Even 
though the work conditions are so wretched, there is a long waiting list with the 
Hamal Panchayat of people seeking work as hamals... The large-scale unemployment 
makes those who have found jobs, even in the most degrading conditions, more 
fortunate than those who have none. So the men hang on to the job for dear life. 
Movement from one job to another is very infrequent. Once a hamal starts working 
in a godown, say, at the age of fifteen, he stays in it for his life- time. 
In 1998 Datta charted the improvements in Mathadi conditions in the following table, 
adapted for this chapter (Datta 1998) (Table 3). 
Table 3: Characteristics of Mathadi Labour Market 
Before 1969 % After the Act 
1 Physical manual labour I 
Unions present 
Strong unions represent workers 
Flexible work 
Establishment of the tripartite board 
No fixed hours of work spread over a day 
Registration of employee and labour user 
Workers work in "tollis" 




Mukadam is one of the Mathadis in a tolli 
Wages by piece rate 
Bargaining minimum piece rate wages (per 
tonne or per piece) and levy one in three 
years 
Basic piece rate linked to Consumer Price 
Index 
No fixed employer 
Settlement and agreements signed over 
working conditions between the union and 
management of many large and Indian 
multinational companies 
Multi-employers. No direct employer-
employee relationship 
Employer-employee relationship is 
mediated by the Mathadi Boards. 
Volume and time of work at time when 
work available 
Workers in a tolli mostly come from the 
same village - often related to each other 
No regularity in or continuity of work, but 
permanent work 
Overtime and double rate after 9.30pm 
No paid weekly days off or holiday 
No retirement fund, medical benefit, 
accident compensation allowance, etc 
A hospital has been set up for medical care 
and sickness. 
Social security benefits paid. 
Average wages earned Rs 150-200 per 
month (in 1962) 
Average wages earned Rs 2,000-10,000 per 
month (1997) 
15,000 to 17,000 Mathadis in Mumbai 




The 2002 report of the Second National Commission on Labour continued to report 
positively regarding the Mathadi Boards. It credited the boards with successfully 
decasualising Mathadi workers and also recommended the Boards as a model for the 
unorganised sector throughout India (see paragraph 7.376) (Government of India 2002: 
129). One of the most important features of the Boards is that they are self-organising and 
financially self-supporting. They do not burden government finances (Jhabvala 2005: 2231). 
Yet the Mathadi Boards do suffer from some problems. They have been criticised by 
workers' advocates for offering different rates of payment workers from market to market 
because the rates are locally decided (Deshpande 1999: L-21). The boards have also been 
criticised for acting as wage distributing agencies and failing to make any positive 
intervention in the market on behalf of the w/orkers (Deshpande 1999: L-21). 
At times, dominant political interests operating at both state and local level have 
manipulated the Boards for their ow/n purposes. The Mathadi Act provides for the 
appointment of state representatives on the boards. According to Deshpande, this gave rise 
to a new system of political patronage. It led to politicisation of the workers' organisations 
as workers' representatives played a crucial role in managing the Mathadi Boards 
(Deshpande 1999). The Congress Party in Maharashtra almost exclusively dominated the 
overall political process in the state until 1995. Deshpande reports that the Congress tried 
to appropriate Mathadi Boards in various ways, as it did in the co-operative movement 
(Deshpande 1999). 
Mathadi work Is also under threat from economic liberalisation and modernisation. With 
the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the 1990s, and the introduction of extensive 
structural adjustment programs, medium and large enterprises in the organised sector 
began "restructuring" their businesses. In the process, these enterprises retrenched 
thousands of workers under voluntary retirement schemes. When firms were unable to, or 
wished not to pay redundancy benefits, they transferred workers to mathadi work. This led 
to an over-supply of workers of this type and reduced the amount of work available to 
existing workers. Since Mathadi workers are piece-rated workers, and their social security 
benefits are linked to the wages they earn, it was feared this would have an overall 
detrimental effect on their earnings and well-being (Datta 1998: L-5). 
The modernisation of loading and unloading of ships and crates also poses a threat to this 
type of work. The introduction of cranes and conveyor belts, and elimination of small 
booking of wagons in railways, reduced the amount of work available to Mathadi workers 
(Datta 1998: L-5). The semi-skilled and skilled workers that operate the machinery are not 
covered by the Mathadi Act, creating two categories of workers conducting work for the 
same purpose. 
The success of the Mathadi Act may also be affecting the demographics of migrant workers 
interested in undertaking Mathadi work. By increasing the earnings of Mathadi and the 
health, education and well-being of their families, the formalisation of this work has led to 
a generation gap. One interviewee, Arun Ranjane, reported that the children of Mathadi 
workers are no longer interested in doing loading and unloading work; instead they aim to 
attain employment in more highly skilled and paid, jobs (Interview with Arun S. Ranjane). 
Indeed, Ranjane reported with some pride that some of the sons and daughters of Mathadi 
workers are medical doctors, lawyers, IT professionals and alike (Interview with Arun S. 
Ranjane). A consequence is that new workers are often migrants from other states. This has 
led to a partial breakdown of the social cohesion of the tolli system. 
Employer bodies and industry associations have voiced opposition to the Mathadi Act since 
it was passed, organising countervailing networks against the Boards. There have been 
accusations from management representatives that erring workers are rarely disciplined. 
They complain that Mathadis refuse to accept the wages as determined by the Board and 
demand more at the factory gates. In order to curb this, there has been a unanimous 
demand from industry owners to expel such workers from the operation of the Mathadi Act 
(Editorial 2010). A further criticism is that the system is operating as a union monopoly. This 
point was picked up in the Second National Commission on Labour: 
...some witnesses did point out that the system works like a closed shop. Some 
representatives of the management also felt that this system created a monopoly 
and resulted in arbitrary fixation of wages. [7.378] (Government of India 2002:129). 
Numerous court challenges to the Act have been attempted by these countervailing 
networks. At the time the Mathadi Act was first passed, the traders of Poona went to court 
to apply for a "stay" (Awchat 1976). A later challenge resulted in a 2009 Supreme Court of 
India judgement on the Mathadi Act that reinforced the jurisdiction of the Act for labourers: 
Bhuwalka Steel Indus. Ltd vs Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Bd. & Anr. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Overall, the Mathadi Boards are a remarkable success story. Instead of extending labour 
law, as in the Bulgarian example, or layering on top of labour law, as in the Australian 
example, the Mathadi Act sets up an alternative regulatory model. This model performs all 
the functions of a normal labour law system, as well additional features, including health 
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and education services, which have made great differences to the social development of 
Mathadi w/orkers and their families. 
By bypassing the normal labour law/ model, regulators in Maharashtra have been able to 
experiment w/ith different tools and levers from those traditionally employed. The Mathadi 
Boards gain their pow/er by modifying the operation of the market. Rather than using the 
usual command and control model of sanctioning non-complying employers seen in most 
employment law systems, the Boards ensure that compliance occurs by acting as an 
intermediary in the hire and payment of workers. They therefore play an active, rather than 
reactive, role in the management of Mathadi working conditions. The Boards are an 
effective model of regulation because they have a monopoly on the supply of labour. 
Normally, labour relations systems impact on labour supply and demand indirectly through 
regulating occupational training, qualifications and pay rates. Most labour relations systems 
do not impede on the operation of labour markets beyond these means. Controlling the 
supply of labour is a stronger lever than the tool kit of enforcement mechanisms normally 
available to regulators. Indeed, it might be considered a small scale "governance" 
mechanism, like tariffs, as opposed to "regulatory" mechanism, strictly speaking 
(Braithwaite, Coglianese et al. 2007). 
An additional benefit of displacing the normal industrial relations system is that a localised 
strategy has been made possible. Boards are organised around the target populations - on 
the docks, in the markets — and respond to the particular needs of those populations. 
Hospitals have been created in response to community demand for health services, for 
instance. Further, because the system is imbued with a sense of experimentation and freed 
of path dependency. Boards have felt at liberty to try out new strategies to achieve 
improved health and human development of Mathadi workers. If the system was part of 
the normal labour relations system, the provision of health services might not be seen to 
be a role of the institutional complex. 
The Mathadi Act qu\ck\'^ became a model for implementation for informal workers in other 
states. The opportunity to experiment has resulted in replication, though arguably with less 
innovation than in the original model. Delegations of workers from other states such as 
Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and so on visited Maharashtra and 
studied the new system. 
Though the boards have been praised as a model for regulation of unorganised workers 
(Government of India 2002: 278), they have not yet been used as a broader model for labour 
market regulation of by the central Indian government. Over the last decade, various 
government inquiries have examined ways to improve the conditions of informal workers 
in India (Committee on Petitions 2006, India 2008). The primarily result has been the 
Unorganised Workers' Social Security Act (2008) which follows the more modified welfare 
board model seen in Kerala. The Act is an important starting point for improving the 
livelihoods of the poor in India, but falls well short of the Mathadi Board model which 
provides much more than a means for extending social security to informal workers. The 
government of India seems hesitant to implement models that allow for the agonistic 
bargaining processes of traditional labour law institutions and the Mathadi Boards, 
preferring instead a model of universal social security provision. 
This chapter has shown that the formalisation of Mathadi workers occurred under a unique 
set of circumstances, in the context of labour unrest and communist influence in post-
Independence Mumbai. These workers were able to gain strong political purchase because 
they represented a category of non-Brahmin workers who the majority Congress party 
wished to gain the support of and be seen to represent. Their early migration to urban 
centres also gave them advantages that other informal workers did not enjoy. They were 
also predominantly male, which likely gave their role in public discourse greater legitimacy. 
Despite the extension of various labour protections to informal workers in India, in many 
ways the conditions of these workers have worsened rather than improved compared with 
the situation for Mathadi workers in the 1960s. In an interview. Sheila Balla, Labour 
Historian, noted that the loss of arable land is still a salient issue for smallholders, 'as 
speculators buy [up the land], and land prices are increasing.' Thus, much of the rural 
population have come to resent that they are denied access to land, and the land is being 
lost to agriculture (Interview with Sheila Balla). Though the interviewee noted that there is 
supposed to be some legal protection providing a "cut-off point" at which land must not be 
converted for industrial use, these are not implemented in practice. As most people do not 
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have enough land to cover their subsistence needs and to generate a profit, smallholders 
are forced to take on multiple jobs (Interview with Sheila Balla). 
Competit ion for informal work has increased since the 1990s amongst the growing 
precariat. Because of poor absorption rates in the formal industrial and service sectors, the 
informal sector grew between 1999-2005, whereas formal sector employment declined in 
both absolute and percentage terms over the same period. Meanwhile, informal sector 
employment went up from 361.7 million to 422.6 million over this 5-year period (Maiti 
2013: 517). 
The living conditions of workers who migrate to urban centres has also become more 
precarious. One of the greatest threats to informal workers in Mumbai, as with other mega-
cities around the world, is the fast pace of urban development. Cases are frequently 
reported in the news and filed in the courts of law by occupants of chawls, old and 
dilapidated buildings, and slum shanties against the grabbing of their properties by 
unscrupulous land developers and builders (Sharma 2010: 84). Harvey calls this process 
"accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey 2003). The precariousness of life for informal 
workers today in India makes the contribution of the Mathadi Act to the betterment of 
Mathadi workers' lives all the more precious. 
I l l 
5 APPAREL INDUSTRY IN AUSTRALIA 
5.1 Introduction 
Workers in developed economies have not been immune from the dynamics of global trade 
and economic liberalisation that have stranded vulnerable workers in poorer countries. This 
chapter tracks the informalisation of apparel production in Australia throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, and subsequent attempts to re-formalise work by the creation of innovative 
legislation and ethical initiatives that add levers and regulatory agents. In order to assess 
the responsiveness of the regulatory innovations that were layered, one on top of the other, 
in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, this study contends that it is necessary to have a sense of 
what it might be responding to. How did national and international factors converge to 
leave a migrant group stranded, without the employment conditions and protections that 
Australia prided itself on providing to its working population? 
As with most countries around the world, beginning in the 1980s, Australia opened its 
economy to global competition, reducing tariffs and other protectionist measures. At that 
time, more and more countries were establishing themselves as sites for apparel production 
— a comparatively easy market to enter. One such example is Cambodia, which is examined 
in a later chapter. When Australia opened itself to import penetration, its manufacturers 
were exposed to competition from poor economies whose competitive advantage was 
cheap labour. At the same time, in part as an attempt to remedy the wrongs of the "White 
Australia" policy and Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War, Australia opened its 
borders to Asian immigration. An influx of Vietnamese and Chinese immigrants followed, 
many of whom were refugees who had spent time in camps before being settled in 
Australia. These two factors together - economic liberalisation and an influx of new workers 
- fuelled the informalisation of work. These types of informal workers are referred to both 
as "outworkers" or "homeworkers", and sometimes also as "sweatshop workers". Not only 
did this influx of immigrants contribute to an over-supply of unskilled labour, the workers' 
particular cultural preferences, as well as their experiences of war, state socialism, fleeing 
their countries of origin in small and unsafe boats and then being interned for years in 
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refugee camps, contributed to their vulnerability and predilection for working at home, 
within family units. 
5.1.1 Field work described in this chapter 
The research for this chapter has benefited from many years of participant observation. My 
interest in industrial outwork in Australia was piqued when I was still an undergraduate 
student. I attended the initial meetings in 1994 which led to the formation of FairWear in 
1995 and the development of the Code of Conduct described in this chapter. The narrative 
of formalisation described in this chapter is informed by around 20 years of participant 
observation. In 2013, just over 30 Vietnamese workers were interviewed in the western 
suburbs of Melbourne.'" An initial four of these interviews were used as pilots for the 
development of questions. 26 of these interviews were then conducted with a group of 
closed questions which are listed in Appendix Two of this chapter. Appendix Three reports 
on the findings. Further interviews were conducted with union and community 
campaigners, employers and fashion designers, as well as countless conversations over the 
years with players in the industry which inform the views expressed in this chapter. 
Conducting interviews with workers entailed visiting the homes of industrial outworkers 
who migrated from Vietnam in the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, where I recorded their life 
histories and observed them work, as their homes also serve as workplaces. Often husband 
and wife teams or good friends worked together. Sometimes children helped. Other 
relatives and friends lent a hand during particularly busy periods. They had purchased 
sewing machines and other materials and set up a production site in their garages, sheds 
and spare rooms. I witnessed the labels of a number of well-known Australian brands being 
sewn into jackets, blouses and pants. 
For most of these people's working lives as machinists they had never received the legal 
rate of pay, paid holidays or sick leave. The families I interviewed reported frequently 
^^  All but two of the respondents to my interviews had arrived In Australia between 1990 and 1995 
from Vietnam, and all were aged between 35 and 55. Equal numbers of men and women were 
interviewed, which differs from the general population of outworkers who are understood to be 
female. All but two were married and had dependent children. The eldest children of the 
respondents were in their late teens or 20s. All interviewees are referred to by pseudonyms. 
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spending 16 hours a day in tliese rooms, sewing clothes. They worked long hours in order 
to earn enough money to support their families. Most told stories of not being paid at all 
for weeks of work, as the "outworker boss" who gives them work had disappeared or simply 
refused to pay. Some workers interviewed had very recently begun to enjoy something 
close to their legal entitlements. 
Regardless of the long hours and the visible strain this work had placed on their bodies 
(many interviewees could not bear to sit for the length of the interview, they had to stand 
and move around while we talked), almost all interviewees spoke of this work in positive 
terms. They didn't know how they would have survived in Australia without it. It had 
allowed them to stay close to their families, to supervise their children's homework while 
they worked, to take short breaks to cook and then return to making a livelihood. Staying 
close to family members was particularly important for those who had experienced trauma 
in Vietnam and in the process of fleeing. All interviewees were proud of what they had been 
able to provide their children because of their hard work, and most with older children 
reported that they had professional jobs and university degrees. 
The first part of this chapter identifies a number of factors that contributed to the 
informalisation of outworkers in Australia since the 1980s, examining the extent of the 
entrenchment of informalisation and its effect on such workers. The second part then 
examines the multi-layered regulatory initiatives that were later developed to address this 
informality, by both state-and non-state players. This chapter provides an assessment of 
how a market-based corporate accountability approach in the TFC industry, overseen by a 
multi-stakeholder industry body, is layered over the existing labour law system. The market 
based initiative is coupled with "supply chain legislation" which expands the methods 
available to workers for recovering unpaid wages. Despite evidence that the regulatory 
initiatives described in this chapter were beginning to have some success in improving the 
conditions of home-based workers, they are being stripped back and de-funded by the 
conservative government elected in Australia in 2013. Thus, this chapter concludes by 
reflecting on the susceptibility to political dynamics of initiatives of this type. 
5.2 Part One: Dynamics of informalisation 
There have always been outworkers working in the TCF sector in Australia. Their numbers 
have ebbed and flowed with waves of immigration and other economic trends such as levels 
of protection (Peck 1990). The period of growth of informal work in Australia the 1980s and 
1990s studied in this chapter is only one instance of cycles of growth and retraction in 
informal work in the TCF industry since industrialisation. Fluctuations in both the numbers 
of outworkers and the extent of informality can be attributed to various causes, with 
different disciplines emphasizing one over the other, often viewing each in isolation. 
The following part identifies four important dynamics of informalisation, representing an 
attempt to understand the ways that these dynamics intersected and compounded one 
another. This part then continues to explain the effects of informalisation on the conditions 
of workers, and examines the extent of its entrenchment. 
5.2.1 Macro-economic restructuring and liberalisation 
One of the most significant triggers of informalisation in Australia's apparel industry was 
the stripping of tariffs and import quotas in order to better integrate Australia's economy 
into global trade. 
The TCF industry in Australia, particularly clothing manufacturers, were traditionally 
protected by high tariffs and/or import quotas. The early emphasis was on tariffs. The 
rationale for tariff protection in Australia in the early part of the twentieth century was both 
to provide shelter for infant industries and also to foster decent work. The 1929 Brigden 
report stated that 'there is more to be said for protecting an industry because it employs 
labour at good wages than for any other reason' (Samuelson 1939). Tariffs supported 
integrated production, with most aspects of manufacturing being conducted by large 
enterprises who employed a large permanent workforce. 
Beginning in 1974, tariffs were reduced and replaced with import quotas.^' Further 
reductions in protection occurred between 1988 and 1995 under the 1987 TCF Industry Plan 
" This section draws on the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, 'Textile, Clothing, 
Footwear and Leather Industries: Action Agendas: A Discussion Paper' (Commonwealth of Australia, 
7-8 March 1999), available at: 
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(or the Button Plan, as it came to be known), with the eventual effect of reducing the 
maximum tariff on TCF products to 25 per cent in 2000 (Department of Industry Tourism 
and Resources 2002). The era of protection for manufacturers was largely over. It became 
much cheaper for Australian fashion houses to source production overseas for certain 
segments of the market. This was facilitated by changes in the institutions governing 
international markets as well as the reforms within developing and emerging economies 
which enabled them to realise their competitive advantage in labour-intensive production 
(Productivity Commission 2008: xv). 
The garment manufacturing industry in Australia haemorrhaged. Reports of factories 
closing occurred on a weekly basis. Other Australian industries survived increased import 
penetration by improving productivity and quality. However, technological constraints 
placed a ceiling on benefits to be gained by upgrading of this nature. 
5.2.2 Small scale production makes homeworking viable 
The liberalisation of apparel trade alone would not have been sufficient to create 
informality amongst outworkers. Indeed, the apparel industry entails specific technological 
and organisational conditions, the nature of which renders the industry susceptible to 
informality. Unlike most significant contemporary industries, much of the clothing sector 
remains small scale and labour-intensive. The production process comprises small, low cost 
machinery, easily operated by an individual, and transportable raw materials with a high 
"labour input to bulk" ratio (Peck 1996). There are technological limits intrinsic to clothing 
manufacture. Operators cannot keep up with the speed of advanced sewing machines. 
Handling time comprises 70-90 per cent of the sewing process, which slows the process 
down considerably (Ellem 1989). Technological advances in pattern making, pre-
programming and inventory control has given factories the ability to subcontract 
manufacturing processes while still ensuring that a certain level of quality is maintained 




Although there are advantages of scale to conducting work in factories, the technology is 
basically the same in the outward processing or cut make and trim end of production, 
regardless of whether the work is conducted at home on a in a factory. Homeworkers can 
buy their own machine(s), operate them in their home and receive sufficient raw materials 
to work for a number of days. 
Fashion trends in the women's and sporting sectors in the latter part of the 20''^  century 
further opened the market for outworkers in the TFC industry in Australia. Whereas there 
were previously only 2-4 annual seasons of fashion, there was now consumer demand for 
constant changes in stock and greater product differentiation. This meant ever shorter lead-
in times for production and smaller runs of one style of garment were required. Electronic 
sales and inventory systems allowed for a speedy evaluation of production requirements 
on individual lines. Finally, the call for swift delivery of fashion merchandise meant that 
Australian production had geographic advantages compared to offshore apparel producers, 
where retailers could be left with unsold, out-dated products if international orders were 
not delivered promptly (Peck 1990). This made production in urban homes a viable option 
for production of certain lines of apparel in Australia. Once production was occurring at 
home, it was much harder to regulate, as later sections discuss. 
5.2.3 Integrated firms disintegrate to pass on competitive risks 
The liberalisation of trade barriers, in addition to the growing propensity towards small 
runs, encouraged the vertical disintegration of large, integrated apparel manufacturers who 
had previously conducted the full package of production. The speed of this vertical 
disintegration was propelled by strong downwards pressure from ever more powerful 
retailers and brands. 
The restructuring of the TCF industry in Australia resulted in a concentration of market 
power amongst a small number of retailers, as many smaller retailers did not cope with 
import penetration and changes in the industry. The clothing retail industry in Australia is 
dominated by a small number of major players — Myer and David Jones at the higher end. 
Target and K-Mart at the lower end, and clothing chains such as those owned by the Just 
Group - hold the lion share of the market (Weller 2007)." This concentration of retailer 
market power, coupled with the damage to local manufacturers resulting from import 
penetration, gave rise to new power dynamics in the industry in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Retailers were able to call the shots in ways not previously possible. It is for this reason that 
TCF value chains in Australia have been characterised as vertical supply chains (Rawling and 
Kaine 2012). 
Manufacturers responded to heightened competition from imports and local businesses by 
casting off non-core aspects of their business or "contracting in" peripheral services and 
functions. These forms of vertical disintegration—the breaking up of large, integrated, 
multi-function corporations into smaller units— led to a re-distribution economic and social 
risk (Amoore 2002, Amoore, 2005 #5465). For core businesses that cast off employees, this 
was an important risk management and cost reduction strategy, enabling business to evade 
responsibility for continuing to uphold wages for workers, and to maintain occupational 
health and safety standards, for example — regardless of fluctuations in working capital or 
customer demand. 
Layoffs from factories and increasing unemployment and underemployment increased the 
supply and decreased the bargaining strength of peripheral, vulnerable workers (Mayhew 
and Quinlan 1998). The latter competed with each other for jobs, accepting the terms they 
were offered. The result was a further contraction in formal employment in the industry 
(Peck 1990) and ever more complicated supply chains. 
5.2.4 Social factors compound economic causes of informality 
At the same time as Australia was integrating into the global economy in trade, the nation 
was also opening up to immigration from Asia. Following the end of the "White Australia" 
policy, Australia accepted large numbers of Vietnamese immigrants, in part to remedy the 
perceived injustice of its involvement in the Vietnam War. These immigrants arrived in 
Australia with low English language levels, no savings, non-transferable skills, and suffering 
trauma from their experiences of social upheaval. These attributes meant that home-based 
" Not all supply chains in Australia are buyer-driven. Small designers that sell from small boutiques 
do not wield the same level of power, and in these supply chains manufacturers may be dominant. 
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work in the apparel industry wasoneof tlie only occupations available to them upon arrival. 
This section of the chapter explores the reasons that workers entered home-based work. 
Chinese, Korean and other Asian immigrants have also made up significant proportions of 
outworkers from the 1990s to today. However, this section focuses on Vietnamese 
immigrants, as these were the primary respondents to the qualitative interviews conducted 
for this study. 
Vietnamese immigration into Australia charts a unique history - an understanding of which 
will help to elucidate how this group of immigrants became entrenched in informal 
outwork. The first major wave of Vietnamese migration to Australia started in the mid-
1970s, with the arrival of large numbers of refugees following the end of the Vietnam War. 
In 1975 the first boat carrying Vietnamese refugees arrived in Australia. By 1981 the 
Vietnam-born population in Victoria, the state in which interviews for this chapter was 
carried out, was over 12,000 (Immigration Museum Victoria 2013). A second wave of 
Vietnamese immigration occurred in 1983-84, following the 1982 agreement between the 
Australian and Vietnamese governments (the Orderly Departure Program) which allowed 
relatives of Vietnamese Australians to leave Vietnam and migrate to Australia. The third 
peak in the late 1980s seems to have been mainly due to the family reunion scheme. 
Vietnamese-born settlers accounted for 8 per cent of all settlers who arrived in 1992 and 
represented an outflow of 100 per million of that country's population (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 1994). Today the Vietnam-born represent the fifth largest migrant community 
in Australia, and after the United States of America, Australia is the second most common 
destination for Vietnamese migrants. 
One reason that many Vietnamese immigrants found themselves conducting industrial 
outwork after arriving in Australia was because they were economically disadvantaged. Like 
other immigrants, Vietnamese immigrants to Australia generally do less well economically 
than their counterparts who have been born in the country. Even in countries such as 
Australia, which maintain large-scale government-funded programs to assist immigrants to 
settle to minimise economic disruption, economic disadvantage still takes place. Reflecting 
the trends in immigration literature, McAllister (McAllister 1995) identifies three main 
explanations to account for the apparently universal economic disadvantages experienced 
by immigrants to a new country. 
The first explanation sees these economic differences as a consequence of the lower levels 
of human capital available to immigrants. This is reflected in the possession of fewer and 
sometimes inferior educational qualifications and skills, and less experience within the host 
society, including poor language skills and other cultural disadvantages. Once they are 
placed within an economically advanced labour market, competing against a skilled and 
experienced workforce, immigrants are immediately disadvantaged. The second 
explanation points to overt discrimination by employers who choose to hire those born in 
the country in preference to equally well-qualified and experienced immigrants. A third 
explanation for the economic disadvantages of immigrants put forward by McAllister is that 
the act of migration itself has negative consequences for a working career. 
Each of these explanations are supported by the data collected in the interviews conducted 
for this study. Like Christina Cregan (Cregan 2001), whose study is described in greater detail 
later in this chapter, I found that a major factor affecting the choice of work available 
outworkers when they first arrived in Australia was low language and occupational skills. 
This put recently arrived Immigrants at a distinct disadvantage once they arrived in 
Australia. Of the respondents to Cregan's study, nearly one sixth had been educated only 
to primary school level, over a half had attended high school level, and the remainder had 
attended a tertiary institution. Only about ten per cent - those raised and educated in 
Australia - said they were fluent. A number of interviewees I spoke to explained that they 
had tried to learn English but had insufficient time due to job and family demands. 
Low literacy levels are also likely to make acquisition of a second language more difficult. 
Vietnam has a low human development index rating compared with Australia. Most of the 
workers interviewed for this chapter arrived in the third wave of Vietnamese immigration 
- in the late 1980s or early 1990s, though some arrived in the first wave. Vietnam was a 
poor country at this time, with low education, health and income. In 1990, the earliest date 
at which data of this type became available for Vietnam, its human development index (HDI) 
was 0.439 (http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/VNM.html). Australia's ranking 
was 0.880 in 1990 (http://hdrstats.undp.ore/en/countries/profiles/AUS.html). The HDI 
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comparison shows a marked disparity between the two countries' life expectancy, 
education and income levels. Even today, the mean years of attendance at school in 
Vietnam is 5, compared with Australia where the mean number of years is 12. Only one 
respondent interviewed for my research had a professional qualification. The majority had 
not completed high school. Very few of the women I interviewed had gone beyond year 8 
at high school. Prior to migrating, most were farmers, fishermen or had worked as tailors in 
family businesses. There were only a few exceptions: one interviewee had finished school 
and been a bookkeeper in Vietnam. Her aspiration, putting all barriers to one side, was to 
be an accountant or bookkeeper in Australia, but she had not realised that aspiration. Apart 
from those who had worked as tailors, most found that their skills and life experience to 
that point did not help them in the Australian job market. 
This low skill base of interviewees was certainly made worse by the experience of migration, 
in keeping with McAllister's thesis. Many of the workers came to Australia on boats, or had 
spent a number of years in refugee camps in the very years when they would normally being 
laying the foundations for their future working lives. A number of respondents to my study 
explained to me the ways in which being in a refugee camp set them back economically. 
Although it provided safety and refuge, paid work is not allowed in refugee camps. Some 
refugees who had sought refuge in Hong Kong, and gained some form of residency for a 
number of years before coming to Australia, were allowed to work. Two worked in clothing 
factories in Hong Kong which provided a good background for industrial outwork. Others 
who were held in Malaysia were not allowed to work at all. This meant that during the years 
when people are normally attending university or acquiring trade skills of some type, they 
were excluded from skill formation. 
Finding themselves without appropriate skills, but needing work quickly, they relied on 
friends to help them gain the skills needed to gain work in Australia. Other than those who 
already possessed sewing skills, most interviewees were taught how to use sewing 
machines by friends and family. Most respondents said that they found out about sewing 
work because a family member or friend told them the work was available. They relied on 
these social networks to find work partly because they perceived that they lacked the skills 
for the formal economy, and partly because they lacked the knowledge to navigate the 
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formal job market. This is consistent with Christina Cregan's study which was conducted in 
2001 (Cregan 2011) which found that 70 per cent of worl<ers found the work through 
friends. 
Even those who were engaged as outworkers after answering ads in newspapers reported 
that they were encouraged to do so by friends who were doing similar work. Ads for 
outwork were posted in Vietnamese newspapers, and the employers or "outworker" bosses 
were generally also from the Vietnamese community. 
This fact of finding work through social networks is consistent with the literature on 
informal work (Arbex and O'Dea 2011). Indeed, research in the field of social networks 
shows that the market for informal work operates differently than the market for formal 
work (Arbex and O'Dea 2011). Similarly, research conducted in 1995 in South Australia 
found that over 50 per cent of Vietnamese respondents belonged to "community 
networks", compared with fewer than a quarter of the other groups (Carson 1995). Those 
involved in community type networks have linked contacts, or what might be termed in the 
social capital literature strong horizontal "bonding capital" (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). 
Their kin, occupational, religious and other social ties tend to intersect and overlap. 
While these community networks provide a strong assurance of finding work, they also limit 
the type of occupations available. The portrayal of the nature of social networks in the 
Vietnamese community studied in Carson's (Carson 1995) project resonates with the ways 
that respondents to my study described their social ties. Most interviewees could only 
speak very basic English, and we needed an interpreter to help conduct the interviews. This 
limited their social interactions to those with Vietnamese language skills, and thus those 
within their own communities. Because interviewees lived in areas with many other 
Vietnamese families, they could do their shopping, attend church or Buddhist temple, and 
socialise within their own ethnic community. They enjoyed close relations with other 
community members and relatives, but did not mix within broader Australian society. One 
respondent who lives in St Albans, Melbourne, said that she only leaves the house to do the 
shopping or take the children places. As the respondent does not speak English, she 'does 
not know what is going on outside the house, except what her husband tells her'. She said, 
'with young children and no English, I can't imagine how that would change'. 
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A Vietnamese couple interviewed for this study, Lan and Hung Nguyen, share a personal 
history which is emblematic of the factors discussed in this section. The couple described 
the traumatic circumstances which characterised their passage to Australia - how they left 
Vietnam in 1989 with 152 others, crammed onto a small boat. It was not until they were 
sure that they were out of Vietnamese waters and clear of Vietnamese authorities that all 
the passengers on the boat collectively decided which country the boat should head 
towards. The passengers slept propped up against a wall or leaning on someone else. 
They were both from Hue, Vietnam. The husband had studied teaching in at university in 
Vietnam - he was the only respondent with a tertiary education. The United Nations (UN) 
refugee camp that they were taken to in the Philippines did not allow refugees to work. 
After being interviewed by the UN High Commission for Refugees (HCR) the couple were 
categorised as refugees and put on a waiting list until a country would accept them. Because 
of restrictions on working in refugee camps, the husband's teaching skills lay idle. Once 
again, the couple did not know where they would end up. It might have been Canada, the 
US or Australia. After three years of waiting, they were sent to Australia. 
When they arrived they were given the opportunity to take English classes, but the husband 
struggled to learn English, as he was scarcely able to find the time to attend the 
government-run classes. He found it difficult to fit in studying, looking for work and doing 
odd jobs at the same time. By now the couple had two young children who he needed to 
support. The family received unemployment benefits, but it was not enough to live on. In 
1996, the husband felt despondent about the prospects for learning adequate English to 
become a teacher. He explained that to be a teacher you have to be highly fluent, not just 
proficient. He was forced, therefore, to find a new career. Many of their friends were 
working as homeworkers, so the husband and wife together attained a "licence" to sew 
clothes. They began their working lives as industrial outworkers, learning the skills from 
friends. This new job allowed the couple to remain at home for their children and also be 
together. 
The couple placed a high value on being able to stay together. This seemed to be a 
consequence of the trauma they had mutually experienced. After suffering political 
repression in Vietnam, leaving their home country and being separated from close family, 
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staying together was important for the pair. Worl<ing from home allowed them to work as 
a team in an environment that they had control over. 
This finding is speculative, but consistent with the literature on refugees and trauma. 
Various adverse psychiatric consequences of traumatic events have been widely reported 
in refugee populations. Epidemiological studies have identified post-traumatic stress 
disorder and depression as the two most prevalent disorders in refugee populations (Steel, 
Silove et al. 2002: 1057). A study of 1161 households with Vietnamese speaking members 
in Australia confirms the experience of trauma by refugees in Vietnamese communities. 
Slightly more than half the respondents had left Vietnam by boat; about the same 
proportion had lived in a refugee camp for a mean period of 19 months before arriving in 
Australia. 203 (17 per cent) respondents were separated from immediate family members 
because of their flight to Australia, and 624 (54 per cent) were separated from other close 
relatives. Respondents reported exposure to between two to seven different traumatic 
events (Steel, Silove et al. 2002: 1059). The study found that those respondents who had 
been subjected to trauma were far more likely to experience mental illness of some type 
(Steel, Silove et al. 2002: 1059).) 
The broad outline of Lan and Hung Nguyen's story was quite typical of the personal histories 
that other interviewees shared with me, as evidence by the data reported in Appendix 
Three, although important personal details varied. Some had quite horrific stories that it is 
hard to imagine ever recovering from. The husband of one of the organisers employed by 
the TCFUA had fled Vietnam ahead of the rest of the family, hiding in a shipping container. 
He was found dead weeks later when the shipping container was unpacked, thought to have 
starved or died from dehydration. 
We can see from the personal histories of the workers how various factors combined to 
draw them into home-based work. 
Research into outwork conducted by Peck has showed that the fact that there were so many 
people choosing sewing as an alternative to continuing to search for work in the broader 
workforce was a factor that contributed to informality (Peck 1990). The supply of labour far 
outstripped demand. Thousands of people were arriving in Australia with either low skills 
or skills which had litt le relevance the Australian context. Every poor, recently arrived 
immigrant that answered an advert isement in an ethnic communi ty newspaper was 
effectively adding to the power of the intermediaries to demand lower and lower piece 
rates. As factory workers lost their jobs, they also joined the ranks of workers looking for 
work as homeworkers. And so, a pool of workers was created that had l itt le incentive to 
push for higher wages, because they needed the work and did not want to cause ripples 
that might lead to them losing the work (Peck 1990). 
Downwards pressure on pay and conditions created by the oversupply of labour created 
the conditions for informal i ty and mistrust in formal institutions deepened it. New 
immigrants had l itt le trust in the institutions of government (and, by association, trade 
unions). In state socialist countries, such as Vietnam, the union and the state are not 
separate. They are arms of the same apparatus. Thus, workers were reticent to make a 
complaint or join collective action for better working conditions. The l i terature on refugees 
and mistrust is vast, and wil l not be rehearsed here (Daniel and Knudsen 1995). For refugees 
who have f led oppressive governments, there is good reason to stay clear of the institutions 
of the state. 
Aff i l iat ions wi th trade unions may have helped to broaden the economic networks and 
established wider bases of trust for new Vietnamese outworkers. In both liberal democratic 
societies and state socialist ones, trade unions also provide bridging social capital (Woolcock 
and IMarayan 2000) and the building of connections between heterogeneous groups f rom 
di f ferent walks of life. Association wi th a workers' organisation or trade union helps to 
create social relations wi th people outside our immediate ethnic or social group. 
Organisations like trade unions help to broaden our "radius of t rust" ; the size of the circle 
wi th in which people are wil l ing to extend trust (Fukuyama 1995). However, it seems that 
their experiences of political oppression in Vietnam meant they were unable to fully take 
advantage of these networks. 
Interviewees generally spoke extremely highly of the Australian state and the bureaucracies 
they had contact wi th over their years in Australia. Yet, ingrained habits of mistrust were 
dif f icult to shake. Interviewees found it diff icult to change entrenched practices of taking 
steps to evade state notice. This contrasted wi th respondents in Bulgaria, discussed in a 
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later chapter, who mistrusted the state but still believed it was the role of the state to solve 
their economic problems. 
This distrust of the state had two effects. On the one hand, it decreased the likelihood that 
Vietnamese outworkers and those of other ethnic groups who fled state oppression would 
make a complaint to the Union or the FairWork Ombudsman regarding labour conditions. 
Interviewees generally feared that if they made a complaint they would not receive work 
again, and their reputation as a worker would be marred. Outworkers I interviewed who 
had made a complaint to the Union reported that they had reached breaking point before 
going to the Union. In all cases, they only complained when they had not been paid for 
weeks of work, generally on more than one occasion. On the other hand, this distrust of the 
state encouraged further reliance on close social networks. When state repression has been 
your experience, it appears that staying within known and familiar social networks and 
harbouring a strong spirit of autonomy is a way to stay safe, even if it means working long 
hours for little pay. Many of workers that I interviewed expressed strong ethics of self-
reliance that were both an statement of entrepreneurialism and resilience, and also a 
culture of keeping one's head down and trying not to draw the attention of the state and 
its agents. 
5.2.5 Extent of informalisation and conditions of workers 
As a consequence of these compounding dynamics, by the mid-1990s, the number of 
outworkers working in the TCF industry in Australia numbered anywhere between 23,650 
(Industry Commission 1997) and 329,000 (Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia 
1995), depending on the source of the estimate. It is difficult to put forward reliable figures, 
due to the informal, sporadic and seasonal nature of outworker employment. The TCFUA 
estimated that outworkers outnumbered factory workers by 12 to 1 by 1994 (Textile 
Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia 1995). Unfortunately, more recent figures are not 
available. 
Today, long run standardized production often occurs overseas in large factories, while 
shorter run and overload work occurs in small factories and homes in suburban Australia. 
As at February 2010, textile, leather, clothing and footwear manufacturing employed 
40,600 people in formal jobs, representing 4.4 per cent of the entire manufacturing sector 
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workforce in Australia (Department of Education 2011: 5). It is important to note however, 
that the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) data (from which those figures are drawn) 
accounts for the formal workforce and does not include analysis of the informal workforce, 
about whom it is difficult to estimate numbers. The number of outworkers is likely to have 
shrunk with the contraction of production in Australia, although it is broadly believed that 
the proportion of outworkers compared with factory workers has continued to grow. 
Household survey techniques would need to be employed to ascertain the current extent 
of home-based work and design appropriate enforcement strategies. 
Work in the TCP industry is highly feminised, likely contributing to low bargaining power. 
The formal textile, leather, clothing, and footwear manufacturing sector has the greatest 
share of female workers at 61.3 percent (Department of Education 2011:13). Compare this 
with wood product manufacturing, which has the greatest ratio of male workers, at 89.4 
per cent. Workers in formal TCP manufacturing earn the lowest average wages of all 
manufacturing sectors at $690 per week. This compares with $950 on average in all 
manufacturing industries. By contrast, petroleum and coal product manufacturing is the 
highest earning manufacturing sector with a median average of $1200 (Department of 
Education 2011). Because the ABS has not collected data regarding home-based workers, 
figures regarding pay and conditions have to be drawn from elsewhere. 
There has not been a recent qualitative or quantitative study of the working conditions and 
pay of industrial outworkers in the TCP industry for many years. The most recent and 
comprehensive study of these workers conditions comes from a study conducted by 
Christina Cregan of the University of Melbourne in 2001 (Cregan 2011). Cregan surveyed 
119 homeworkers using a snowballing technique to recruit the interviewees. All had come 
to Australia from 1979 onwards. They had travelled in small boats and arrived via transit 
camps in South East Asia. They were ethnic Vietnamese from the South. She surveyed 116 
females and 3 males whose ages ranged from 17 to 64. The average age was 39 and the 
mode was 50. 
Cregan found that, on average, workers received around AUD $0.50 to $5.00 an hour for 
their work — less than half the legal minimum — once piece rates are converted to hourly 
rates (Cregan 2002). (The legal minimum Australian wage, as of 1 July 2014, has been set at 
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$16.87 per hour (or $640.90 per 38 hour week before tax).) Around 62 per cent of the 
workers worked seven days per week, and 95 per cent of respondents did not receive 
holiday leave, sick leave or public holiday pay (Cregan 2002). Another study comparing the 
occupational health and safety (OHS) experience of factory-based workers and outworkers 
in the clothing industry found that outworkers suffered three times the level of injuries 
experienced by factory-based workers. The two main reasons for the differences in injury 
rates were the use of a piecework payment system and the long hours worked by 
outworkers (Mayhew and Quinlan 1998). Working hours were particularly long. Nearly two-
thirds (62 per cent) spent 7 days a week sewing, with a further 26 per cent working for 6 
days. Almost all of them worked during the school holidays and on public holidays. 
The reason for the longest hours were rush jobs. When workers had to finish rush jobs they 
worked from very early in the morning to midnight or later. The workers expressed no 
choice about taking on rush jobs, since any job was needed. Another factor is that workers 
need to work for as many hours as possible in order to make a living wage. The excessive 
hours and worry inevitable leads to strains on the physical and mental health of the 
outworkers. Physical problems included exhaustion, dizziness, eye problems and aches and 
pains. Often, after a long day, workers complained of difficulty getting to sleep. 
Respondents to Cregan's study reported constantly worrying about irregular work and gaps 
between the end of a job and the beginning of a new one. A number of homeworkers 
reported receiving unfair treatment. They were intimidated and controlled by their need 
for work and pay. 
5.2.6 Entrenchment of Informality 
Over time, both the available data and my research suggests that a group of workers have 
become stuck in home-based work. Interviews with workers indicated that there are various 
interrelated causes. 
I was struck, when conversing with these interviewees, by how hard it was to get them to 
talk about different working futures or aspirations for alternative careers. The respondents 
had limited ideas about what other work they could conduct after many years engaged as 
outworkers in the TCF industry. They became animated when discussing the study and 
careers of their children, but their tone was flat when they responded to questions about 
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their own working lives and tlie alternative occupations they could engage in. They likewise 
had very few opinions about what changes the government could undertake to improve 
their situation. They were willing to respond to closed questions, but did not offer opinions 
or provide detailed answers to open ended questions on these points. Responses were 
short or required numerous follow up questions and re-framing to elicit a response that had 
been answered with enthusiasm by their Bulgarian counterparts. 
Lan Nguyen, described earlier in this chapter, immediately answered the question of why 
she kept doing this work despite the low pay and other problems with the words, "for our 
children". Homework allowed her to be home all the time. When her children were little 
she could work around their day sleep times and when they were occupied with other 
activities. When they were in bed at night, she could begin work again. Once they were at 
school, she could work during school hours, supervise their after-school activities, cook 
dinner and begin work again when the kids were resting and sleeping. All respondents rated 
being able to care for children extremely highly, as a reason for doing homework. 
Regardless of the down-sides - the isolation, the demands of the work, the low pay - this 
facet of industrial outwork was greatly valued by respondents of both genders. Some 
women said that they would like to find work outside the house once their children were 
Independent, so they could socialise with other people more and work regular hours. But 
they only saw this as an option once their children were grown. 
One of the reasons that interviewees were willing to give up so much in order to stay at 
home was related to their cultural preferences for child-rearing. None had placed their 
children in childcare when they were of pre-school age. Most interviewees with children at 
school age took them to numerous extra-curricular activities after school, including extra 
tuition to boost their school marks. This is commonplace amongst certain ethnic groups, 
particularly Vietnamese Australians. A number of respondents said that being at home was 
even more important when their children were in high school than in primary school, 
because the children needed more supervision with homework and other activities, and 
because they were facing more complex social problems at school. One respondent 
complained that their children had faced racism at school from teachers, and had wanted 
to leave school, so they had needed emotional support and considerable urging to keep 
studying. 
For interviewees whose children had finished school, they generally believed that this 
strategy had paid off. The children of interviewees who were past school age had, almost 
without fail, attended university. Many were now working in professional, well-paying and 
secure jobs and were able to provide financial support to their parents. This was a great 
source of pride for the interviewees. 
The male respondents recounted slightly different reasons for remaining as homeworkers, 
despite the poor conditions. Their perception was that they had become trapped. For 
example, because Hung Nguyen was working long hours, he didn't have time to continue 
with English study, and because he was working from home, his English abilities stagnated 
and then deteriorated. His confidence in his capacity to learn English also diminished the 
longer he worked from home. By the time he was in his 40s, retraining seemed futile, even 
if he somehow managed to find the time. He didn't believe that anyone would hire a man 
in his 40s who was just starting out. The only option was to find work in factory doing the 
same work as he was doing at home, and he looked but factories were letting people go, 
not hiring. When I asked him what he would prefer to be doing instead of working as a 
homeworker he said 'working in a factory'. Because he had already told me he didn't like 
doing sewing work, I pushed him, and asked, 'but would you do if things were different, and 
you could do anything at all?'. He answered, 'be a teacher'. 
Years working as outworkers limited access to the institutions that facilitate moving into 
high-paid work or into other occupational fields. To use industrial relations terminology, it 
exacerbates "labour market ossification" for this group of workers. There is no path of 
career progression within the industry for an outworker, other than becoming an 
intermediary and employing others to conduct the work. Projections for the future of work 
in the industry are gloomy. The textile, leather, clothing and footwear manufacturing sector 
is expected to experience the strongest decline in employment of all manufacturing sectors 
with a predicted fall of around 4 per cent per year in the five years after 2014 (Department 
of Education 2011: 7). This is partially related to the further reduction in tariffs planned for 
this period, but is primarily linl<ed to the increased competition from cheaply made imports 
with the consistently high value of the Australian dollar. 
Most of Lan and Hung Nguyen's friends who had moved out of the industry had found work 
as fruit and vegetable pickers. The Nguyens said they were relieved not to be doing this kind 
of work, since it involves driving 2-3 hours to get to the farms that require pickers, and then 
home at night. They said that during picking season, those people hardly see their families. 
Hung said, 'It isn't work you can do at the same time as caring for children, but if someone 
can stay home with the kids, you can make an ok living.' It appears that for these 
outworkers, the acceptance of low rates of pay and poor working conditions is closely 
related to a lack of employment alternatives. 
5.3 Part Two: Dynamics of Formaiisation 
Up until the mid-1980s, it was the policy of the relevant trade union - the TCFUA - that 
outwork should be considered illegal. The Union did not organise workers of this type and 
actively tried to persuade manufacturers not to use them. In the mid-1980s, the TCFUA 
changed its position and began to push for the extension of formal entitlements to 
outworkers. The response to such pressure by governmental authorities has been 
incremental. First, in 1987, the federal industrial tribunal adopted award provisions 
designed to permit regulatory agencies to supervise the contracting process and to extend 
minimum entitlements to outworkers. In the mid-1990s, after the TCFUA published a report 
titled 'The Hidden Cost of Fashion', which gained considerable community attention, the 
Union joined with community groups and churches to form an organisation called 
'FairWear' (Burchielli, Delaney et al. 2009). Further pressure by the Union and community 
groups led to the adoption of voluntary codes of practice by retailers and manufacturer 
employers intended to provide incentives for the core companies to ensure that outworkers 
were extended most of the same formal entitlements as employees. Thereafter, lobbying 
efforts were directed at state governments to enact specialist legislation which deemed 
outworkers to be employees at law, and allowed workers to make claims for unpaid 
entitlements against parties who are not the direct contractor in the supply chain. These 
laws differed slightly in each state in which they were enacted. In 2011, lobbying efforts 
resulted in this state legislation being mirrored in national legislation. 
This chapter considers each of these steps to have added a "layer" of regulation and 
additional regulatory levers to the existing labour laws. 
5.3.1 Layering 
This section of the paper assesses reforms and layers that were added to the core regulatory 
instruments of labour law in order to address the informality experienced by outworkers. 
They include: 
i. The amendment of the definition of "employee" in the core regulatory instruments, 
so as to extend the scope of labour regulation for outworkers. 
ii. The establishment of a voluntary code, which companies may sign up to, regulated 
by an accrediting and promotional body called Ethical Clothing Australia, which is 
overseen by a multi-stakeholder body. 
iii. The enactment of new supply chain legislation, that allows outworkers to make 
claims for unpaid entitlements against another party higher up in the supply chain, 
even where they are not deemed employees under the award or state "deeming" 
acts. 
The primary aim of these interlocking regulations is that homeworkers receive the same 
pay, entitlements and working conditions as workers who toil within factories. The 
subsequent sections of this part of paper describe how this layering works to bolster the 
core institution and alter the incentive structure. 
The Core Institution: Award Regulation and Labour Legislation 
In Australia, labour laws are constituted of legislation - the FairWorkAct 2009 at the Federal 
level - and awards, multi-employer industrial agreements that set out the minimum 
conditions under which employees in a specific industry can be employed (referred to 
jointly as "labour laws" in this paper). In 1987 the Federal Clothing Trades Award (now the 
Textile, Clothing, Footwear and Associated Industries Award 2010) was extended to cover 
outworkers. These provisions are reflected in state awards, and provide outworkers with 
the same rights as other employees, including regular work, overtime pay, paid holidays, 
annual service leave and long service leave, superannuation and the right to skills 
assessment. 
Despite this legislative advance, widespread non-compliance with labour laws continued. In 
1996, a Senate Committee noted that with regards to outworkers '[t]he practice of non-
compliance with the award wages and conditions is so widespread that it is considered to 
be the norm' (Senate Economics Reference Committee 1996). There appears to be two 
major reasons for this continued non-compliance. Firstly, by requiring that outworking be 
regulated as a form of "employment" , the regulatory form creates incentives for evasion 
through creative supply chain management. Secondly, the Award does not sanction those 
who have power within the supply chains, rendering the Award an inadequate tool for 
shaping behaviour throughout the market. 
The legal form of the employment relationship creates perverse incentives for those 
organizing work to avoid compliance through choosing advantageous legal forms (Nossar, 
Johnstone et al. 2004). Employers and intermediaries often pressure outworkers to 
establish themselves as separate business enterprises and thus become, by definition, self-
employed contractors (Senate Economics Reference Committee 1996: 29). This 
circumvention means that both workers who are considered employees under the relevant 
laws, and those who are not, may work in the same supply chain, carrying out the same 
work for the same intermediary. Yet because one is registered as a "business" they are not 
entitled to the same conditions as those who were not. 
Secondly, the expansion of the definition of employee did not address the broader power 
dynamics in supply chains that were contributing to non-compliance with labour laws. 
Private market regulation (see Figure 1) puts strong downwards pressure on supply chains 
and is a cause of informality. The direct employers, known as "outworker bosses" in the TCF 
industry, may not have very much discretion in determining the wages (piece rates), hours 
(largely determined by volume of work) or other conditions under which outworkers toil. 
Parties above them in the supply chain, such as manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers, 
often have far greater control over these factors. As has been demonstrated elsewhere 
(Marshall 2006) and discussed in Chapter 2, supply chains in the TCF industry are 
hierarchical markets in which "core businesses" (retailers, fashion houses and brand names) 
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wield strong control over the other parties in the supply chain in order to reduce risk and 
increase profits (Gereffi, Humphrey et al. 2002). They are able to do so by virtue of their 
high market concentration and buying power in contrast to the growing number of suppliers 
who compete for their work. Suppliers competing for rare contracts with retailers may be 
willing to risk non-compliance with the relevant labour laws in order to comply with 
demands for low unit costs from core businesses - upon whom they are dependent for 
survival. The threat of meagre legal sanctions (the largest penalty awarded to date has been 
ADD $110,550 (Textile Clothing & Footwear Union of Australia v Southern Cross Clothing Pty 
Ltd [2006] FCA 325 (28 March 2006)) is insignificant compared with the economic sanction 
of being dropped as a supplier by a major retailer. 
Figure 1: Supply chain-based countervailing forces 
' use competitive pressure on those below for 
cheaper prices 
' use supply chain management to govern supply 
chains for cheaper prices 
• compete for international business 
' pass compettive pressures onto smaller producers 
' encourage competition between outworkers 
• reduce overheads by passing costs onto outworkers 
' Compete for scarce work 
' Fear retribution if complain 
The First Layer: Market based incer^tives 
In the mid-1990s the TCFUA, together with an alliance of community groups which came 
together under the banner of 'FairWear', developed a market-based industry-wide Code of 
Practice to bolster the existing legal framework governing the TCF industry. This mechanism 
has a number of notable features. 
Firstly, the Code builds on the outworker provisions of the relevant labour laws as its base. 
Its aim is to enhar)ce the operation of labour laws. The code therefore operates as a 
complementary regime. 
Secondly, the Code established Ethical Clothing Australia, adding a new agent to the 
regulation of homeworking (see Figure 2). Ethical Clothing Australia oversees the operation 
of the code. TCFUA is responsible for receiving complaints from outw/orkers and monitoring 
compliance w/ith the Code. If a problem is not rectified within a reasonable period of time, 
the non-complying company that gives work out to homeworkers risks losing its contract to 
supply the retailer or accredited manufacturer after Ethical Clothing Australia's Committee 
considers the complaint. The Committee is also able to revoke a manufacturer's 
accreditation. 
Figure 2: Additional agents added by layering 









to other players 
'Organises workers 
Thirdly, as well as creating disincentives for non-compliance, the Code also creates 
incentives for compliance. Manufacturers who complete the accreditation process are 
licensed to display the Ethical Clothing Australia label in their g o o d s . " The goal is to attract 
consumer preferencing and reverse the perverse incentive that the extended definition of 
"employee" had set up. It is in this sense that the market based regulation acts like a "pace-
maker", changing the signaling in the system. 
A number of aspects of this layering add market pow/er in the service of state-based 
regulatory power. Because market power is so concentrated in the Australian TCF industry 
amongst a small number of retailers and large fashion houses, the survival of smaller 
manufacturers depends on receiving on-going contracts for supply to these big players. If 
the brands and fashion houses refuse to order from them in order to maintain their 
accreditation, this is the most powerful sanction available. These aspects of the Code allow 
market power to be captured in the service of enhancing labour standards, helping to 
change the signalling that the existing laws were sending to businesses to guide their 
behaviour. 
The Second Layer: supply chain legislation 
The second layer of the complementary regime is supply chain legislation. In the 1990s and 
2000s, legislation of this type was enacted in a number of states, and in 2012 it was enacted 
at a Federal level {Fair Work Amendment (TCF Industries) Act 2012) following intense 
lobbying by the TFCUA and community organizations of the Federal Labour Government. 
The legislation allows for recovery for lawful entitlements against parties who may be 
contractually removed from the outworker (see Figure 3).^" This expanded on the operation 
of Federal statutes such as the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), which operate primarily by 
reference to the existence of a contract of employment, and are therefore unable to 
adequately regulate supply chain dynamics. 
^^  See http://www.ethicalclothlngaustralia.org.au/business/how-to-apply. 
" The right of recovery is generally for annual leave and long service leave, commission and re-
imbursements or compensation for expenses incurred or loss sustained. 
137 
Figure 3: Supply Chain Legislation 
sSEa 
There are a number of occasions in which this supply chain legislation can provide an avenue 
of redress for outw/orkers. For instance, when the intermediary who gave the work to the 
outworker wasn't paid at all by the manufacturer, or wasn't paid a sufficient amount, 
attempting to recover the money from the intermediary would be futile. It is simpler, in 
those circumstances, for the outworker to target the manufacturer directly. In other 
instances, if the intermediary cannot be found, a claim can be made against a party higher 
up in the supply chain. 
Perhaps the greatest innovation of this legislation is the extension of the concept of 
"employer". In a sense, the legislation recognizes that the entire supply chain acts as an 
employing entity. 
5.3.2 Assessment 
This section of the chapter assesses the benefits and pitfalls of this approach to regulating 
home-based outwork. This section queries the extent to which the amendments to the 
labour code are able to respond to the dynamics of informalisation described in Part one of 
this chapter. Further, to what extend does the new multi-layered framework respond to the 
experiences of workers and the deficits in working conditions? 
By establishing additional regulatory layers and levers, the new framework has managed to 
expand the scope of labour law for vulnerable outworkers without having to tackle broader 
institutional reform. This is perhaps the primary advantage of the complementary system 
described above. Thoroughgoing reform of labour law in Australia so as to expand the 
personal scope of its application is highly unlikely. Labour law has been under attack for 
meddling in the operation of the free market in the last 30 years, and thus any increase in 
its scope would be likely to undergo fierce opposition. In this political climate, then, layering 
techniques seem the most politically viable way of ensuring that peripheral workers are 
afforded the same protections of core workers. Only transport workers in Australia have 
achieved similar types of "supply chain regulation", and this was because of the high 
accident rates causing deaths and injuries not only to workers - truck drivers - but also to 
others on the road (Rawling and Kaine 2012). 
The layers add tools to the enforcement techniques available to regulators depending on 
the difficulty in achieving compliance once a breach is detected (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1995). By providing punitive sanctions in the event of a breach, the Award supplies the 
formal legal mechanism through which outworkers are protected. The Award also extends 
basic, non-negotiable labour standards to outworkers, allowing labour inspectorates or 
unions to ensure the enforcement of these standards in court. However, as noted above, 
without more supportive structures, the Awards tend to attract only low levels of 
compliance. Therefore, they are most effective in protecting vulnerable outworkers only 
when combined with softer enforcement techniques, including consumer recognition of 
ethical behaviour. 
The addition of new outworker-specific bodies to the labour law framework has been an 
important step in addressing the dynamics of informality. The establishment of certain 
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regulatory entities described in this chapter has allowed weaker actors to be fortified 
through networks with other actors. The power of one strong actor (retailers) enrolled 
against another (fashion houses and manufacturers) (Braithwaite 2006: 888). Here, actors 
have been added to the regulatory process who have influence at different stages of the 
supply chain. In this complementary networked regulatory system, the state is able to draw 
on the power of non-state actors who are allies in increasing compliance, including the 
Union and Fair Wear, and builds consent from industry bodies through incorporating them 
into processes, such as the Ethical Clothing Australia committee which oversees the 
operation of the Code. 
This multi-layered approach could help to overcome some of the barriers created by lack of 
trust discussed in this chapter, however, the evidence suggests that there is still a long way 
to go in this regard. Having regard to the broad sociological and psychological factors linked 
to the distrust of state institutions by immigrants from oppressive countries, more work is 
needed to fully rectify those dynamics of informality. Efforts surrounding cultural 
integration and community outreach should be embarked upon further. Apart from an 
organisation that operates in one state of Australia (NSW), called Asian Women at Work, 
other organisations have had little success engendering the trust of homeworkers. The 
Victorian Branch of the Union has taken various steps to increase the trust and familiarity 
of Vietnamese and Chinese workers, including running English classes and social events. 
English classes, in particular, have been immensely popular, but one of the union organisers 
confided in me that it is very difficult to get workers to attend social events. The Union does 
not employ the same kinds of grass roots organising techniques as Asian Women at Work, 
which based its methods on the successful community organising of the South Korean 
democracy movement. Asian Women at Work organises in the geographical location off the 
workers - out of the homes of community representatives - with the support of the 
organisation's coordinators (Conversation with Lina Cabaero-Ponnambalam 2013). 
Workers go walking together in the morning, hold regular social events, as well as sharing 
information about rights and entitlements. There is strong "ownership" and control of the 
organisation by workers. Unfortunately, Asian Women at Work has no formal place in the 
regulatory system described in this part of the chapter. Instead, the NSW branch of the 
TCFUA is charged with representing workers in the labour law system and Ethical Clothing 
Australia. It is discouraging to note that the NSW branch of the TCFUA does not even employ 
a Vietnamese, Chinese or Korean speaking organiser. 
Instead of viewing hard laws and market based soft laws as alternatives, the strength of this 
system is that it sees different mechanisms as being best used in combination - as 
complements to each other (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998: 14). The complementary 
layered system attempts to harness existing market dynamics in which strong private 
governance or bureaucratic power is wielded by parties high up in the supply chain. Because 
de-accreditation by Ethical Clothing Australia means that manufacturers and organizers of 
production cannot supply to accredited retailers, there is a strong market sanction for non-
compliance. This helps to strengthen the compliance of businesses who may not have been 
deterred by the relatively weak formal legal sanctions. 
Streeck and Thelan anticipate that new layers may gradually empower an unintended 
group, and thus sow the seeds of radical institutional transformation (Streeck and Thelen 
2005). It remains to be seen what impact introducing a market-based, multi-stakeholder 
body Into a labour market institution will have. Such bodies operate on very different 
principles than labour market institutions - that are founded on the idea that there is a 
fundamental conflict of interests between labour and capital. Multi-stakeholder bodies, on 
the other hand, tend to take as their starting point that all interests are legitimate and equal, 
and through a process of discussion amongst representatives, strive for sustainable 
outcomes. There is no process for mediating between distinct and incompatible interests. 
Within the market-based corporate accountability system, unions conduct monitoring, 
which is a technical act, compared with bargaining which is an inherently adversarial act. 
One weakness of the Code and Ethical Clothing labelling system is that it requires 
widespread voluntary participation throughout the industry for it to be a success.^^ As long 
as it is voluntary, the prevalence of the ethical label depends on the goodwill of brands to 
accredit. When only a small number of brands have accredited, the pressure on others is 
^^  The code has been made mandatory for retailers in two states: NSW and South Australia. It was 
mandatory in Queensland, but was repealed upon election of a conservative state government. 
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minimal. When a high proportion of Australian brands have accredited, those who have not 
accredited will stand out. There is a foreseeable tipping point for Ethical Clothing Australia: 
when a sufficient number of companies have become accredited it will offer a real choice 
for consumers, placing more pressure on those companies that have not accredited. If a 
mandatory code is enacted at a national level, as is provided for in the Fair Work Act, this 
will surely create the momentum needed. However, this seems improbable under the 
current federal government. For the time being, it appears that the Ethical Clothing 
Australia initiative will remain in its current form, as a market mechanism which depends 
on the moral actions of both consumers and brands. Ethical Clothing Australia enjoys low 
levels of legitimacy amongst manufacturers, which allowed for a successful campaign by 
the conservative government to stop funding it (Toscana 2014). 
There are a number of factors which currently undermine the strength of the Code, as well 
as the TCP regulatory system more broadly. These include low awareness and 
understanding of outworker protections, combined with low levels of trust between 
workers, suppliers, labour rights organisations and principal companies, who do not work 
collaboratively and often fail to understand each other's circumstances (Diviney and 
Lillywhite 2007, Participant Observation: Senate Hearing inquiry into the Fair Work 
Amendment Bill 2011). 
A further weakness is that the framework discussed in this chapter only governs clothes 
made in Australia, which only accounts for a small part of clothing sold in the country. One 
of the biggest sources of downwards pressure on labour unit costs is international 
competition. Most clothing sold in Australia is imported from low cost countries, and even 
clothing which is sewn in Australia has components that are sourced from elsewhere: the 
'Cut Make and Trim' aspect of production may occur in Australia, but the thread and the 
material is sourced from elsewhere. The system of ethical regulation only governs the cut 
make and trim phase in Australia. Labels that are conducting the Cut Make and Trim phase 
of production ethically in Australia, accredited with Ethical Clothing Australia, have been 
found to have far less scrupulous practices elsewhere in the world (Gershon Nimbalker 
2013). The Australian model is an incomplete ethical regulatory system. 
5.3.3 Conditions today 
It is difficult to draw conclusions about the precise extent to which these new regulatory 
levers have been able to address the dynamics of informality and improve outworkers' 
conditions. The industry suffers from a paucity of evidence and studies which could help to 
inform the field. The research discussed in this chapter was conducted ten years after 
Cregan's study, and did not entail surveying as many workers. Just over 30 workers were 
interviewed. Unlike Cregan study, and previous studies of home-based workers, my 
research found evidence that these regulatory levers were having some impact. In contrast 
with Cregan's study, in which she found no evidence of workers receiving their legal 
entitlements, a number of workers that I interviewed were either receiving legal wages and 
other entitlements or close to them, as reported in Appendix Three. These interviewees 
were all working in supply chains that are linked to lead companies that accredited under 
the Homeworkers Code of Practice through Ethical Clothing Australia. For all of the 
interviewees who were receiving close to their legal entitlements this was a relatively new 
phenomenon. Only a few months earlier, they have been receiving less favourable 
conditions close to those described by Cregan. 
Five of the workers interviewed for my study were receiving work as "employees" receiving 
the full entitlements expected for an employee, including sick pay, holiday pay and 
superannuation. They were paid a set wage on a fortnightly basis. These people were 
sewing labels accredited under the Ethical Clothing Australia system, and the factories or 
intermediaries that gave out the work had been inspected by the TCFUA. Four of these 
workers elected to work on a part-time basis because the pay they could receive as 
employees was the same as working long hours as a contractor, when the breaks between 
orders were taken into account. 
Other workers interviewed were also working for factories operating within accredited label 
supply chains, but were not receiving their full entitlements. They were still receiving their 
pay on a piece rate basis. The piece rate had been calculated so as to ensure that they 
received around ADD $17 per hour. Yet these workers were not receiving holiday pay, sick 
pay or superannuation. This is evidence that there is some "creative" interpretation of the 
rules. When I checked with a representative of the TCFUA, she explained that the Union 
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was working their way through the supply chain and often the process of full adoption of 
the legal provisions took some time, and a number of visits. Regardless of the fact that the 
workers were not receiving their full entitlements, the pay rate received is still well above 
that recorded by previous studies. Encouragingly, it suggests that the state outworker laws 
combined with the Homeworkers Code of Practice and operation of the Ethical Clothing 
Council is having an incremental improving effect within the industry. 
Three of the workers interviewed were earning under AUD $10 an hour, when they 
translated piece-rates to hourly rates of pay. Two said they were earning AUD $7-8 an hour. 
The highest rate of pay was AUD $20 an hour. 
All outworkers interviewed had, in the past, been given instructions by intermediaries to 
take steps to obfuscate the employee relationship as a condition of receiving work. Many 
had been told to apply for an Australian Business Number, referred to as a "license to work" 
in the industry (thus, they would be considered self-employed contractors rather than 
employers under law). More recently, many had been told to incorporate as proprietary 
limited companies and employ someone. A number of outworkers who had set up such an 
arrangement had employed a relative. In one case, the outworker had employed an 
international student who was renting a room in their house. These findings suggest that 
there is an effort to evade the employment relationship being made within the industry. 
Twelve of the interviewees reported having a problem or dispute in relation to their work 
in the last year, particularly in relation to pay disputes. The most commonly reported 
problem was that they been told to fix problems with the sewing of garments without any 
pay, or were refused payment for sewing on the grounds that the sewing quality was not 
high enough. For the latter problem, the respondents disputed that there was a genuine 
problem with the quality of the sewing. Research participants from the TCFUA reported that 
this is a common way of under-cutting the pay of outworkers. One respondent told me that 
she had received faulty fabric, and a dispute with the middle-person erupted over 
responsibility. Three respondents described not being paid at all for work they had 
completed. They had contacted the Union for assistance recovering these unpaid wages. 
One of these workers had not been paid for two months of pay, causing considerable 
financial hardship. 
A number of interviewees who said they had not had any problems in the past 12 months 
explained that they had experienced frequent problems in the past, and that these had 
stopped once they signed agreements to become employee outworkers, rather than 
contractors. They attributed this partly to the paperwork that now governed any working 
arrangement under the Award, bolstered by the Code. Intermediaries who gave them the 
work could no longer deny that work had been completed or dispute the volume or hours 
taken, because these items were set out on the paperwork. Otherwise, paperwork 
associated with work covers only the pattern and design, not details related to pay. For 
workers who are called "contractors" (although this may not be legally correct, regardless 
of the registration of ABNs or companies), they generally negotiate pay rates per piece 
orally. This means that there is either no paper trail or a limited paper trial if a dispute erupts 
over pay rates of unpaid wages. 
For all interviewees who were receiving either their full legal entitlements or close to their 
legal entitlements, this was a relatively new phenomenon. Perhaps the most significant 
finding was the difference that the change in conditions had made to the interviewees' lives. 
Interviewees who received higher pay reported a lessening in pain related to injuries thanks 
to the capacity to take breaks, time to spend with family and leisure time, which they had 
not enjoyed since arriving in Australia. 
This was evidenced most clearly in the interview I conducted with Lan and Hung Nguyen. 
Both suffered from back pain and discomfort in their forearms. They told me that they were 
going on holidays this year for the first time since arriving in Australia 19 years ago. Only 
three months earlier, the Union had contacted them through the Ethical Clothing Australia 
initiative, and because the brand they were sewing was becoming accredited under the 
Code, they began to receive close to their legal entitlements. The biggest impact for them 
was that they no longer needed to work long hours. Because they were receiving close to 
the hourly rates, they had decided to work part-time. They told me that they did not need 
a lot of money, now that they only had one child living at home, but they wanted to work 
less and finally have some time to themselves. Just the day before I met them, they had 
received large envelopes with information about their superannuation (pension plan). This 
was the first superannuation payment of their working lives. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
The evidence presented in tliis chapter has shown that even in a developed economy, which 
has a strong tradition of trade unionism, informalisation has occurred in industries which 
are particularly exposed to global trade. 
This chapter has tracked the dynamics of immigration from Vietnam, in particular, drawing 
on interviews which collected details of the life histories of Vietnamese home-based 
outworkers to better understand why they began working at home in the apparel industry, 
and why they became stranded in this low paying work rather than finding pathways out of 
it. The interviews revealed that a mixture of interlocking factors had compounded each 
other: interviewees learned to distrust the state and its agents in repressive state socialist 
regimes; fleeing Vietnam was terrifying and traumatic; time spent in refugee camps robbed 
interviewees of the opportunity to develop new occupational skills. They arrived in Australia 
ill-prepared to enter the workforce and compete for work with workers who were familiar 
with the labour market, literate and skilled. Close community networks assisted them to 
find work as homeworkers. Friends and family taught them how to sew. Although this 
allowed them to survive their early days in Australia, it also compounded their isolation. 
The work had served them well in many regards: they had been able to raise children, and 
been able to stay close to loved ones, a quality of the work they valued greatly after the 
trauma of leaving Vietnam. However, their bargaining position was weak, and they had 
been unable to either demand their legal entitlements, voice complaints or find work in 
another occupation. 
In the early days of labour shedding and informalisation, the relevant union viewed 
industrial outworkers as predators taking work from members. A policy shift in the mid-
1980s made the TCFUA a pioneer in the organisation of home-based outworkers. With the 
help of community support, the Union then campaigned for the extension of labour laws to 
cover these workers. Rather than campaigning for the wholesale reform of labour law, this 
lobby group pressured government for "special" treatment of these workers, in view of 
their particular vulnerability. Market-based incentives have been layered onto traditional 
labour laws, with extended scope to alter the incentive structure for employers and spread 
responsibility for the conditions of outworker throughout the supply chain. This is a more 
diffuse form of regulation to match the diffusion of control following the vertical 
disintegration of production. 
Though the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the strategy of deploying 
multiple regulatory levers was beginning to lead to formalisation, the Australian approach 
continues to suffer from certain shortcomings. Primary amongst these is the weakness of 
labour market regulation strategies of this type against private market governance within 
global supply chains. The evidence shows that tariffs and other trade barriers were a far 
more robust form of labour market protection than labour laws at a domestic level. In the 
face of strong downward pressure on labour unit costs from cheap imports, maximum force 
regulation would be required to create sufficient countervailing pressure for labour 
standards to ratchet up. The labour laws and market-based ethical initiative examined in 
this chapter are nation-bound responses to a problem which has international dynamics, 
and thus lack the power or reach to address some of the strongest forces driving 
informalisation. For example, ethical label initiatives at the domestic level have little hope 
of influencing consumer choice when the retail market is so heavily globalised, as those 
ethical choices represent only a small portion of TCF products available to consumers. 
Private regulatory agents, including the relevant union, have attempted to overcome 
various barriers to trust experienced by Vietnamese workers who make up the majority of 
the home-based, informal workforce in Australia. However, their approach has had a 
limited effect given the broad social and psychological dynamics underlying this 
informalisation. Indeed, many remain fearful of accessing the regulatory initiatives that 
have been put in place to protect them. Until stronger bridging social capital is built 
between these migrant workers and regulatory agents, the force of the regulation will likely 
remain underutilised. 
Appendix 2 
Questions to asl< during interviews of home-based worl<ers (with Vietnamese 
translation) 
(Cau hoi de phong van ngLfcyl may tai nha) 
How old are you? 
(Ban bao nhieu tuoi?) 
Where were you born? 
(Ban sinh a dau?) 
How long have you lived in Australia? 
(Ban da song a nu'o'c Uc bao lau rSi?) 
Do you live in a rural or urban setting? 
(Ban song cr vung thanh thi hay b ngoai 6?) 
Are you a woman or a man? 
(Ban la nam hay n&?) 
What was your previous occupation? 
(Nghe nghiep cua ban traac day la gi?) 
Are you married and living with your partner? 
(Ban da c6 gia dinh rieng va dang song chung vai nhau phai khong?) 
If you are married, what is your husband/wife's occupation? 
(Neu ban da CO gia dinh thi vo* hoac chong ban lam ngh'e gl?) 
Is your husband/wife in full time work? 
(Va hoac chong ban c6 cong viec toan tho'i khong?) 
Do you have dependent children? (Ban c6 con dang song phu thupc vao ban khong?) 
How many? (Ban c6 bao nhieu ngirai con?) 
How old are they? (Con ban bao nhieu tuoi?) 
What Is the highest level of education you have completed? 
(Mtfc do nao la cao nhat trong hoc van cua ban?) 
l=Primary (Tieu hoc) 
2=Secondary (Trung hoc) 
3=Tertiary? (Dai hoc) 
When did you first became a homeworker? 
(Ban tr6 thanh ngirai may tai nha khi nao?) 
What were you doing just before becoming a homeworker? 
(Ban lam gi truoc khi tro thanh nguai may tai nha?) 
Why did you become a homeworker? 
(Tai sao ban trof thanh ngiroi may tai nha?) 
Please rate these four statements regarding the importance of reasons for becoming a 
homeworker: 
(Hay dinh mure cho nhu'ng ly do quan trpng de tra thanh ngifcyi may tai nha cho 4 cau ben 
d L f d i ) 
"Wanted to care for my children": 1 = Unimportant; 2 = Neither important nor 
unimportant; 3 = Important 
("Muon Cham soc cho con cai": 1 = Khong quan trpng; 2 = Vita quan trpng vua khong quan 
trpng; 3 = Quan trong) 
"Could fit work round my family duties" - 1 = Unimportant; 2 = Neither important nor 
unimportant; 3 = Important 
("Co the lam nhiJng cong viec gia dinh khac" - 1 = Khong quan trpng; 2 = VCra quan trong 
VLfa khong quan trpng, 3 = Quan trpng) 
"Could not find any other work" - 1 = Unimportant; 2 = Neither important nor 
unimportant; 3 = Important. 
("Khong the kiem bit ky viec gi" - 1= Khong quan trong; 2 = VCfa quan trpng vCfa khong 
quan trpng, 3 = Quan trpng) 
"Did not have other relevant qualifications" - 1 = Unimportant; 2 = Neither important nor 
unimportant; 3 = Important 
("Khong CO bang cap lien quan khac" - 1 = Khong quan trpng; 2 = VL/a quan trpng vira khong 
quan trpng, 3 = Quan trpng) 
How did you start? (Ban bat dau nhu the nao?) 
l=Told about work by friend (Nghe ban be noi) 
2=Answered newspaper advertisement (Thay tren bao) 
3=Through previous employer (Thong qua ngu-pi chu tru'ac) 
In an average work day, how many hours do you work, including setting up, trimming, 
cleaning up and transporting the garments? 
(Trong mpt ngay trung binh, ban lam viec bao nhleu gia, bap gpm ca viec thi/c hien, cat chi 
va dpn dep?) 
How many times in the last 2 weeks have you worked through the night to get the work 
done? 
(Trong 2 tuan vifa qua c6 bao nhleu ngay ban phai lam viec thau dem de hoan tat cong 
viec?) 
What determines how many hours you work? (Sao c6 the blet bap nhleu gla ban lam viec?) 
1= I work as many hours as required to finish the pieces I am given by the deadline 
(1= T6I lam theo so glof du'pc yeu c'au de hoan thanh san pham tru'oc thcyl han) 
2= I work the hours of my shift, as decided by the factory/employer 
(2= T6I lam theo ca du'pc qui dlnh bal chu nhan) 
3= I decide how much work I do depending on other commitments and my desire to work 
(3= Thai glan lam viec tuy thupc vao nhu-ng viec khac tol phai lam va viec thi'ch lam hay 
khpng) 
Have you had any time off/a holiday in the last year? (Ban c6 thai gian nghi/ngay nghi 
trong nam nay khong) 
l=Yes (1= Co) 
2=No (2=Kh6ng) 
Was this time off/tioliday from worl< paid? (Thai gian nghi/ngay nghi c6 du-ac tra tien 
khong?) 
l=Yes (1= Co) 
2=No (2= Khong) 
Who gives you the worl<? (Al dL^a viec cho ban?) 
l=Agent (1= Dai dien) 
2=Friend/relative (2= Ban be/ngLfcJi than) 
3=Factory (3=Hang xu'o'ng) 
Who pays you? (Al tra tien cho ban?) 
l=Agent (1= Oai dien) 
2=Friend/relative (2= Ban be/ngu'6'i than) 
3=Factory (3=Hang XLrang) 
How are you paid? (Ban duac tra tien bang cach nao?) 
l=wage per hour (1= iirang theo giof) 
2=piece rate (2= luang theo cai) 
How much do you earn per hour? (If you are paid by the piece, how much are you paid 
per piece and how many pieces can you mal<e up per hour?) 
(Ban du-oc tra bao nhieu tien mot gio? Neu du'o'c tra theo cai, ban du-ac tra bao nhieu tien 
cho mot cai va ban c6 the lam bao nhieu cai trong mot gio'? 
Are you paid more for difficult pieces? Does the rate of pay vary depending on the skill 
level required for a piece? 
(Ban CO du'o'c tra cho nhu'ng s in pham kho khong? San pham d y a c tra tuy thupc theo mCrc 
dp kho cua san pham phai khong?) 
Do you get enough work? Would you like more work? 
Ban CO nhan du viec khong? Ban c6 thich them viec niJa khong? 
How did you learn to do the work? (Ban hoc de lam cong viec nay nhu- the nao?) 
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l=Previous training ( l=Hpc tir trLfc/c) 
2=Training provided by agent or factory (Bai dien hoac hang xu-oTig da day) 
3=Shown by friend (Ban be chi day) 
4=Self taught (Ti/hpc) 
What equipment do you use to do the work? 
(Ban dung nhfrng may nao de lam viec?) 
How did you get your equipment? (Ban c6 nhCfng may moc cua ban nhu the nao?) 
l=Bought it myself (1=11/ mua) 
2=Given by agent/factory (2=Dai dien mang den) 
3=0n loan from agent/factory (Muan tLC dai dien/hang) 
How would you describe your family's financial situation? (Tmh hlnh tai chinh cua gia dinh 
minh nhuthe nao?) 
Which one of the following phrases best describes your family's financial situation? (Hay 
dung mot trong nhOng cum sau day de mieu ta ve tinh hinh tai chmh cua gia dinh ban? 
1= We are comfortable and can easily meet all the costs of running a household and living. 
(1= Chung toi rat thoai mai va c6 the d l dang dap i>ng cac khoang chi tieu trong gia dinh.) 
2= It is sometimes difficult to meet all the costs of running a household and living. 
(2=Thing thoang t5i thay kho khan de dap irng cac chi tieu trong gia dinh.) 
3= It is often difficult to meet all the costs of running a household and living. 
(3= Toi thay kho khan de dap Crng cac chi tieu trong gia dinh.) 
4= it is always difficult to meet all the costs of running a household and living. 
(4= Luon luon gap kho khan de dap u-ng cac chi tieu trong gia dinh.) 
Currently, how do you feel about your job as a homeworker? Please tell me which of the 
following statements is most accurate. I will read them all once and then repeat them so 
you can make a choice: (Hien tai, ban can thay nhu' the nao ve cong viec may tai nha? Hay 
cho toi biet nhiJng cau nao ben duai la dung. Toi se doc chung mot Ian va lap lai, sau do ban 
CO the chon) 
1 = I like the work a lot; (1 = Toi thi'ch cong viec cua toi rat nhieu;) 
2 = I like it the work; (2 = Toi thich cong viec nay;) 
3 = I neither like nor dislike it; (3 = Toi khong thich cung khong ghet) 
4 = I dislike it but put up with it; (4 = Toi khong thich nhung cung lam dirac) 
5 = I dislike it and find it hard to cope. (5 = To! khong thich va thay kho khan khi lam viec) 
Have you ever had any big problems with the work? If so, what happened? 
(Ban CO bao glo gap van de gi kho khan vol cong viec khong? Neu c6, viec gi xay ra? 
How would you say that your life has changed or been effected by doing this type of work? 
(Cuoc song cua ban c6 bi anh hifcmg hay thay doi khi lam cong viec nay khong?) 
How much time do you have for yourself - to relax and do the things you like - in a week? 
Ban CO nhieu thai gian cho minh khong - de thu gian va lam nh&ng viec ban thfch trong mot 
tuan? 
Have you ever experienced health problems or injuries because of the work? 
(Ban CO khi nao bi van de gi ve sCfc khoe hay chan thuong do cong viec khong?) 
Do you consider yourself to be an entrepreneur /business person? 
(Ban CO cho minh la ngLfcyi chu doanh nghiep/thu-ang nhan khong?) 
What work would you prefer to be doing? 
(Ban thich du-gc lam cong viec nao?) 
Are you looking for other work? 
(Ban CO dang tim kiem cong viec nao khac khong?) 
What do you think needs to change so that you have better work opportunities? 
(Ban CO nghT la minh can phai thay doi de c6 du'gc mot ca hoi tot hon khong?) 
If you were in government, what would you do to improve the situation of people like 
yourself, who work from home or in small workshops? 
(Neu ban trong chinh phu, ban se lam gi de cai thien tinh canh cua nh&ng ngu'o'i nhu" ban, 
nhu-ng ngu'o'i lam tai nha hoac nhu-ng hang xu-ang nho?) 
Please rate the following statements in terms of their importance in relation to how much 
each would help to improve your situation. Feel free to explain your answer after you 
have rated each point. (Hay dinh mure nhiJng cau ben dirai v'e tam quan trong trong viec 
giup de cai thien tinh canh cua ban. Hay tu' do giai thich cau tra Id! cua ban sau khi ban da 
djnh muc.) 
"I gain training and increase my skills so I can move into better work" - 1 = Unimportant; 
2 = Neither important nor unimportant; 3 = Important 
("Toi se hoc them nhi'eu ky nang de to! c6 the doi cong viec tot hen" - 1 = Khong quan trong; 
2 = Vira quan trong vCfa khong quan trong, 3 = Quan trong) 
"The state pays me unemployment benefits so I don't have to do work which is badly 
paid" - 1 = Unimportant; 2 = Neither important nor unimportant; 3 = Important 
("Chinh phu cho toi t r g cap that nghiep nen to! se khong phai di lam cong viec ma du-oc tra 
qua thap" - 1 = Khong quan trong; 2 = VCra quan trong vira khong quan trong, 3 = Quan 
trong) 
"The agent or factory shares more of their profits with the workers in the form of more 
pay" - 1 = Unimportant; 2 = Neither important nor unimportant; 3 = Important 
("Oai dien va hang xu-dng chia nhau qua nhieu lai nhuan vol nhu-ng cong nhan trong hinh 
thirc d u a c tra nhi'eu han" -1 = Khong quan trong; 2 = Vita quan trong vCra khong quan trong, 
3 = Quan trong) 
"The brand company pays more money per piece to the factory or agent" - 1 = 
Unimportant; 2 = Neither important nor unimportant; 3 = Important 
("Hangxu'o'ng hay dai dien nhan nhieu tien mot cai tu" cong ty chinh" - 1 = Khong quan trong; 
2 = Vira quan trong vOa khong quan trong, 3 = Quan trong) 
"More employment and lower unemployment rates": 1 = Unimportant; 2 = Neither 
important nor unimportant; 3 = Important 
("Ti le cong viec cao va that nghiep tha'p" - 1 = Khong quan trong; 2 = Vu-a quan trong vira 
khong quan trong, 3 = Quan trong) 
"Better management of the economy by the government" - 1 = Unimportant; 2 = Neither 
important nor unimportant; 3 = Important 
("Chfnh phu phai c6 che dp quan ly kinh te tot han" - 1 = Khong quan trong; 2 = VCfa quan 
trong vCra khong quan trong, 3 = Quan trong) 
"Stronger laws regulating home-based work" - 1 = Unimportant; 2 = Neither important 
nor unimportant; 3 = Important. 
("Luat le manh han cho ngLfOi may tai nha" - 1 = Khong quan trpng; 2 = VCfa quan trgng vifa 
khong quan trong, 3 = Quan trpng) 
"Better enforcement of existing laws regulating working pay and conditions" - " 1 = 
Unimportant; 2 = Neither important nor unimportant; 3 = Important 
("Thi hanh phap luat hien hanh tot hon trong viec tra lu'ffng va di'eu kien lam viec" - 1 = 
Khong quan trpng; 2 = VOa quan trpng vira khong quan trpng, 3 = Quan trpng) 
Thank you very much for participating in this study. 
Cam an ban da tham gia vao viec nghien ciru nay rat nhieu. 




Age Where born Year arrived in 
Australia 
Number of years 
in Australia 
Currently in rural or 
urban setting 
Woman Man 
1 41 Vietnam 1992 19 urban Y 
2 46 Vietnam 20 urban Y 
3 49 Vietnam 1991 20 urban Y 
4 55 Vietnam 24 urban Y 
5 48 Vietnam 1990 21 urban Y 
6 37 Vietnam 1995 urban Y 
7 urban Y 
8 35 Vietnam 1990 21 urban Y 
9 46 Vietnam 18 urban Y 
10 45 Vietnam 1990 urban Y 
10b 54 Vietnam 20 urban Y 
11 46 Vietnam 19 urban Y 
12 41 Vietnam 1995 urban Y 
13 42 Vietnam 1993 urban Y 
14 46 Vietnam 1987 urban Y 
15 50 Vietnam 1992 urban Y 
16 55 Vietnam 1992 urban Y 
17 57 Vietnam 1982 urban Y 
18 43 Vietnam 1993 urban Y 
19 40 Vietnam 1988 urban Y 
20 58 Vietnam 1992 urban Y 
21 52 Vietnam 20 urban Y 
22 55 Vietnam 29 urban Y 
23 40 Vietnam 1993 urban Y 
24 49 Vietnam 21 urban Y 
25 mid 20s Vietnam 13 urban y 
Survey 
Number 


















Y 2 17 12 
2 Worl<er Y Worker 2 14 12 




Y 2 28 20 
4 Process worker Sewing 
homeworker 
2 29 19 
5 Clotfiing factory 
worker In Hong Kong 
Y Sewing 
homeworker 
Y N 28 26 
6 Clothing factory 
worker 
Separated NA 4 18 13 
7 
8 Clothing factory 
worker 
Y Bus driver Y 5 17 14 
9 y Y 2 16 15 
10 Clothing factory 
worker 
Y Unemployed N 2 21 15 
10b Meat industry 
factory 
Y 27 26 
11 N Unemployed N N 29 
12 Unemployed/Farmer Y handy man N casual 3 20 11 
13 Clothing factory 
worker 
Y N 1 17 
14 Clothing factory 
worker 
Y Sewer and 
handy man 
casual 3 29 24 
I S Refugee Y Sewer Y 1 27 23 
16 None Y Sewing 
homeworker 
Y 27 23 




1 30 29 




N 1 27 8 






2 16 9 
20 Studied and worl<ed 
in aged care 
N widow 1 18 
21 Worked in a bakery N 2 21 19 
22 Process worker Y Sewing 
homeworker 
Y 2 21 15 
23 Restaurant Y Sewing 
homeworker 
Y 3 12 14 
24 Y Housewife N 5 27 25 
25 Leather cutter 
factory 
Y Housewife N 3 4 4-0 
When started and why began outwork 




















"Did not have 
other relevant 
qualifications" 
1 1995 Child care 
responsibilities 
3 3 2 3 
2 2004 Can't find 
factory work 
1 3 3 1 
3 1991 Lack of English 
skills, and no 
other 
employment 
3 3 3 3 
4 1993 3 3 




3 3 3 3 
6 1996 Child care 
responsibilities 
3 3 3 3 
7 
8 1995 age 15 To help aunty 3 3 1 2 
9 since arriving Child care 
responsibilities 
3 3 1 3 
10 1990 Friends were 
doing it and 
needed money 
3 3 1 1 
10b 8 years ago Child care 
responsibilities 
3 3 1 1 

















f ind any 
other 
w o r k " 
"Did not have 
other re levant 
qual i f icat ions" 




and had no 
money 
3 3 3 3 




3 3 3 
14 2006 To be home 
with family 
3 3 1 1 
15 1996 Make money 3 3 3 
16 1996 3 3 3 
17 1993 Help wife and 
Child care 
responsibilities 
3 3 1 1 




3 3 3 3 
19 1993 Flexible and 
can control 
20 2008 Was too old to 
find another 
Job 
3 3 3 3 
21 2yrs ago Lack of skills 
and flexible 
hours 
1 2 3 3 
22 1985 Child care 
responsibilities 
3 3 1 1 
23 2011 Child care 
responsibilities 
3 3 2 1 
Survey Year Why "Wanted to "Could fit "Could not "Did not have 
Number commenced commenced care for my work round find any other relevant 





24 18 yrs ago Flexibility, 
children and 
no English 
3 3 2 3 
25 4 yrs ago To be at home 
with wife 
3 3 2 1 
Contract information 













How much per 
hour? 
Paid more for 
difficult pieces 
1 3 3 2 under $10 N 
2 3 3 1 $17.14 N 
3 3 3 2 $7-8 Y 
4 3 3 2 $7-8 
5 3 3 1 $17.14 Y 
6 3 3 1 $17.14 N 
7 
8 3 3 2 $15 Y 
9 3 3 2 $21 Y 
10 3 3 2 reasonable Y 
10b 3 3 2 $15 Y 
11 3 3 2 Y 
12 3 3 2 $13 a piece Y 
Survey Number Who gives you Who pays you? How are you How much per Paid more for 
the work? l=Agent paid? l=wage hour? difficult pieces 
l=Agent 2=Friend/relative per hour 
2=Friend/relative 3=Factory 2=piece rate 
3=Factory 
13 3 3 2 unsure Y 
14 3 3 2 $15 a garment 
15 3 3 1 $17.14 Y 
16 3 3 1 $17.14 
17 3 3 2 $18 a piece which 
takes 40-50mins 
Y 
18 3 3 2 $20 Y 
19 3 3 2 $22 a piece 
20 3 3 2 $5 Y 
21 3 3 1 $17.14 Y 
22 3 3 2 $10.60 
23 3 3 2 less than $15hr Y 
24 3 3 1 $17.14 Y 
25 3 3 2 unsure N 
Nature of work 
Survey 
Number 
Do you get 
enough 
work? 
How did you 























difficult to meet 
costs 3= Often 
difficult to meet 
costs 4= Always 
difficult 
How feel about job? 1 
= like a lot; 2 = like 
the work; 3 = neither 
like nordislike;4 = l 
dislike it but put up 
with it; 5 = 1 dislike it 
and find it hard to 
cope. 
1 Y 4 1 2 3 
2 Y 4 1 1 2 
3 Y 1 1 2 4 
4 1 1 1 4 
5 Y 3 1 1 1 
6 Y 3,4 1 2 4 
7 
8 Y 3 1 2 1 
9 Y 3 1 2 3 
10 Y 3 1 2 2 
10b N 3 1 2 4 
11 N 3 1 1 1 
12 Y 3 1 1 1 
13 Y 1 1 3 2 
14 Y 1 1 1 1 
15 Y 3,4 1 2 2 
16 Y 3,4 1 2 3 
17 N 4 1 2 2 
18 N 1 1 1 1 
Survey Do you get How did you How did you Family's financial How feel about job? 1 
Number enough learn to do the get your situation? = like a lot; 2 = like 
work? work? equipment? Comfortable 2= the work; 3 = neither 
l=Previous l=Bought it Sometimes like nor dislike; 4 = 1 
training myself 2=Given difficult to meet dislike it but put up 
2=Training by costs 3= Often with it; 5 = 1 dislike it 
provided by agent/factory difficult to meet and find it hard to 
agent or factory 3=0n loan from costs 4= Always cope. 
3=Shown by agent/factory difficult 
friend 4=Self 
taught 
19 N 4 1 
20 N 1 1 3 2 
21 Y 3 from friend 2 2 
22 Y 3 1 4 2 
23 N 2 1 3 3 
24 N 3 1 2 1 
25 N 1 1 3 2 
Problems with w o r k 
Survey Big problems Description Life How life 
Number occurred in of problem changed changed due 




2 N N 
3 Y Sometimes 
has to fix the 
Y less time to 
socialise/go 
out 
Survey Big problems Description Life How life 
Number occurred in of problem changed changed due 






5 Y Sometimes 
returns the 
work if it is 
difficult 
N 
6 N N 
7 
8 Y Wasn't paid, 




Y more tired 




10 N N 
10b N N 
11 N N 
12 N N 




15 Y Fixing faulty 
garments 
N 
16 Y Fixing faulty 
garments 
N 
Survey Big problems Description Life How life 
Number occurred in of problem changed changed due 
relationship with after to work 
contractor/employer? beginning 
sewing? 
17 N N 
18 N N 
19 








22 Y Two months 
of work not 
paid for by 
contractor 
Y 










he only does 
the required 







Time for self? Work related 
health problems 
Nature of health 
problem 
1 None Y 
2 Y N 
3 None Y back problem from 
sitting down 
4 none Y 
5 Y N 
6 Y N 
7 
8 None Y bacl< pain 
9 Y N 
10 Y Y back ache and sore 
arms 
10b Y N 
11 Y N 
12 Y N 
13 Y N 
14 
15 Y Y Back pain 
16 Y 
17 Y N 
18 Y 
19 Y Serious back pain 
20 None N 
21 Y N 
22 None Y Stress 
23 None N 
24 Y N 
25 Y 














1 Y N No idea Y 
2 N N N 




N To work in a factory Y 
4 Y N Y 
5 N N Nothing else N 
6 N N Work in a factory N 
7 
8 Y back pain N Book keeping N 
9 N N Shop or factory N 
10 Y back ache 
and sore 
arms 
N Social work N 
10b N N Metal industry Y 
11 N Y likes sewing N 
12 N N Something from home N 
13 N N Sewer N 
14 N Sewing 
15 Y back pain N Not sure N 
16 N Y 
17 N N Not sure N 














19 Y serious bacl< 
pain 
Any worl< not in a factory or where you are 
yelled at, needs freedom 
20 N N Not work at home so 
can meet people and 
have more money 
N 
21 N Serious bacl< 
pain 
N No idea N 
22 Y N Bus driver Y 
23 N N To have a good job Y 
24 N Stress N Sewing at home N 
25 N Electrician N 
Changes needed to improve the lives of homeworl<ers 
1 = Unimportant; 2 = Neitlier important nor unimportant; 3 = Important 
Survey Change Training Unemployment Factory Brand pays more 
Number needed for benefits shares money 
better work more 
opportunities? profits 
1 3 1 3 2 
2 N 3 3 3 1 
3 Y 1 1 3 1 
4 2 3 3 1 
5 N 1 1 3 3 
5 N 1 3 3 2 
7 













Brand pays more 
money 
9 N 3 1 3 1 
10 N 3 1 3 1 
10b Y 3 2 3 
11 N 1 3 3 
12 N 1 1 3 
13 N 3 2 
14 2 3 2 
15 Y 1 3 3 
16 1 3 3 
17 N 1 3 1 
18 N 1 3 3 
19 
20 N 1 3 1 
21 unsure 1 3 2 
22 Y 1 3 3 
23 Y 1 3 2 
24 N 1 3 2 















1 3 3 3 3 
2 3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 3 3 
Survey More employment Better management Stronger law/s Better 
Number and lower of the economy by regulating home- enforcement of 
unemployment rates the government based work existing laws 
4 3 3 3 3 
5 3 3 2 3 
6 3 2 2 3 
7 
8 2 2 3 3 
9 3 3 1 2 
10 2 3 3 3 
10b 1 2 3 2 
11 2 3 1 2 
12 1 2 2 3 
13 3 3 3 2 
14 2 3 2 3 
15 3 3 3 3 
16 3 3 3 3 
17 3 3 1 1 
18 3 3 1 1 
19 
20 3 3 3 3 
21 1 3 3 3 
22 3 3 3 3 
23 3 3 3 3 
24 2 3 3 3 
25 3 3 3 3 1 
6 BULGARIAN LIGHT INDUSTRIES 
6.1 Introduction 
This cliapter traces the growth of the informal worl<force in the light industries of Bulgaria 
after the collapse of the Eastern European socialist bloc in 1989. Currently, there are an 
estimated 500,000 home-based workers in Bulgaria, comprising both own-account 
outworkers (providing services such as hairdressing, tuition, translation) and industrial 
outworkers. The following chapter will focus primarily on this latter group of industrial 
outworkers, working within the light industries. Light industries are generally comprised of 
labour-intensive operations and end products targeted to consumers, such as clothing 
manufacturing and consumer electronics. In Bulgaria, home-based workers carry out work 
for firms or their intermediaries, usually on a piece-rate basis. The work includes hand-
stitching shoes, packaging, beadwork, sewing and gluing (Spooner 2013). 
The dynamics of informalisation charted throughout this chapter track the country's social 
and political history leading up to and following the dissolution of the Eastern bloc in 1989 
and its integration into the global capitalist economy. The aim is to track the way that 
national and international factors converged in the 1990s to create dramatic social change, 
leaving at least a third of the working population in Bulgaria stranded in informality by the 
end of the 1990s. By 2006, informal work in Bulgaria constituted somewhere around 20 per 
cent and 35 per cent of overall work, and was an entrenched feature of the Bulgarian 
economy. 
Bulgaria occupies a portion of the eastern Balkan peninsula, bordering five countr ies-
Greece and Turkey to the south, Macedonia and Serbia to the west, and Romania to the 
north. Its location placed it at the geographical periphery of the Eastern Bloc prior to 1991. 
Its small population and weak political presence compounded this peripheral status. After 
1991, Bulgaria became one of the favoured locations of Western European brands for Cut 
Make and Trim manufacturing in the garment sector thanks to reforms in the rules of trade 
which facilitated outwards processing. Work was conducted through a triangulated 
relationship: Western European brands would contract with Greek manufacturers, who 
they had established relationships with from the 1980s. These Greek manufacturers would 
conduct some work in Greece, and contract the rest to manufacturers in Bulgaria, where 
labour was cheaper. 
In 2011, Bulgaria's labour law underwent a radical change, following a successful campaign 
for the extension of employment laws to cover home-based workers. The state's expansion 
of employment law was in part, a reflection of Bulgaria's desire to demonstrate adherence 
with European Union (EU) recommendations as part of its integration into the EU. The 
developments may also be viewed as a concession to the concerted domestic campaign by 
associations representing home-based workers. These groups succeeded in bringing to the 
attention of the government the significant scale of home-based work being conducted in 
the country, and the failure of existing laws to provide protection to these peripheral 
workers. 
The regulatory approach taken by Bulgaria differs from the regulatory responses examined 
in the other case studies examined in this dissertation. Bulgaria's response to informal 
outworkers represents a universal approach to the expansion of employment law. Namely, 
workers conducting any type of work at home are explicitly covered by the law passed in 
2011. The initiatives examined in Cambodia and India only apply to one industry. In 
Australia, only one state has widened the scope of its labour laws to include home-based 
workers across a range of industries. Thus, the Bulgarian case study provides a useful point 
of comparison as the only country to have implemented such wide-reaching formal legal 
protections to all informal home-based workers. 
6.1.1 Field work described in this chapter 
The first field work reported in this chapter was undertaken in 2004. It focused on the 
experience of small factory owners in the light industries in Bulgaria, and the workers who 
conducted sewing, packing, gluing and so on either in the factories or at home. The research 
carried out at this time confirmed the contractual precariousness of this work. This 
encouraged further contracting out by Bulgarian manufacturers to home-based workers to 
further save on labour unit costs, and pass the risks of precarious contracts onto these 
workers, contributing to growing informalisation. 
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A second round of field work was then conducted in 2010. This entailed interviews with 
some of the same factory owners and workers, as well as union leaders, employer 
organizations and other policy makers grappling with the growing informal economy in 
Bulgaria. At this time, there was burgeoning debate in Bulgaria about how to best regulate 
the now well established home-based workforce. 
What was most striking about the differences in the findings of the 2004 and 2010 field 
work was not just that inequality had increased in the interim, worsening conditions for the 
poor and leaving only a minority of Bulgarians with enormous wealth. Official statistical 
sources had already painted a grim picture in this regard. What was most marked was the 
change in people's attitudes to the economic system, legal institutions, government and 
towards each other. Economies are embedded in normative social assumptions that can be 
called moral orders (Wallace and Latcheva 2006: 83), shaped by expectations of the state, 
of the collective and of individual action. In 2004, people had lost their livelihoods, but some 
level of optimism prevailed. Interviewees believed that when the new market-based 
economy became better embedded, their livelihoods would stabilise and corruption would 
become less rife. In 2010, after the economy had been pummelled by the 2008/9 
international financial crisis, a fog of pessimism layered perceptions. Bulgaria was 
particularly hard hit by this financial crisis, in part because the growth it had experienced in 
the mid-2000s was on the back of a property boom, as Western Europeans bought second 
houses. In 2010, interest rates were around 18 per cent, hurting all those who had invested 
in property or expanded their operations through leveraging. Adding to this pain, the rules 
of international trade had been further reformed in a way that had resulted in a shift of 
manufacturing from Eastern Europe to northern Africa and Asia. The shift in perception 
between these two instances of field work will be remarked upon further throughout this 
chapter. 
* + * 
Part One of this chapter discusses dynamics of informalisation. It considers the growth of 
informal work over three periods: the late years of state socialism, the early years of the 
transition, and the later years as Bulgaria became a fully-fledged market-based economy. 
Part one also considers the conditions experienced by homeworkers during these periods 
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characterised by informalisation. Part Two tracks the dynamics of formalisastlon, focussing 
on legal developments in 2010-11, aimed at grappling with the growth of home-based work. 
It then critically appraises these legal developments in light of the analyses of the dynamics 
of informalisation. 
6.2 Part 1: Dynamics of informalisation 
The aim of this part of the chapter is to describe why de-industrialiation and labour stripping 
occurred in the 1990s, stranding a large part of the population in unemployment after 
having been guaranteed work under state socialism. It explains how people became 
simultaneously disenchanted with the state, at the same time as maintaining statist values 
that would result in particular visions of regulatory solutions. 
Rather than focussing primarily on internal policy factors that contributed to the growth of 
informality, consistent with most literature on the topic (Bartlett and Rangelova 1997), this 
chapter examines regional and international rules that made Bulgaria's transition to 
capitalism particularly bumpy, contributing to its high reliance on informal work. During the 
state socialist years, these rules were set by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 
which was dominated by the Soviet Union. Bulgaria's close relationship with the Soviet 
Union left the state ill-prepared for the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Compounding the 
challenges of reform, adjustment and integration into the global economy. Western Europe 
sought to take advantage of the new supply of cheap labour by establishing trade rules 
which encouraged outward processing by new members of the European community under 
preferential terms for Western European brands. This contributed to the specialisation of 
Bulgarian industry in low-value added areas, where competitive advantage lies primarily 
with low labour unit costs. Bulgaria's diverse industrial base did not survive this period, 
paving the way for its later reliance on financial and property based foreign investment. 
We can say, then, that international and regional trade rules prior to and after the transition 
to capitalism compounded mismanagement of the transition by national governments. 
Figure One: Combined international and national factors that led to mass labour 
shedding and informal work 
— International Factors 
Bulgaria has heighest economic dependency on 
Soviet Union of all CEECs, encouraged by Soviet 
Union 
Existing 'black market' allow/s trading of surplus 
state planned production, encouring a shadow 
economy along side the formal economy 
Specialisation in production required under 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance rules 
Shift towards greater oppression and spying in 
1980s before transition undermines trust in state 
and encourages personal exchange 
Few existing trading relationships with West when 
openned to global trade after transition - bad 
competitive position compared with other CEECs 
Post-transition financial liberalisation combined 
with underwriting of state owned enterprise 
failure leads to simultaneous banking and state 
debt crisis entailing hyperinflation 
'Europe Agreements' governing trade signed after 
transition allows only 'outward processing' - not 
full package production, encouraging competition 
based on low unit labour costs 
State cannot bail out banks. Citizens lose their 
savings when banks fold. State cannot pay social 
security or state employee wages 
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
heightens competition wtih Asia and North Africa 
- leads to further de-industrialisation 
Late timing of privatisation means that Foreign 
Direct Investment has already dried up by the 
time state owned enterprises are sold 
Figure 1 shows the way that international factors and national factors aggravated each 
other to produce mass labour shedding and informal work. The staging of these causes of 
informal work from the period before the transition to capitalism to the late 2000s is 
mapped in the subsequent sections of this part. 
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6.2.1 Period One: State socialism 
A number of dynamics were established during thie years of state socialism which later 
contributed to the high dependence on informal work in Bulgaria. These dynamics included 
Bulgaria's dependence on the Soviet Union as a trading partner and for finance, its 
geographic and political periphery to the Comecon, and the reliance on black market trading 
and "second jobs" to attain consumer goods during this period. Also influential was the 
spirit of distrust in the state which would carry over into the transition. 
Bulgaria developed high levels of economic dependency on the Soviet Union under the 
trading rules of the Eastern bloc, and diversified its trading partners less than other 
Eastern European countries in the later stages of state socialism. Consequently, the state 
was poorly positioned to integrate into the world economy after transition. Prior to 1989, 
the Soviet Union accounted for around 70 per cent of Bulgaria's trade (Spenner and Jones 
1998). Production specialization among Council for Mutual Economic Assistance members 
emphasized the permanent division of the development and production of commodities 
among countries in order to take advantage of economies of scale and to avoid 
duplication of research and development efforts. In line with this approach, Bulgaria was 
encouraged to develop its agro-industry and electronics in the 1970s (Marrese 1986: 308), 
and other light industries in the 1980s. Outside of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance countries, Bulgaria fostered trading relations with some Western European and 
non-European countries. However, in the years leading up to the end of the Eastern Bloc, 
Bulgaria seemed to be opting for greater autonomy from Western trade and capital 
markets and orienting trade more toward the Bloc (Tyson 1986: 284). 
Bulgaria's high dependence on the Soviet Union would create major problems after the 
Eastern Bloc collapsed. After the Soviet Union dissolved, Bulgaria not only lost access to 
subsidised goods and the major consumer of its products (Tyson 1986: 242), it also lost its 
chief financier (Marrese 1986: 311). The transition to capitalism was triggered as much by 
a debt crisis^^ as by disillusionment with the ideology of state socialism. As we shall see later 
In 1990, Bulgaria defaulted on its SlOb external debt repayments held mainly with commercial 
banks: Bartlett, W. and R. Rangelova (1997). "Small Firms and Economic Transformation in Bulgaria." 
Small Business Economics 9(4): 319-333. 
in this chapter, high levels of sovereign debt, as well as its low level of integration In the 
world economy, triggered privatisation and labour shedding, contributing to the growth of 
informal work. 
Existing informal economy 
The informal economy was already an entrenched feature of the Bulgarian economy prior 
to the transition to capitalism, although there was full formal employment. Poor state 
planning frequently resulted in surpluses of certain products, while other commodities 
were in deficit (Bartlett and Rangelova 1997: 320). Surpluses often found their way onto 
the black market in Bulgaria, and were traded on informal international markets. Those who 
wished to source consumer goods that were in deficit also had to do so on the black market. 
This was known as the "second economy" which was estimated to have constituted around 
35 per cent of the total economy (Genov 1999: Chapter 12). 
An ethos of self-reliance, which would later underpin informal work, was fortified by 
increasing distrust in the state in the later years of state socialism. Bulgaria enjoyed a more 
liberal form of socialism for most of the post war period than many other Eastern bloc 
countries, including Russia, but in the final years of the regime became more repressive and 
paranoid. Ideological scrutiny and citizen-on-citizen spying was encouraged by the state in 
the years before the system's collapse, leading to a retreat to the family, trusted friends 
and individualism. State records have now shown that around 1 out of every 6 Bulgarians 
was an informant for the secret service. The full social consequences of this, in terms of 
undermining the social fabric of a country, are difficult to comprehend. 
The contempt expressed towards the socialist state was eventually its undoing. Liberal 
outcry at the breakup of an environmental demonstration in Sofia in October 1989 
broadened into a general campaign for political reform. Despite the promise of general 
elections and further liberalization, demonstrations throughout the country led President 
Mladenov on December 11, 1990 to go on national television to announce the Communist 
Party had abandoned power. 
6.2.2 Period Two: Early stages of transition to capitalism: 1989 to mid-1990s 
The growth of informality in Bulgaria was exacerbated by national governance that 'was 
marked by a lack of vision for comprehensive structural reforms and by repeated political 
hesitations' (Tache and Neesham 2011: 93) during this transitional period. 
One aspect of this mismanagement was in the area of the financial governance. The 
imposition of partial "macroeconomic shock therapy" (Spenner and Jones 1998: 943) was 
initiated early in the transition, including price liberalization, tight credit policy, and 
monetary reform. Large-scale restructuring of Bulgaria's pricing and financial and banking 
system began at the end of 1989, but was largely mishandled. Ponzi schemes flourished. 
The enormous losses of the enterprises owned by the state were nationalized via 
monetization (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 1997: 74). By late 
1996, internal and external debt reached alarming levels (60 per cent and 243 per cent of 
GDP respectively) (Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003: 21). After several devaluations of the 
Bulgarian leva (BGN) in 1996 (altogether BGN was depreciated by 590 per cent in 1996), the 
exchange rate totally collapsed in February 1997 (Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003: 20). The 
harsh devaluation of BGN was accompanied by a short period of hyperinflation. During this 
period, 14 out of 46 commercial banks folded (Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003). Depositors 
lost more than 50 percent of their savings in one year (Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003: 22). 
By January 1997 Bulgaria was at breaking point, facing an overall political and economic 
crisis. People queued at bread lines for food. Hospitals were unable to afford medical 
supplies (Amanpour 1997). Tens of thousands of people were protesting daily against the 
government and calling for early elections, culminating in the storming of Parliament on 
10th January 1 9 9 7 . " Mass strikes, nightly marches and road blocks across the country 
followed a violent clamp down on the protestors, with a broad societal participation until 
finally, on 4 February, the government agreed to hold elections. 
In July 1997, a new government implemented a new monetary policy which provided higher 
levels of monetary and fiscal stability (Berlemann and Nenovsky 2003). It also promised to 
" For video footage see: http://www.voutube.com/watch?v=PnvXOszEZr8, accessed 6 October 
2014. 
speed the process of privatisation in order to rid tlie state of tlie burden of financing 
unviable state-owned enterprises. This increase of the pace of privatisation, triggering mass 
labour shedding, began at a time w/hen citizens had lost their savings, were traumatised by 
the economic and political turmoil of the previous years, and were struggling to find their 
place in the new economy. Owing to the indebtedness of the state, also, it was unable to 
fund the structural adjustment programs that might have softened the impact of this 
process on an already fragile population. 
Regional trade rules 
It would not be accurate to blame the growth of informalisation on internal 
mismanagement alone. Changes in regional trade governance also played a large part. 
Bulgaria didn't just enter the global economy at the same times as the rest of the Eastern 
bloc and much of Asia, it entered at a time when the global rules of trade were encouraging 
the greater integration of economies across the globe. Regional groupings and countries 
with the power to shape and take advantage of heightened integration manipulated these 
rules to their advantage. Peripheral states, such as Bulgaria, scrambled to adjust. 
Regional norms governing trade in Western Europe were reformed to allow Western 
European brands, manufacturers and fashion houses to profit from "outward processing" 
in Central Eastern European countries (CEECs) under the "Europe Agreements" which 
opened their borders to trade. Bulgaria signed a Europe Agreement in 1993 (Navaretti 2004: 
886). Western European countries aimed to improve their competitiveness in anticipation 
of increasing import-penetration from Asia with the phasing out of protection under the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Textiles and Apparel (ATC) (Economic 
Commission for Europe 1995:199). 
Taking advantage of its low unit labour costs, proximity to Western Europe, and its well 
trained workforce, "outward processing trade" (OPT) from Western Europe to Bulgaria 
grew in the 1990s. The term "outwards processing" is used synonymously with offshore 
assembly production, production sharing, cut-make-trim or cut-make production 
(CMT/CM). EU-based manufacturers, agents or retailers contracted producers in CEECs to 
manufacturer apparels and footwear for re-import to the EU (Begg 2003: 2199). This 
primarily involved the bundled supply of most inputs and components to the producer. In 
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hindsight, the Europe Agreements benefited EU producers and discriminated against the 
import of full-pacl<age products from CEECs, encouraging the least value added forms of 
production in Bulgaria and de-industrialisation (Economic Commission for Europe 1995: 
120). 
As a consequence of these snowballing internal and external factors, the 1990s were 
marked by widespread de-industrialisation in Bulgaria. For example, whereas in 1988 the 
electronics industry accounted for 17 per cent of GDP, by 1994 that share had fallen to not 
more than 4 per cent (lankova 2000:126). By the early 2000s, light industries were the only 
surviving industry branch (Tait 2007). This, in turn, contributed to a negative cycle of ever 
greater state indebtedness, financial crisis and eventual labour shedding which forced 
people into informal work. 
In sum, Bulgaria's early transition to capitalism was characterised by poorly managed state 
institutions, as well as large gaps in the institutional framework governing capitalism. This 
led to an institutional vacuum, as old state socialist institutions were dissolved. Fast 
structural and institutional change occurred without any existing experience of markets or 
attendant expectations about market behaviour. This led to the flourishing of 'an informal 
system of redistribution practices between different social groups' (Tache and Neesham 
2011: 93), leaving a large proportion of the population jobless. 
6.2.3 Period Three: Later stages of transition to capitalism: mid-1990s to early 2010s 
Following the period of great economic turmoil in the early 1990s, in the second half of the 
1990s and 2000s, Bulgaria's economy began to stabilise. However, policies of privatisation 
which sold state owned enterprises at "fire sale" prices, as well as a contemporaneous 
process of illegal privatisations at even lower prices, put in place a process that some 
commentators have called a "synergistic spiralling of wealth and poverty" or the rise of a 
"new feudalism" (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000: 291). Assets worth about 100 billion B6N 
and enormous profits were acquired or "privatised" under suspicious circumstances (either 
illegally or by "side methods") (Bitzenis 2003: 68).^ ® A small minority benefited greatly in 
this stage of the transition while labour shedding worsened, unemployment deepened and 
informal work proliferated. The already low trust in the institutions of the state dropped 
further still. 
Privatisation was a massive task: 80 per cent of enterprises were state owned at the 
beginning of the transition, one of the highest percentages among the former communist 
countries (Bitzenis 2003: 61). By 2000, employment in private enterprises had risen to 70.8 
per cent (Hurley 2003). In the clothing industry, this process was even more acute: the 
percentage of employment in private enterprises increased from 55 per cent in 1996 to 
close to 100 per cent in 2000 (Hurley 2003). 
The merger of two economic systems that were once largely separate produced a global 
oversupply of labour without a significant increase in the global stock of capital (Polaski 
2006). Eastern bloc countries competed for a share of existing global - and particularly 
Western European - investment. By the time Bulgaria began privatising, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland - countries close to Western Europe that had already developed strong 
trade relationships prior to transition - had already 90 per cent of the FDI to the region 
(Elchengreen and Kohl 1998: 3). Bulgaria failed to attract sufficient FDI to make up for the 
shortfall created by the retreat of the Soviet Union as its primary bank roller and trading 
partner. 
The small amount of FDI that dribbled into Bulgaria was attracted by its low labour costs. 
Labriandis's study of Greek small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) reveals that 
investment generally involved a relocation of "Third Degree Subcontracting" f rom Greece 
in order to take advantage of wage differentials. The process of Third Degree Manufacturing 
works as follows: Manufacturing had been first subcontracted from a Western European 
business to a Greek business. The Greek business then set up a factory in Bulgaria and 
subcontracted aspects of this work to that business to take advantage of the cheap labour 
'®This amounts to profits of around USD $64 billion according to today's exchange rate. The amount 
in US dollars according to exchange rates of the time is more difficult to calculate. The exchange 
rate slid from BGN 487 to BGN 1,588 per USD S i in the first quarter of 1997. 
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that existed just over the border. In 1996 it was estimated that the ratio of Bulgarian and 
Greek wages in the apparel industry was somewhere between 1:7 to 1:15, whilst 
productivity was 1:1.5 (Labriadis 1996). All components were supplied from Greece and 
final products were then usually exported to third countries. This is known as triangular 
production or triangulated supply chains. 
Compounding the difficulties attracting FDI, in the 2000s the international governance of 
textile and clothing was further reformed, creating even less favourable terms of trade for 
Bulgaria. The WTO's Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, governing the phase out of 
quotas, was of immense significance for nations that were highly dependent on clothing 
and textile export, as Bulgaria had become following the loss of its other industries in the 
early 1990s. The Agreement put a stop to the preferential treatment Bulgaria had enjoyed 
over Asia under the 'Europe Agreements' (Economic Commission for Europe 1995: 121). 
After 2005, CEECs, Northern Africa and Asia competed on equal terms. 
Faced with lack of capital or know-how, and now competing on equal terms with North 
Africa and Asia in the garment sector, firms undertook asset stripping and labour shedding. 
Labour shedding in Bulgaria was amongst the steepest of CEECs during the transition to 
capitalism. Unemployment began rising immediately after the introduction of the economic 
reforms at the beginning of 1991, from less than 100,000 to reach around 600,000 by the 
middle of 1993 (Bartlett and Rangelova 1997: 321). Of the 1.2 million jobs lost in the 1990s, 
1 million were lost in manufacturing (Garibaldi, Makovec et al. 2001: 1). Wage-based 
income, which had accounted for 100 per cent of total incomes at the beginning of 
transition, had fallen to just 40 per cent by 2003. 
The result was a quick decline in individual and household earnings. By 1997, the World 
Bank estimated that 36 percent of the population was living in poverty (World Bank 2005). 
This triggered a renaissance of the role of traditional families and "clan factors" in economic 
activities (Tache and Neesham 2011: 97). Where employment became available, those 
" EU membership also meant that Bulgaria had to abandon individual trade policy such as quotas 
and restrictions on imports of footwear and apparel, and the rules of the Common External Trade 
(GET) policy took effect. 
already employed attempted to assure places for their relatives. Gainfully employed 
relatives often became financially responsible for numerous other family members. Others 
raised income through informal activities. By 2010, unemployment and under-employment 
had become entrenched in Bulgaria (Eurostat 2010). 
A great deal of light industrial work shifted to the "hidden" or informal economy. This was 
particularly stark in the apparel industry. According to official Department of Labour 
statistics, by 2004, the average number of people employed in clothing production 
enterprises in the country was 33.28 per cent. Research conducted by the Bulgarian Gender 
Research Foundation (BGRF) indicated these official figures severely underestimated the 
size of the industry. Industry knowledge suggested that it was common place for enterprises 
to operate several workshops, while registering only one. The remaining workshops 
operated "in the shadow" (Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation 2001: 19). This is 
consistent with broader data concerning reliance on informal income in Bulgaria at the 
time. By 1998, Wallace et al found income in Bulgaria was derived 55 per cent from the 
formal economy, 20 per cent from the social and household-based informal, a-legal 
economy and 25 per cent from the black or illegal economy (Wallace and Latcheva 2006: 
88). 
6.2.4 Homebased work in light industries 
This section of the paper discusses the conditions experienced by home-based workers 
based on interviews with workers conducted in 2004 and 2010, augmented by secondary 
evidence. 
The retreat to informal work can be seen as an economic adjustment that provided a way 
to increase the competitiveness of the Bulgarian labour market and reduce unit labour costs 
in the face of unfavourable terms of trade. A survey of clothing workers throughout Bulgaria 
conducted in the early 2000s found that majority were piece-rate workers, demonstrating 
the precariousness of work in the sector, and the extent of the flexibility of production. Only 
31 per cent of workers were found to be permanent, while 14 per cent were on short term 
contracts. 51 per cent of workers were piece-rate workers (Women Working Worldwide 
2003:211). 
The fieldwork conducted for this study in 2004 documented a high reliance by footwear 
companies on outworl<ers, with unregistered homeworkers sometimes outnumbering 
formal employees for one firm. None of the workers interviewed in 2004 had employment 
contracts. Likewise, a study conducted by BGRF of homeworkers in various sectors found 
that less than 10 per cent of homeworker respondents conducted work with a contract 
(Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation 2001). By 2009, the total number of home-based 
workers in the light industries of Bulgaria was estimated at around 500,000 (Eurofund 
2009): an extremely high number given that the population of Bulgaria was only 7.5 million. 
In 2010 the Society for Development and Homebased Production and the Confederation of 
Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria surveyed 500 homeworkers in 10 Bulgarian cities. Of 
these workers, 82.3 per cent were women. 51.2 per cent were aged 50-65 years, and 97.1 
per cent had worked for more than 15 years exclusively at home (Zlateva 2010). The 
dependent homeworkers interviewed for this study were mainly women, but they were 
often joined by their husbands and other family members when the volume of work was 
too great to complete alone. Men also conducted dependant homework when they could 
not find employment elsewhere. 
Interviewees for this study came from a range of occupational of backgrounds. Many 
workers interviewed were highly qualified and skilled workers with many years - sometimes 
decades - of professional experience in very technical fields. Amongst those interviewed 
were economists, metallurgists, doctors, and scientists, including a former professor in 
biochemistry, child-care workers, as well as former factory workers that might be expected 
to conduct this work. 
A 59 year old homeworker in Pernik 
Natasha^" is a 59 year old divorced woman who lives in Pernik, around 40km south west of 
Sofia. After school she worked in a number of clerical positions, working her way up to 
become deputy head of placement for a large factory, amongst other jobs. By 1988 she was 
the deputy head of the commercial department of a nearby municipality. During the 
^^  This is not her real name. The interview was conducted at her home in September 2010. 
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transition to capitalism, these economic planning units were no longer required and she 
lost her job. For ten years she worked in various shops in her the local area. Although this 
employment paid enough to survive, it was on a casual basis and not as fulfilling as her 
previous high powered, highly-skilled work. In 1998 she lost this work because of her age. 
Her perception is that business owners sought younger people to front their shops. 
Since that time she has been the victim of what is termed "job churning". The local 
employment agency placed her in short-term job after short-term job. Over a three year 
period she worked as a security guard at a school and then at a library, for the Social Services 
department as a consultant, and for a fruit and vegetables shop, with periods of 
unemployment in-between. 
In order to survive in periods of unemployment, in 1991, she began to do homework for a 
local knitwear company and also a company that sold festival souvenirs. She found this work 
through word of mouth. In the early 1990s, she received training as part of an EU program 
to become a babysitter. She is now paid to babysit her grandchildren for a few hours a day. 
To augment this income source, she has worked for a local Greek-owned swimwear 
company since 1995 sewing beading onto swimsuits. This work is seasonal. Most work is 
conducted between March and June, to prepare for summer. The company calls her when 
they need work done. Sometimes, during particularly busy periods, she goes into the factory 
to help with packing. She calculates that she earns around 10 6BN (USD$6.96) for 8 hours 
work, with no benefits such as health insurance, paid sick leave or social security payments. 
There is no shortage of work, but the work is poorly paid and extremely demanding. 
She explained that in Pernik there are many educated people, but no jobs. During the 20"' 
century Pernik developed as a centre for coal mining, limestone quarries and heavy 
industry. (It is reported that before its industrial exploitation started, the local people dug 
coal up with picks and shovels and transported it with carts and wheelbarrows.) However, 
the larger mine in the region closed shortly after the transition to capitalism, leaving 12000 
workers unemployed. She spoke of deep personal frustration, not just at being so 
economically vulnerable, but also at having her managerial skills wasted. She was aware 
that under better economic circumstances she would be at the peak of her career or 
beginning a fruitful retirement. Instead, she has no prospects for retirement and conducts 
low-paid manual work. She said, 'No-one asks us what we can do'. 
The work often had detrimental effect on health in the short and long term. I observed a 
number of workers using toxic glue to adhere the soles to shoes or to make paper shopping 
bags. They complained of severe headaches on a daily basis. 69.8 per cent of the 
respondents to a survey of 500 outworkers used hazardous materials (paint, chemicals, 
adhesive, dust and fertilisers) when working at home (Zlateva 2010). In many cases, 
members of their household were also in contact with these materials. 
6.2.5 Remuneration 
Secondary data examined for this study, along with my own research, shows that the great 
majority of homeworkers in Bulgaria were not receiving income stipulated by law. Most 
workers interviewed described living on a subsistence level of income. A survey undertaken 
of clothing enterprises found that those on registered employment contracts might receive 
the minimum wage, but the majority of employees received their pay as "cash in hand", 
and received less than the minimum wage (Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation 2001: 
19-20). Consistent with this finding, a large scale survey of home-based workers conducted 
in the mid-2000s found that 74 per cent declared that their homeworking incomes were 
below the national minimum wage (Petkov 2006). 
They had no income security. For dependent workers, this was because they did not have 
formal, enforceable contracts with the contractor who provided their main source of 
income. The nature of the relationship with contractors was a crucial determinant of 
income for dependent homeworkers. Most homeworkers were highly dependent on the 
contractor who gave them work. More than half (58.2 per cent) worked only with one 
contractor, 17.9 per cent with more than one contractor and 12.5 per cent were self-
employed (Petkov 2006). Non-payment for work conducted was common. Half of the 
respondents reported that they very often had problems in receiving the negotiated 
amount for their work. In most cases, the contractor often claimed that the quality of work 
was not sufficient or that the contract had not been observed (Petkov 2006). 
Non-wage factors of production were rarely paid for by contractors. Petkov's survey found 
that only 13.3 per cent worked in specially prepared premises for the purpose of work. The 
majority of homeworkers (67.4 per cent) shared their workspace with family members 
(Petkov 2006). However, only 7.1 per cent received compensation from the contracting 
company for heat and light expenses and machine maintenance and equipment during the 
process of production (Petkov 2006). Dependent and semi-dependent workers interviewed 
for the present study explained that the price per unit had remained the same for the last 
6 years. However, the cost of living had increased markedly due to significant increases in 
food prices, power and the costs of meeting other basic needs. As such, they believed their 
real wages of homeworkers had decreased from 2004 to 2010. 
This lowering of living conditions was part of a national trend, caused in the early days of 
transition from the end of subsidised oil from the Soviet Union and favourable terms of 
trade, and later by the 2008 global financial crisis. Other factors came into play, including 
rising global food and power prices, accession to the EU, et cetera. Bulgarians were growing 
poorer and reducing their consumption. In December 2009, each household earned just 
€415 per month, which was €60 less than the previous year. Around one third of the 
employed citizens in Bulgaria could be classified as "working poor" (Euroavtiv 2010), and 
this data does not necessarily include all informal workers who are likely poorer. 
6.2.6 Fluctuations in worl< 
Interviews with factory managers suggested that significant fluctuations in volumes of 
orders for factories drove the use of large peripheral, home-based workforce. Descriptions 
of the factories studied are shown in Table One below. The managers interviewed in 2004 
regarded orders from EU firms as precarious. The managers of all four factories studied 
voiced concern that the subcontractors from whom they source could easily choose to 
source production elsewhere. The managers of Factory B and C reported that the volume 
of orders of shoes from Italian companies had dropped in the past few years, as more 
work was sourced from Romania as well as Middle Eastern countries." These managers 
also complained of constant downwards pressure on prices (and therefore profit margins) 
Unit volumes were not made available to me by Individual factories. 
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from Italian companies who said that they could go elsewhere if their price demands 
weren't met. It was for this reason that Factory B was attempting to diversify the sources 
of work by establishing business relationships with Greek contractors. The manager of 
Factory D explained that although the contracts they had in place with major brands for 
supply were often for a 4 year period, the volume of work is not specified. Thus, within 
that 4 year period the volume could become close to negligible without any breach of 
contract. He lamented: 
The last two-three years have been very hard. There were 300,000 pieces in a season 
from Brand X [a major Australian brand with a branch in France] 2-3 years ago, but 
now Brand X are sourcing from Morocco and Tunisia, so there is less and less work. 
Factories and workshops often closed during slumps in demand, and demand for work was 
very much driven by seasonal fluctuations (Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency 2002:11). 
These fluctuations in orders contributed to irregularity of employment, with workers 
sometimes being over-employed and at others under-utilised. At peak times, work would 
regularly begin at 09.00 and finish at around midnight without interruption (Zlateva 2010). 
I sat with families until late into the night, watching them sew the uppers of major brand 
shoes and snacking with them. Often the whole family was mobilised to fill orders during 
peak periods. Both in my fieldwork in 2004 and 2010, I observed the use of child labour as 
younger family members pitched in to complete large orders and stay on good terms with 
their contractors. 
Table One: Factory Descriptions 
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At other times, home-based workers received no work from contractors. Slumps in work 
led many workers to seek second or third jobs to augment earnings from home-based work. 
Most of the workers I interviewed worked in the agricultural sector growing tobacco, 
peaches and tomatoes to supplement their sewing income. Rozalina Ivanova, who formed 
a home-based workers organization called Kaloian in Petrich described later in this chapter, 
had a growing herd of goats, allowing her to produce feta cheese from a building at the side 
of her house. 
6.2.7 Homework amongst pensioners 
Industrial homework and own account home-based work is conducted disproportionately 
by pensioners and those over 50 (Zlateva 2010). As a consequence of Bulgaria's 
indebtedness, it was unable to meet its obligations to pension payments and pension levels 
stagnated. The pension no longer provided a liveable income for a large proportion of the 
elderly population by 2010, and the financial crisis of the mid-1990s had wiped out the 
savings of many families. This drove an unprecedented number of elderly Bulgarians into 
the informal workforce to supplement their pension and savings. 
6.2.8 Access to social security, health insurance and the pension 
The instability of home-based work poses a significant barrier to access to social security, 
health insurance and the pension. The first tier of Bulgaria's social security, health insurance 
and pensions requires employer or individual contribution (depending on whether the 
worker is employed or self-employed) for eligibility for later payments (Editorial 2010). As 
homeworkers were generally not formal employees or self-employed people, they 
described rarely having access to social insurance in times when they did not have any work 
because they were unable to register as "unemployed". This placed them in extreme 
hardship when work was not available. It also locked them into conducting any work they 
could find, instead of taking the time to search for more rewarding work which would make 
better use of their skills. Lack of access to social security could therefore be seen to 
contribute to wider labour market rigidity. 
Because homeworkers were unable to contribute to pension or other retirements savings, 
they had little prospect of retiring later in life. Their years of service as homeworkers would 
not be recognised, as they were not formal employees or registered self-employed workers. 
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Their years of service prior to the transition to capitalism may be counted, as well as any 
other formal jobs they have held, but these do not account for a liveable pension. They 
therefore faced the prospect of either w/orking for life or hoping that family members would 
support them when they were no longer able to work. 
6.2.9 Social impact of homework 
As we have seen, remuneration from home-based work in Bulgaria was very low at the time 
this study was conducted. Most women interviewed reported not being able to pay bills, or 
constantly feeling stress about their inability to do so. They reported this stress had a 
significant impact on their general satisfaction with life more broadly. This is consistent with 
a 2010 European-wide study which found that those with the most negative experience of 
life are those for whom life is more socio-economically difficult and those who have 
difficulties paying their bills "most of the time" (European Commission 2010). 
Interviewees often complained of finding the work tiring, tedious, boring and isolating. 
These complaints were most common amongst those completing "dependent" style work, 
entailing repetitive work, sewing together parts of the same style of shoe over and over 
again, or gluing together the same shopping bag hundreds of times in one day. Beyond the 
tedium, women expressed frustration that their brains and skills were not being used. They 
found the contrast with their former lives, before the transition to capitalism, difficult. Only 
the women who conducted own-account work, such as craft, reported satisfaction at being 
able to work creatively - although this type of work was rarely sufficient to generate a 
liveable income. Many women said that although they did not wish to forget those aspects 
of the former state-socialist system that were problematic, they at least they had secure 
work which used a greater range of their skills and talents. The women exhibited negative 
social and psychological symptoms related to downward social mobility (Kessin 1971), 
which are outside the scope of the present study, but deserve greater attention. 
Low piece rates meant working long hours so as to earn enough to survive. This has 
numerous social consequences. Interviewees were asked how much "time they had to 
themselves" when they were not conducting work or family care duties. Most women 
reported that they had only one or two hours a week of leisure or "time to themselves". 
Instead of resting in the evenings, they carried out some form of home-based work. Not 
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only does this result in constant tiredness, it also leads to social isolation. Many respondents 
said that they do not have time to catch up with friends anymore. In addition to reporting 
feeling lonely, they also said that they found it hard to find out about work and other 
opportunities. Many respondents reported feeling a breakdown of trust in their local 
communities, and in broader Bulgarian society. This had a significant impact on their overall 
sense of well-being and satisfaction with life. 
A family of homeworkers in Petrich 
Rumiana is a homeworker in Petrich. When I visited, she, her son, her daughter and her 
mother were sitting around a table piled with socks in the badly lit basement of her 
apartment building with little ventilation. The walls were stacked with pickled vegetables, 
readyfor winter. The family had organised themselves in a production line In order to group 
the socks into pairs, attach them to a cardboard backing and then fold them into packages. 
The sock packages were then placed in larger boxes, reading for transport to other parts of 
Europe. 
They had been doing this job for two months for a Greek company. They showed packaging 
they had attached socks to for German and UK companies. Both teenage children were 
school aged and helped their mother with the work after school and on the weekends. They 
expected to pack 15 boxes with these containers of socks during the two days of work over 
the weekend, with the four family members working long hours. They would be paid 45 
GBN (USD $31.30) for the work. 
The reason that they had started this work is because of a recent business problem. The 
family owns a warehouse in which, until recently, a factory had been operating which made 
blouses. This provided a source of rental income for the family, in addition to the taxi driving 
carried out by the husband and beading homework normally conducted by Rumiana. One 
day, Rumiana visited the warehouse to discover that all machinery had been removed and 
the factory had disappeared. The business that rented the warehouse had left without 
paying two months of rent or utility bills, leaving Rumiana to pay the bills. Rumiana and her 
husband argued over whether it was worth trying to pursue the matter in court, to recover 
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unpaid rent and payment of the utility bills. Even if they can find the business man who 
rented the warehouse, it is likely that he would claim bankruptcy. The family told me that 
they have little faith in the legal system. 
6.2.10 Values underlying informal work 
Market behaviour, including labour market behaviour, is shaped by values and norms. This 
period after the transition to capitalism witnessed a slow alteration of collective 
perceptions and values as people adapted in social terms to capitalism. Generally, trust in 
the institutions of the state was undermined in the period after transition. A survey 
conducted in 1998 of unemployed adults found that mistrust in major state institutions was 
considerably higher than trust. Trust in the courts was less than 10 per cent, and trust in 
parliament was around 15 per cent (Genov 1999: Chapter 10). Rumiana's experience of 
feeling unable to seek legal recourse after being wronged was typical amongst the workers 
I interviewed. Unless interviewees enjoyed connections with powerful people, they 
expressed feeling a sense of disempowerment in their public dealings. According to the 
survey data reported by Genov et al, civil society organisations including political parties, 
trade unions and civic associations enjoyed even less trust than the state institutions (Genov 
1999: Chapter 10). 
Despite disapproval and mistrust in the formal structures governing society, various surveys 
in the last 20 years have shown that statist-oriented attitudes have remained strong in 
Bulgaria (Genov 1999: Chapter 12). The expectation for social problem-solving has 
continued to be directed primarily at the state. For example, survey data from 1998 showed 
that unemployed people agreed that the state should provide the conditions for satisfying 
their basic needs (Genov 1999: Chapter 10). This statist-orientation was reflected in my 
conversations with home-based workers, also. 
This orientation toward the state caused a sense of heightened disorientation in light of the 
reality that the state was no longer able to meet the needs of its citizens. This experience is 
known by sociologists as "value-normative disorientation". This is when contradictory and 
mutually exclusive value preferences are held by individuals and collectives. Interviewees 
expressed a paradoxical belief in a strong role for the state in solving societal problems and 
simultaneous distrust of it. 
This sense of bewilderment and being cut adrift appeared to follow from the rapid speed of 
organizational and societal change, coupled with a growing discrepancy between the heady 
optimism of the beginning of transition and realities which appeared later in the process. 
Attitudes towards the transition conveyed during interviews became more pessimistic 
between 2004 and 2010. In the interviews I conducted, as with other surveys, Bulgarian's 
tended to express fear for the future and dissatisfaction with their lives (Genov 1999: 
Chapter 10). According to a 2010 survey, Bulgarians had the highest levels of dissatisfaction 
with life in general and with the standard of living in Europe. Indeed, Bulgaria was the only 
European country where close to half of citizens (48 per cent) say they were dissatisfied 
with their life in general (European Commission 2010: 39). 
Though state failure created an institutional and value-based vacuum, it also meant that 
people could engage in activities that were outside of the law without fear of legal 
repercussions. None of the home-based workers interviewed feared retribution for failing 
to pay taxes or not registering as self-employed. Mistrust and lack respect for the state 
meant that they felt little regret at acting outside of the formal economy. They felt the state 
had left them with no other choice. 
6.3 Part 2: Dynamics of formalization 
Part 2 of this chapter explores the embryonic dynamics contributing towards re-
formalization that were emerging as my study of Bulgarian light industries concluded. It 
then offers an assessment of the laws that have been put in place to regulate home-based 
work, as a response to the growth of informality in Bulgaria. 
Because trade unions were key protagonists in the movement that brought down the 
communist government in Bulgaria, they were included in the process of transformation 
through social dialogue in ways that were seen in few countries in transition from state 
socialism to capitalism. However, they had to reorient themselves. Podrekepa, the 
independent union federation which was most active in leading strikes and protests against 
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the communist government, became less political after 1989 and focused on its role as an 
industrial protagonist. The traditional, state socialist unions shifted away from acting as 
arms of government and management. In the meantime, the growing informal economy 
was undermining the membership base for unions, and yet none of these unions showed 
an interest in organizing this growing workforce of informal workers. Instead, associations 
representing the interests of home-based workers emerged. The lobbying effort of these 
associations, coupled with Bulgaria's desire to be seen to be complying with European 
Union labour standards as part of its accession, resulted in new laws which regulated 
homework in 2010-11. This part of the paper describes the development of these laws and 
provides an early assessment of them. 
6.3.1 A new role for labour organisations 
The process of formalization which occurred in Bulgaria entailed the re-formation of the 
county's labour movement. Labour had held a place that was at once privileged and at the 
same time subordinate to the economic goals of the state under state socialism. The Labor 
Code of 1951 regulated a new, socialist model of collective bargaining which produced 
"collective contracts" for the "mobilization of workers" to produce more in the name of 
rapid industrialization (lankova 2000: 118). These were replaced in the late 1980s w/ith 
horizontal contracts between management and enterprise unions on the one side, and 
higher level union personnel and state administrators on the other (lankova 2000:189). 
Despite the strong place of unions in state socialist structures, unions were actively involved 
in the downfall of the socialist state in Bulgaria. Waves of strikes were instrumental in its 
destabilization. There were some 500 strike actions in the first few months after the 
November 1989 crisis, led by a new independent trade union called Podkrepa which had 
been formed in February 1989. The force of the strikes gave Podkrepa legitimacy and forced 
the government to make political concessions towards liberalisation. Podkrepa became a 
prominent part of the Bulgarian political opposition. In December 1989, it was one of the 
13 founders of the umbrella organization of the democratic opposition, the Union of 
Democratic Forces. During this period, Podrekpa's goals were political: to dismantle the old 
political structures, create new forms of economic ownership and new attitudes toward 
ownership, and support its political partners and allies. Following the mass rallies of late 
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1989, the government agreed to roundtable negotiations on the political future of the 
country, which lasted from January to April 1990 (lankova 2000: 119). 
These Roundtable negotiations became a key feature of the transition to capitalism. The 
old, official trade unions underwent a series of organizational changes to adapt to the 
realities of an emerging market economy, beginning with the proclamation of their 
independence on November 25, 1989 (lankova 2000:120). These official unions were also 
invited to play a significant role in negotiations, in the spirit of inclusivity. This strong 
institutional role of unions in the transition was backed by strong membership: 79 per cent 
of workers in manufacturing enterprises self-identified as union members in 1992 (Spenner 
and Jones 1998: 944). 
Through this process, unions established for themselves a permanent institutional place in 
the new democratic architecture of the country. Negotiations early in the transition 
developed into a multi-tier bargaining system with tripartite bargaining at the national, 
sectoral, regional, and enterprise levels, taking different forms over the 1990s. Social 
dialogue and tripartite cooperation in Bulgaria occurred with the National Council for 
Tripartite Cooperation at its apex (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions 2006). This was in contrast to the trend across much of the world, 
where bargaining was becoming decreasingly de-centralised. 
Preoccupied with their role in these institutional structures and with negotiating the demise 
of state-owned enterprises, unions failed to organize the growing informal workforce. In an 
interview in 2010, a Podkrepa official explained that independent unions had decided not 
to attempt to organise home-based workers, as a matter of policy (Interview with 
Aleksandar Zagorov 2010). 
6.3.2 Formation of associations organizing home-based workers 
In the 2000s, local, regional and national groups began to emerge to organise home-based 
workers In Bulgaria. These groups filled the gap in organisation left by unions' neglect of the 
informal workforce. The addition of these new actors to the labour landscape played a 
pivotal role in helping to address the dynamics of informalisation which had left informal 
homeworkers workers out in the cold. This occurred with the assistance of international 
organisations, including the Clean Clothes Campaign and Homeworkers Worldwide (now 
known as Homenet). These organisations have provided important material and capacity 
building assistance. The Clean Clothes Campaign has funded surveys of workers and 
conducted naming and shaming campaigns in Western Europe based on the information 
provided by worker association in Bulgaria and fact finding missions. Homenet has provided 
advice and training in organising home-based workers. Local groups can be said to have 
networked around capacity deficits in various ways (Braithwaite and Drahos 1999, 
Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). 
The umbrella organisation representing home-based workers nation-wide in Bulgaria is the 
Home-Based Workers' Association, comprised of 35,000 members. There are 8000 
members who pay on a regular basis. Its members are drawn from 22 of Bulgaria's 28 
provinces (Spooner 2013). Homeworkers are also represented by local organisations. 
Regional homeworker organisations, such as Kaloian, work in an alliance with Home-Based 
Workers' Association, meeting a few times a year to determine strategy and share ideas. 
When I visited Kaloian in 2004, it had had around 3,500 members. Organisers from the 
group estimated that there were 7000 home based workers in the area it serves, out of a 
population of 63,000. 
I observed Kaloian's organizing techniques while I was in Petrich in both 2004 and 2010. 
Members met in small numbers each other's homes. They often brought food with them, 
sharing meals made with produce from their gardens and farming plots. I watched them 
conduct marathon-long meetings, starting early in the morning and finishing at midnight to 
plan their strategies. The organisers spent evenings after they had finished their own work 
for the day visiting other workers to keep them abreast of developments. 
The Home-Based Workers' Association and its member organisations are hampered by lack 
of funding and other legal constraints. One legal constraint is labour law in Bulgaria, which 
restricts the representation of workers in social dialogue processes and collective 
bargaining to registered trade unions with 50,000 members. Though existing unions are in 
some ways important allies, they have in other respects acted as a blockage to lobbying and 
organising efforts, which is one reason that the groups have networked with international 
NGOs and pursued other means of influence. 
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Until the mid to late 2000s, the Home-Based Workers' Association and its associated 
regional groups pursued diffuse lobbying objectives. Kaloian was particularly active in 
organising dependent homeworkers in export chains. For example, at the time when the 
Olympics were held in Greece, production levels and urgency increased in Petrich and other 
areas in the south of Bulgaria that border Greece. Kaloian took advantage of both the 
economic boom and the urgency, and were able to bargain for better rates. With the help 
of the Mayor of Petrich, they also achieved equal pay for women in the town and villages. 
Prior to the interventions of the organisation, home-based workers in Petrich were 
generally paid more than in the villages. Later in the 2000s, the organisations turned their 
attention to lobbying the national government for reforms to the Labour Code to ensure 
that home-based workers were offered the same protections as standard workers. 
6.3.3 Global norm diffusion through Convention on Homework 
This process of national lobbying coincided with the process of global and regional norm 
diffusion after the ILO's Convention on Homework (Convention 177) was passed. On 27 May 
1998, the European Commission released recommendations for the ratification of the 
Convention 177 on home work by all EU countries (European Industrial Relations 
Observatory On-Line 2010). After around four years of lobbying. Convention 177 was 
ratified by Bulgaria in 2009 (Zlateva 2010). Though less peripheral member states have 
failed to ratify the Convention (only 10 countries have ratified globally), Bulgaria has been 
particularly keen to demonstrate adherence to EU recommendations as a way, perhaps, of 
insisting on its normative inclusion in the Union. 
The government set up a special working group of the National Council for Tripartite 
Cooperation as part of a larger suite of anti-crisis measures (Zlateva 2011). The government 
left the social partners to decide on rules for dependent home-based work in Bulgaria and 
to propose legislation (European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line 2010), setting a 
new precedent for the operation of the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation. These 
negotiations included employer organisations and both trade union federations - CITUB 
and the Confederation of Labour Podkrepa. Throughout 2010, the National Council for 
Tripartite Cooperation drafted an agreement. On 16 June 2010, all groups involved signed 
a preliminary agreement regarding the regulation of home-based work (European Industrial 
Relations Observatory On-Line 2010). On 24 November 2010, in the presence of the Prime 
Minister of Bulgaria, Boyko Borisov, and the Minister of Labour and Social Policy, Totyu 
Mladenov, the National Agreement on Regulation of Homebased Work was signed (Zlateva 
2011). 
6.3.4 National Agreement on Regulation of Homebased Work 
The National Agreement on Regulation of Homebased Work provided for the amendment 
of the Labour Code. The amendment requires that dependent homevi/orkers are provided 
w/ith a labour contract and enjoy the conditions, including health and safety, guaranteed by 
Bulgarian labour, social security legislation and collective agreements, regardless of their 
place of work. The agreement set out (Zlateva 2011): 
• definitions of what constitutes a workplace; 
• necessary workplace equipment; 
• proceduresfor joining a union; 
• what is meant by homeworking; 
• the elements to be included in employment contracts to protect the rights of 
people in atypical forms of employment. 
In a press release announcing the agreement, the Minister of Labour and Social Policy, Mr 
Mladenov said: 'From now on the rights of the people working in atypical employment will 
be regulated, they will receive employment contracts, social security insurance and their 
working time will count towards pensions' (Zlateva 2011). The Labour Code was 
subsequently amended in line with the agreements, providing for legal regulation of 
employment relations and working conditions for homeworking. 
6.3.5 Assessment 
This section assesses to what extent the amendments to the labour code redress the 
dynamics of informalisation described in Part one of this chapter. To what extent do they 
respond to the experiences of workers and the deficits in working conditions? Is this 
response adequate to the task of improving the conditions of home-based, informal 
workers in Bulgaria? 
The amendment to the labour code marks a big step the regulation of atypical work, putting 
Bulgaria at the forefront of initiatives of this type. However, the law suffers from structural 
and incentive-based deficiencies. The primary structural deficiency flows from restrictions 
in the Labour Code concerning the representation of workers. Participation in social 
dialogue processes, collective bargaining and other forms of representation is limited to 
registered trade unions with 50,000 members. This is particularly problematic for home-
based workers, who, as noted above, are primarily represented by homeworker 
associations not registered as unions. This diminishes the capacity of such groups to play a 
role in the enforcement of the laws, or in bargaining over terms and conditions. This 
significantly weakens the strength of homeworkers' representation, given the lack of 
interest that the Light Industries Union and other representative unions have shown 
towards homeworkers. In interviews, representatives of unions were quite open about their 
lack of knowledge about home-based work and their decision not to try to represent these 
workers. Experience from other countries, including Australia, shows that without the 
targeted representation of homeworkers, combined with the active enforcement of 
homeworker provisions in labour laws, the likelihood of the laws being enforced is low. Now 
that homeworkers are considered employees under the Labour Code, unions may have an 
incentive to be more active in representing them. 
The law does not offer any additional incentives for parties to comply with the law. Yet, as 
we have seen in this chapter, the incentives against compliance are manifold. On the 
employer and contractor side, there is pressure within supply chains to lower labour unit 
costs in the face of global competition. Employers therefore tend to completely, or at least 
partially disregard laws concerning labour contracts and contributions towards welfare 
benefit. As this chapter has discussed in some detail, this pressure stems from Bulgaria's 
industrial downgrading so that most work conducted in light industries is in outward 
processing where competition is based on low labour unit costs. On the worker side, 
because the taxation and welfare system is regressive, there are disincentives against 
formalising for those who are only receiving the minimum wage. Owing to a mistrust 
towards the state and its institutions, Bulgarian workers tend not be uncomfortable working 
informally. Furthermore, because unemployment is so high, workers are wary of pushing 
for higher wages or formal contracts for fear of antagonising employer/contractors and 
losing work. For both sides, low levels of trust in the state is likely to further erode the 
impetus to comply with the law, regardless of how good it appears on paper. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has tracked a number of dynamics which combined to first, create and then 
consolidate, a large informal workforce in Bulgaria. A primary dynamic was the institutional 
vacuum created by the dismantling of state regulatory systems and their slow or inadequate 
reform to new market institutions (Hamm, King et al. 2012). Modern capitalism is 
characterized not only by capitalist property relations (private ownership of the major 
means of production), but also by the presence of a strong bureaucratic state (Weber 1968, 
Weber and Whimster 2004). It simply took time to replace the existing regulatory functions 
with new ones that were appropriate to the new market-based system. The retreat of the 
state took place faster than legislation to control and shape market activity could be passed 
and implemented (Wallace and Latcheva 2006: 84). This vacuum was related to the central 
tension or paradox of having a centrally-driven transition towards de-centralisation. Once 
the state was weakened and partially abandoned as the administrative centre, how were 
new agencies and regulatory functions to be created? 
The institutional vacuum had a number of consequences. First, at various times in the 
course of the transition from the command economy, the state was not able to control 
aspects of economic transformation. This was witnessed in the weak oversight of financial 
bodies allowing the flourishing of Ponzi schemes and over lending. Second, the new 
economic forms existed without adequate regulation or policies. For instance, the labour 
force restructuring and the creation of a surplus labour force occurred without offering 
alternative programs, practices, and measures for new employment, or effective 
institutions for the enforcement of new labour laws. A study of an unemployment office in 
the regional town of Pernik, for example, where some interviews were conducted for this 
study, found that the employees of the office were struggling to know what services to 
provide. There were no financial resources to meet the expectations for training courses. 
Further, there were no realistic prospects for alternative employment in the municipality. 
'So, to train for what type of job?' the authors of the study ask (Genov 1999). The overall 
consequence was that individuals and households enjoyed very low income security. People 
suffered the loss of their existing work in an economy in which very few new jobs were 
being generated, and in which existing work was mainly unregulated. 
Similarly, the privatisation of state owned companies occurred without the regulation and 
institutional knowledge that is present in mature capitalist countries with longer market 
traditions. Those who took over the management of newly privatised enterprises had 
learned their management skills in highly bureaucratised state enterprises, where the 
agency problems differ from those in a private enterprise. Third, the weakness of the 
remaining state meant that legislation was easily subverted by agents within the state who 
wished to "grab" state resources in their own interests or tunneling out state institutions 
from the inside (Wallace and Latcheva 2006: 84). Weber argued that a bureaucratic state is 
essential to modern capitalism because in its absence, individual capitalists might resort to 
political capitalism - the use of personal relationships with state officials to create extra-
market opportunities for profitable activity (Weber 1968, Weber 1981). Bulgaria witnessed 
a form of primitive accumulation, which resulted in the transfer of previously state-owned 
assets to a small group of private individuals who were in a position to grab them at 
enormous profit. Grabbing was associated with disobedience of the generally accepted 
rules of fair market competition that have evolved over years of repeat transactions in 
mature market economies (Petkov 2006). For those who had no experience of the market 
system, these implicit codes of behaviour were not self-evident. Methods of capital 
accumulation were often ruthless. 
Fourthly, the new legislation enacted by the state could often be characterized as what 
Wallace et al refer to as 'absurd and non-viable' (Wallace and Latcheva 2006: 83). The 
welfare system - with the high rates of individual contributions expected of workers - is an 
example of such non-viable legislation in Bulgaria. The difficulty of complying with such laws 
encouraged the persistence of traditions of rule bending and corruption inherited from the 
days of state socialism (Wallace and Latcheva 2006: 83). 
In additions to these dynamics which flowed from the institutional vacuum, the economy 
suffered from a raft of difficulties entering the global market economy that flowed from its 
external relations in the Eastern bloc prior to the transition. Its close relation with the Soviet 
Union, which subsidized the Bulgarian economy in various ways, as well as Its almost 
exclusive trading within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, meant that Bulgaria 
was ill-prepared to enter the global market. Its failure to attract nutritious FDI also 
contributed to the scale of labour shedding that occurred in the 1990s, leading to the 
entrenchment of unemployment and a sizable informal workforce. 
Cumulatively, all of these factors contributed to the growth of a large informal workforce. 
To bring to life the effect of this informality, this chapter has focussed on the experience of 
home-based workers in light Industries, describing the scope of this workforce and their 
conditions. Prior to the introduction of new legislation addressing the informality, the 
picture of an Informal worker in Bulgaria was often a bleak one - with few respondents 
expressing hope for the future or satisfaction with their present working life. 
Part Two of this chapter examined the dynamics which led to amendments of the Labour 
Code to ensure that home-based workers are offered the same protections as standard 
workers. The law was passed following lobbying by homeworker associations, norm 
diffusion through the EU and ILO and a desire on behalf of the government to demonstrate 
responsiveness to the financial crisis. The focus on a legislative solution can be seen to flow 
from the "statist-orientation" that remains strong in Bulgaria and the channelling of union 
activities into processes of social dialogue which lend themselves to the creation of legal 
responses to social problems. 
Though the expansion of the scope labour law to cover these atypical, precariat workers is 
an important step, its impact is likely to be limited given the dearth of additional regulatory 
levers to bolster its application and effectiveness. The reasons for informality explored in 
this chapter are manifold, and flow from both external and internal governance and 
economic influences. The expansion of the scope of labour law is a weak answer to these 
forces. 
7 GARMENT INDUSTRY WORKERS IN CAMBODIA 
7.1 Introduction 
This cliapter tracl<s tlie dynamics of informalisation and subsequent formalisation of 
work in tlie garment industry in Cambodia. In particular, it explores the factors that have 
contributed to and hampered the effectiveness the combination of the US-Cambodia 
Bilateral Textile Agreement (UCTA) and the International Labour Organisation's (ILO) 
Better Factories Project (BFC) (which are together referred to in this paper as "the 
init iat ive") .Unl ike the Mathadi Boards examined in the previous chapter, about which 
little has been written, the Cambodian labour initiative is well documented and 
frequently heralded as a model for transnational labour regulation in developing 
countries. 
In order to assess the responsiveness of this transnational labour initiative, this 
dissertation contents that it is necessary to have a sense of what it might be responding 
to. How did the Cambodian working population come to be almost entirely working in 
informal conditions by the early 1990s? What international and national factors 
converged to produce virtually no industrial sector, high levels of poverty and 
governmental structures that were unable to govern and regulate the emerging garment 
sector? 
In describing the labour regulation initiative and assessing it, the chapter makes two 
important interventions in the already abundant literature on the initiative. Firstly, it 
focusses on the role of the trade incentives, as preferential treatment in trade played a 
critical part in encouraging investment in formal enterprises. In this way, trade 
incentives were just as important as the BFC in improving the labour standards of 
participating enterprises. Secondly, it examines the initiative in the context of 
Cambodia's political economy. A great deal has been written about the program in the 
industrial relations, labour law and development literature. However, this literature 
" The research reported in this chapter was funded jointly by the UK Department for 
International Development and the Economic and Social Research Council. The project is headed 
by Professor Simon Deakin of Cambridge University and the present author. The interviews 
referred to in this chapter were conducted by Enying Zheng, Eng Kunthea and the current author 
in March 2014. 
almost never examines way that the initiative's operation and long-term sustainability 
is influenced by the interests of Cambodia's ruling elite. Although some authors have 
considered the initiative in light of "corruption" (Kolben 2004, Kolben 2007, Hall 2010), 
this offers only a thin understanding of the dynamics of pow/er maintenance by the ruling 
elite. Indeed, understanding certain behaviours and sets of relations in terms of 
"corruption" tends to a view/ that they are an aberration or somehow outside of the 
normal order. This view inhibits an understanding of these behaviours and relationships 
as part of a relatively stable political economy. This chapter seeks to remedy this gap by 
analysing the initiative in the context of the political economy of Cambodia. This 
approach allows us to develop an understanding of the way that dense networks of 
relationships support what is understood in the West as corruption. This leads to an 
appreciation of the ways that the ruling elite have approached BFC and UCTA and, thus, 
their broader impact on Cambodia's economy and social relations. 
After French colonisation, decimation at the hands of Pol Pot and years of civil war, work 
in Cambodia was almost entirely informal. Although a small civil service persisted, the 
work paid so little that workers had to supplement their wages in various ways, making 
it difficult to describe the work as entirely formal. Following the Paris Peace Agreement 
of 1991, Cambodia became crowded with international NGOs and foreign aid bodies 
clambering to make up for the failure to intervene during the Pol Pot regime and the 
subsequent years of civil war.^^ Partly because Cambodia was geographically small and 
poor it offered an opportunity for experiments in aid programs and other types of 
assistance. The UCTA, which included a labour standards provision and heralded the 
creation of the ILO's BFC programme is celebrated as one of the great success stories in 
regulatory innovations in developing countries for its role in facilitating the formalisation 
and the improvement of labour conditions in the garment industry of Cambodia (Polaski 
2006). It has since expanded to Vietnam, Jordan, Haiti, Lesotho, Nicaragua and Indonesia 
under the auspices of the ILO's Better Work programme. 
" From 1965 to 1975, under the administration of President Lyndon Johnson, and then during 
Richard Nixon's "secret war", Cambodia was bombed as part of an effort to destabilise tlie 
Vietnamese National Liberation Frot and the rurally based communist Khmer Rouge. In 
hindsight, it became clear that the bombing campaign actually strengthened the Khmer Rouge 
movement and weakened US allies King Sihanouk and the government of Lon Nol: Medvedev, 
K. (2013). "Picking up the Threads: Model Approach Helps Cambodia Design a New Fashion 
Image." Women's Studies Quarterly 41(1/21: 131. 
Today, thanks to the impact of preferential trading agreements with the US and other 
countries since the 1990s, the garment industry is the biggest employer in the country, 
employing 320,734 workers, among which 293,664 are women (Chheang, Shintaro et al. 
2011: 3). It is also the country's largest foreign currency earner - contributing about 80 
per cent of Cambodia's annual foreign exchange earnings (Chheang, Shintaro et al. 2011: 
3). However, the formalisation of the garment industry is not spreading to other 
industries to a comparable extent. By 2003 the informal economy accounted still for 62 
per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 85 per cent of the total workforce. The 
remaining I S per cent of the workforce was employed by "formal" sectors, especially in 
the garment industry (230,000), the tourism sector, which employed 70,000, and public 
administration with 350,000 employees (Arnold and Han Shih 2010: 402). Although the 
rate of economic growth has been impressive over the last two decades — Cambodia 
enjoyed an average growth of 8.4 per cent from 1994 to 2008 (Sotharith 2012) — the 
share of wealth is concentrated in a small number of elite hands. This has diminished 
the capacity for growth of formal enterprises across non-garment sectors. Further, 
despite the perceived success of BFC, industrial relations in Cambodia's garment 
industry are still far from ideal. Wages are supressed through the government's 
minimum wage setting process. Protests and strikes have often been followed by the 
murder of union leaders and the injury of others, sometimes quite openly by police, and 
at other times in a more covert manner. This chapter addresses these apparent 
contradictions in light of the Hun Sen government's skilful maintenance of neo-
patrimonial interests. 
7.1.1 Field work 
The analysis of the operation of BFC conducted in this chapter draws extensively from 
interviews conducted in Cambodia in early 2014 with union leaders and other people 
with experience of the labour movement, personnel from BFC, representatives of 
factory management and representatives of employer bodies. The author has been 
conducting other research into neo-patrimonalism in Cambodia over the last three 
years. The views expressed in this paper reflect understandings developed through this 
research. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Part One examines the dynamics of Informallsation 
owing to French colonisation, the Pol Pot regime and civil war. It then considers the way 
that the neo-patrlmonlal politics of the Hun Sen government hampered the Cambodia's 
development in the post-Paris Peace Agreement period. Part Two tracks the dynamics 
of the formallsation of the garment Industry following the signing of the UCTA and the 
development of the BFC project. It examines how these developments have been 
deployed by the Hun Sen government to maintain neo-patrlmonlal power, and how this, 
In turn, has fettered the success of the Initiative. 
7.2 Part 1: Dynamics of Informalisation 
Cambodia's formalised export garment Industry did not begin to develop until the 1990s 
when Cambodians first experienced peace after decades of social turmoil. In the 
decades prior, there had been little industry and most enterprises operated Informally 
or as state-owned enterprises. The informality of the Cambodian workforce Is largely 
attributable to French colonisation, mass murder under the Khmer Rouge and years of 
civil war curbing the development of industry. It was hoped that Cambodia's economy 
would rapidly expand after democratic institutions were put In place. Though growth 
has been rapid, poverty reduction has been slow and, as noted, 85 per cent of 
Cambodian workers continue to operate in the informal economy. One of the reasons 
for this Is because a small elite has captured the resources of the state Instead of 
fostering a developmental state. 
7.2.1 Colonisation, the Khmer Rouge and Civil War 
The dynamics of colonisation and civil war experienced by Cambodia in the twentieth 
century explain why, today, most work In Cambodia occurs in poor, small and micro 
enterprises that are unregulated by government. This section briefly outlines the various 
ways that these dynamics thwarted economic development, hampered the 
development of formal enterprises, and hindered rationalist bureaucratic development 
in the Weberlan sense. 
French colonisation did little to contribute to economic growth in Cambodia. The French 
Protectorate of Cambodia was established In 1867, and Cambodia was integrated into 
the French Indochina union In 1887. It Is often joked that France's main contribution was 
to develop more efficient methods for collecting taxes. The French colonial government 
raised agricultural taxes and imposed a head tax that had to be paid in cash. Those who 
could not pay the taxes conducted a "corvee service" - a tax rival - demanding as many 
as ninety days a year on public works projects. Large percentages of annual rice harvests 
were confiscated, contributing to rural indebtedness (Tyner 2008: 26). The tax forced 
many peasant families to send men of working age to the cities, mines and plantations 
in search of waged labour, creating a supply of surplus labour. The French otherwise 
transformed Cambodia's village-based economy negligibly. Industry was rudimentary 
and was designed primarily to process raw materials, such as rubber, for local use or 
export. 
French authorities assumed full control over Cambodian affairs in the financial, legal and 
commercial fields. A bureaucratic hierarchy was established, with French nationals 
occupying the upper echelons of the state and ethnic Vietnamese dominating the lower 
rungs of government. Cambodians were mostly excluded from bureaucratic roles (Tyner 
2008: 25). The Cambodian people were allowed few opportunities, before the 1940s, to 
participate in the political process. French colonisation prepared the country very poorly 
for independence, or for developing institutions of government. This is one of the factors 
which explains why it has been so hard for the Cambodian state to develop industrial 
relations institutions, such as effective inspectorates which could keep a check on labour 
conditions and encourage formality. 
In 1946, Cambodia was granted self-rule within the French Union and had its 
protectorate status abolished in 1949. Cambodia won independence from France in 
1953 and became the Kingdom of Cambodia. Just as the education system and other 
institutions of nation building were beginning to reap benefits under Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk, the Pol Pot occupied Phnom Penh. Up to two million people died during the 
four years of Khmer Rouge rule (Mclntyre 1996: 730). Cities were evacuated, wiping out 
commercial hubs. The regime put to death the majority of the nation's educated elite 
(Hall 2000: 120). A lasting legacy of this period is that individuals of school age at the 
end of the 1970s, especially men, have a lower educational attainment than those in the 
preceding and subsequent birth cohorts (Walque 2006: 233). This has had a long-term 
impact on Cambodia's rate of development. It also explains the country's high reliance 
on outside technical assistance, including BFC. This is the cohort who, in other countries, 
are today heading up government departments and leading industrial development. 
However, in Cambodia, this group of men were killed or largely left without secondary 
or University education, limiting their occupational choices and capacity to take charge 
of government. 
In 1977, conflict erupted with Vietnam, leading to the invasion in 1978 and eventual 
takeover of Cambodia by Vietnam in 1979. On January 10, 1979, the Vietnamese 
proclaimed the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and a new regime was installed 
based to an extent on mid-level Khmer Rouge officials who had earlier fled to escape 
being purged. Together with other Cambodian communists who had spent much of the 
Post-World War II period in Vietnam, they formed the backbone of the new 
administration (Vickery 1986, Becker 1998, Gottesman 2003). In 1981, the pro-
Vietnamese PRK won parliamentary elections. A young former Khmer Rouge officer 
named Hun Sen headed the new PRK government. He had survived years of war, bloody 
infighting, political purges and rapidly changing alliances, and had manoeuvred himself 
into power (Hall 2000: 120). 
Civil war continued throughout the 1980s, with Western, Chinese and ASEAN support 
for the resistance groups and Soviet Bloc support for the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea. This not only divided the nation, it hampered economic development. 
Resources were diverted to fighting and more working aged men died. The industrial 
sector, which is usually first to formalise, accounted for only 5 per cent of Cambodia's 
GDP by 1985, down from 19 per cent in 1969. Industrial activity was concentrated in the 
processing of agricultural commodities, mostly rice, fish, wood and rubber (Sotharith 
2012). Enterprises were small, employing an average of fewer than 200 workers 
(Sotharith 2012). 
With the reduction in Cold War tensions, Cambodian politics slowly began to normalise 
as foreign backers of the royalists, the PRK and the Khmer Rouge began to withdraw 
their financial and military support for these factions, aided by the UN-sponsored peace 
process (Cock 2010). After Vietnam withdrew Its military forces in 1989, the PRK 
renamed itself the State of Cambodia, and formally abandoned socialism. The 
Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (the Paris 
Peace Agreements) were signed October 23 1991. The UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) followed in 1992, culminating in the 1993 elections, contested by 19 
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parties (Gainsborough 2012). These transitional processes sought to project Cambodia 
forward into peace and democracy. 
There was a surge in civil society activity, and more vocal and diverse media emerged 
(Gainsborough 2012). Yet government remained bedevilled by factional rivalry and 
political violence (Mehmet 1997). In 1997, after an uneasy period of sharing power with 
Prince Norodom Ranariddh's royalist party, Hun Sen launched a bloody coup in which 
his opponents were exiled, arrested, tortured, and in some cases summarily executed. 
Since 1997, Hun Sen has led the country and solidified his political and economic power. 
7.2.2 Post Paris Peace Agreement neo-patrimonialism 
Since the end of the Khmer Rouge regime, Cambodia's state has created its own 
relatively stable political and economic elite (Cock 2010: 251). A relatively small number 
of elites hold concurrent positions within the government, legal institutions and the CPP, 
and remain closely associated with Hun Sen, despite the existence of a rational-legal 
bureaucratic system rooted in the principles of separation of power. They are largely 
post-Khmer Rouge-era politicos who built their influence following the economic 
liberalization of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The strength of ties between these elite 
families is fortified through intermarriage (Litner 2007) as well as shared business 
interests. The powerful elite maintain their influence by combining political, military, 
economic and administrative power through an "interlocking of pyramids of patron-
client networks" (Scott 1972). This section of the chapter explores the operation of neo-
patrimonialism on the growth of a formal workforce across diverse industrial sectors. 
Though the concept is sometimes ambiguous (Zabludovsky 1989, Charrad),^'' in seeking 
to understand the structure and administrative machinery of the Cambodian political 
system, scholars have often turned to the Weberian concept of "patrimonialism". Neo-
patrimonialism is a highly personalized, patron focused, and often presidential system, 
where the benefits of resource extraction through formal state apparatus are 
concentrated only among a small group of elites. Neo-patrimonial systems co-opt the 
Patrimonialism was conceptualized by Weber as an ideal type: "an analytical construct that 
one compares to real-world cases, ones that correspond imperfectly to the conceptual tool at 
hand but that can also be illuminated by them": Charrad, M. M. and J. Adams (2011). 
"Introduction: Patrimonialism, Past and Present." The ANNALS of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 636(1): 6-15. 
formal and informal mechanisms ofthe state to gather personal wealth, via rent seeking. 
The formal governance structures in the neo-patrimonial state become a machine for 
harvesting income and gaining resource control. 
The Hun Sen government, led by the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) employs a variety 
of techniques to maintain power and quell dissent including violence, gifts and foreign 
assistance. The predatory character of the Hun Sen regime partially explains why it 
needs external resources and assistance. A significant source of state revenue comes 
from tapping into the flows of aid provided by foreign actors to supplement what can 
be internally captured (Muasher 2007). Much of the remaining income comes from 
foreign direct investment, as is the case with the garment industry which is 100 foreign 
owned. These resource inflows provide Cambodian elites with a certain level of regime 
autonomy. As the provision of basic services is predominantly externally financed and 
managed, state actors have greater freedom from domestic pressures that might 
otherwise compel the use of their offices for public benefit (Cock 2010, Nicholson and 
Low 2013). These dynamics are readily evident in the area of labour relations, explored 
below. 
7.2.3 Burgeoning garment sector 
Beginning in 1994, the government of Cambodia started privatising small and medium-
sized state-owned enterprises (Sotharith 2012). In 1993, as part of a program of 
economic and structural adjustment, the government, with the support of the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, put in place a number of policies 
encouraging foreign investment. It offered significant financial packages to investors 
willing to begin operations in Cambodia under a new Law on Investment passed in 
August 1994. By 1995, this policy had attracted the establishment of 20 new garment 
factories, which grew rapidly to 32 by mid-1996, employing an estimated 20,000 
workers (Hall 2000: 129). 
Due to Cambodia's slow development and the poverty spurred by colonisation and the 
conflict of the twentieth century, Cambodia's population represented a large pool of 
cheap labour. This was attractive to foreign investors and brands seeking to source 
garments from Cambodia for a low cost. On the other side of the coin, for families facing 
hunger and stark privation, the garment factories in and around Phnom Penh became a 
source of salvation. Young women travelled by the tens of thousands from their rural 
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villages to work in Phnom Penh with the hope of being able to send money home to 
their families. According to Hall, they often offered the last chance their families (Hall 
2000: 128). 
Conditions in the Bourgeoning Garment industry 
The conditions of workers in the garment industry in the mid to late 1990s were 
characterised by low wages, forced overtime, being locked into the factories, no paid 
sick leave or holidays and the payment of pre-employment fees which placed workers 
in a type of indentured labour. Workers were required to work far in excess of the 
maximum hours permitted under law, with shifts up to fifteen hours, seven days a week, 
with no days off (Hall 2000: 160-161). Fines were awarded to workers who refused to 
work on Sundays. Initially, workers were paid piece rates, rather than wages, leading to 
great variance in monthly incomes amongst those workers in the same section of the 
one factory (Athreva 1996: 5). By 1998, wages were paid rather than piece rates, but 
wages were frequently lower than the already extremely low legal minimum. There 
were no provisions in the Labour Code for minimum wages until 1997, when the 
minimum wage was set at USD $40 per month for a 40 hour working week under a sub-
decree for the garment sector (Shah 2010: 7). In practice, this operated as a maximum 
rather than a minimum. 
In order to gain employment in garment factories, many young women were forced to 
pay bribes or a "finder's fee" to so-called "employment brokers" (in breach of Article 
7(1) of ILO Convention 181). These employment brokers were often the security guards, 
borrowed from the local police force, who were employed by factories both to guard 
factories and to recruit workers from villages. Workers were required to pay around USD 
$40 to USD $100 to these employment brokers to obtain work (Hall 2000:153). Because 
rural families did not have such money, often family land would be held as collateral for 
a loan. Interest charged on the loan was then deducted from the workers' wages. 
Despite the fact that these conditions were in breach of the Labour Code, they went 
unchecked either by an effective state Labour Inspectorate or an active union 
movement. Under the 1997 Labour Code, responsibility for monitoring factories and 
enforcing labour law and regulations lies with labour Inspectors and Labour Controllers 
with the Bureau of Labour Inspection, part of the Ministry of Labour (Article 343). By 
1998, the official number of labour inspectors at Cambodia's Ministry of Labour was 100, 
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but according to a UN report, 'only about twelve in fact carry out inspections. This is not 
sufficient if the Ministry is to address labour disputes In a comprehensive manner.' 
(Secretary General 1998: 16) The vestiges of French colonialism and the challenges of 
the transition to capitalism meant that the inspectorate had limited capacity to regulate 
these new businesses. Corruption was widespread, and low wages necessitated the 
taking of "gifts" (Hall 2000: 126). Corruption was also fuelled by the entrenched system 
of political allegiances between factory owners and powerful bureaucrats and 
politicians. As a junior civil servant, refusing bribes and reporting serious violations of 
the Labour Code would result in trouble with superiors. Hall found that factories were 
only fined for Labour Code violations when they lost the protection of their political allies 
or tried to operate without such "friends" (Hall 2000: 127). 
In the early days of the garment industry in Cambodia, collective bargaining and 
independent union organising did not occur (Athreva 1996) (Secretary General 1998: 
16). State-controlled syndicates were demobilized as part of the transition from a 
planned economy to a market-driven economy and most leaders of the Union 
Federation of Kampuchea were given important positions in state institutions (Nuon and 
Serrano 2010:24). In 1996, the Free Trade Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia 
(FTUWKC) was the first union federation to be established in after democratization. It 
emerged as Sam Rainsy, along with other union activists such as Chea Vichea, began 
organizing local unions to counter those identified with the ruling party. The CPP and 
employers responded by fostering their own unions. The CPP formed the Cambodian 
Trade Union Federation in 1996, soon renamed the Independent Trade Union of 
Cambodian Workers, which differentiated itself from the FTUWK by rejecting militancy 
and encouraging direct negotiations with employers. As of July 10, 1998, a total of 32 
garment unions were officially registered with the Ministry of Labour. Of these, only 
three were independent of government or management domination. Of the others, 28 
were either Independent Trade Union of Cambodian Workers (ITUCW) or Trade Union 
of Workers (TUW), 'regarded as "paper unions" established by factory management with 
the collusion of the Ministry of Labour' (Hall 2000: 145). 
Hall found evidence that the Ministry of Labour and high ranking CPP officials routinely 
colluded with employers to deny workers the right to form independent unions (Hall 
2000:136). Employees were asked to sign membership forms for management aligned 
unions as a condition of employment. Various formal and informal hurdles were placed 
in the way of independent unions that tried to register with the government. 
7.3 Part 2: Dynamics of Formalisation 
This part of the chapter explores the dynamics that have supported the formalisation of 
the garment industry. In the late 1990s a number of institutional changes occurred to 
trade relations and labour relations which encouraged the growth of the industry with 
close supervision by the ILO. Most of the literature on labour relations in the garment 
industry focuses on the labour standards aspects of the bilateral agreement between 
the US and Cambodia. However, other aspects of the agreement, in conjunction with a 
variety of additional institutional developments, had an influential role in generating 
large and formal enterprises and providing opportunities for the birth of a new labour 
movement. 
7.3.1 Institutional underpinnings of the Cambodian garment industry 
In the late 1990s, Cambodia's garment industry enjoyed a major boost from 
arrangements under the Multifibre Agreement that permitted the establishment of 
quotas limiting imports into countries whose domestic industries were facing serious 
damage from rapidly increasing imports (Beresford 2009). Investors sought new 
locations for the manufacture of garments after their own country's quota had been 
filled. 
In 1998, the US initiated negotiations to impose a quota on Cambodian products. The 
American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), together 
with member unions including the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile 
Employees (UNITE), the International Rights Fund and the Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights, lobbied the Clinton Administration particularly hard to have a stronger 
Labour Code in Cambodia mandated by UCTA. While the Cambodian government and 
the Garment Manufacturing Association of Cambodia (GMAC) were involved, according 
to Kolben, 'the two primary negotiating parties ere the US government and the ILO' 
(Kolben 2004: 91). No Cambodian trade unions or Cambodian NGOs were consulted 
(Kolben 2004: 91). UCTA was signed and came into effect in 1999 and was eventually 
extended until December 2004. 
A number of additional institutional changes were made to the landscape of labour 
relations during this period. In late 1998, the government liberalized procedures for 
trade union registration, allowing for a swift increase in the number of officially 
recognized labour unions (Nuon and Serrano 2010:17-18) . This was fol lowed in 1999 by 
the creation of a tripartite Labour Advisory Committee (LAC) which reviews and 
approves labour regulation. It also undertakes a periodic minimum wage review. 
The Cambodian garment industry further benefited from the use by the US and the EU 
of provisions in the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Textile and Clothing to 
re-impose import quotas on China, in the former case until the end of 2008 and in the 
latter until the end of 2007. A bilateral agreement between Cambodia and the EU giving 
duty- and quota-free access to Cambodian garments was signed in 1999, and from 2001 
Cambodia was included in the EU's Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, which granted 
the same conditions (Beresford 2009). Though in reality, only a small proportion of 
Cambodian exports benefited from duty-free access to overseas markets, these 
institutional factors appear to have supported the initial growth of the industry, and the 
emergence of a critical mass of large, privately owned formal enterprises in Cambodia ." 
7.3.2 Structure of the garment industry 
As this section of the chapter discusses, although the Cambodian economy is particularly 
dependent on the garment industry, the industry remains remarkably disembedded 
from the rest of Cambodian society, economy and the state. Embeddedness has to do 
with the constitutive institutions and networks of interaction that shape market activity 
(Polanyi 1957). Less embeddedness implies that markets are governed more strongly by 
basic forces of supply and demand, rather than being submitted to the control of various 
societal institutions (Polanyi 1957). More specifically, in a capitalist system, a less 
embedded market can be described as one in which powerful business actors exert 
market power with relatively weaker countervailing power wielded by the state. This 
section suggests that over time, this disembeddness presented opportunities for 
international civil society organisations, independent unions and the ILO in promoting 
better labour conditions and continuing formalisation. 
" The reason usually cited was Cambodia's inability to meet the strict rules of origin, owing to 
the non-inclusion of China in the derogation list. 
From a starting point 1 per cent of GDP in 1993, and seven factories in 1994, the industry 
expanded to 14 per cent of GDP by 2011, and 72 per cent of total merchandise exports 
(Chheang, Shintaro et al. 2011). The garment industry quicl<ly became the main income 
generator wi th in the Cambodian labour force. Rather than improving wi th economic 
growth , poverty levels in the Cambodian countryside rose due to illegal logging, 
draughts and the granting of agricultural concessions that reduced the land available for 
farming (Un 2012, Un 2013). The salaries of female factory workers became a vital 
component of the rural economy, wi th workers sending between 30-50 per cent of their 
salaries home (around $10-30 each month) (Bank 2004). 
The number of apparel factories expanded at a steady rate between 1998 and 2004, but 
then declined slightly after the end of UCTA before recovering again without noticeably 
affecting employment growth (Beresford 2009). This marked the first significant 
departure f rom an agrarian society organized around family f a r m s . T h e average size of 
these establishments stabilized at about 1100-1200 workers by 2008 (Beresford 
2009:371),^^ large enough to support a market economy style of trade unions, wi th shop 
stewards and more than one union competing for worker membership. 
The garment industry is highly disembedded from the local economy. Production is not 
for a domestic market: clothing mainly goes to the US, the EU, Canada, and Japan 
(Chheang, Shintaro et al. 2011). This means that nearly all inputs must be imported 
(Arnold and Han Shih 2010: 415). 93 per cent of garment enterprises are fore ign-owned 
(Chheang, Shintaro et al. 2011). Though this reduces the economic nutrition of the 
industry for the rest of the economy, and in some ways renders the industry less 
beholden to patrimonial ties that bind the rest of the economy to elite networks. 
The industry is further disembedded f rom the political forces driving the local economy 
by the neo-liberal logic driving the agreement with the US. In return for UCTA quotas, 
Cambodia agreed, among other concessions, to reduce tariffs on its apparel and textile 
imports, and not to exercise non-tariff restrictions, such as import licensing. Cambodia 
55 per cent of the labour force were in agriculture and agricultural production accounted for 
31.7 per cent per cent of GDP in 2009: Nuon, V. and M. Serrano (2010). Building Unions in 
Cambodia: History, Challenges, Strategies. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional 
Cooperation in Asia. 
" Official employment data is unreliable in Cambodia. 
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offers a generous foreign direct investment regime with 100 per cent foreign capital 
investment and tax holidays (Asuyama, Chhun et al. 2012: 64). As a consequence, the 
industry's direct contributions to official government revenue have been limited almost 
entirely to export licences (Chheang, Shintaro et al. 2011: 4). 
The Ministry of Commerce holds the most povi^erful official domestic position in the 
garment industry by granting these export licenses. Because of the limit imposed on the 
number of garments that could be exported, the government set up a complex system 
for allocating export quotas to companies. The system provides opportunities for raising 
revenue from public quota auctions, as well as less public opportunities for officials 
administering the auction to obtain payoffs for granting allocations (Kolben 2004: 86). 
Though the Ministry of Labour is responsible for setting minimum wages, mediating 
disputes and monitoring compliance with the law, in practice it has less institutional 
sway than its formal authority would suggest. As is outlined in the next section, the 
acceptance of "gifts" continues to be common place. 
Other than these payments, the high proportion of foreign ownership of enterprises 
means that a significant part of the profits are repatriated. Cambodian elite are relatively 
uninvolved in garment factories, and opportunities for predatory behaviour and 
opportunities for wealth extraction are limited by the neo-liberal institutional 
architecture of the industry. This has provided various opportunities for the burgeoning 
labour movement that might not otherwise have existed. 
There were a number of contradictory forces at play which impacted on the willingness 
and capacity of employees of apparel factories to wield political and industrial power in 
the early development of the garment industry. The low-skilled workers that filled the 
non-managerial positions were chiefly single young women, drawn from rural villages 
and earning low wages. Rural migrants constituted 90 per cent of all garment workers 
by 2010 (Medvedev 2013: 133). Wages were extremely low, but living in communal 
dorms and flats allowed these young women to live separately from their families, 
whereas the average income renders survival outside of the family unit largely 
impossible for most young people (Derks 2008). As Hughes (Hughes: 842) puts it, freed 
from scrutiny and patrimonial ties of village life, 'garment workers represented one of a 
few groups who had the opportunity to respond both to a climate of greater political 
openness in the cities and to a widespread feeling that the regime was struggling to 
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legitimize itself.' The growth of the garment industry thus saw the development of a 
formal workforce that was less tied into the CPP's neo-patrimonial networks, and less 
dependent upon the state apparatus for employment, compared with say, state 
employees who constituted the largest body of formal workers prior to the expansion 
of the garment industry. 
It is often expected (in the Western media at least) that Chinese run factories^® will adopt 
repressive human resource management strategies that will generate fear of labour 
activism. However, Chinese ownership and management may have had a converse 
effect in Cambodia because of historical antagonisms. Workers striking against Chinese 
managers for improved conditions were treated with considerable sympathy by the 
Cambodian media with articles starting with phrases such as: 'In the garment industry 
the low-paid workers are ethnic Khmer; the high-paid supervisors Chinese' (Lo 2006).^' 
At a t ime when workers were finding their political voices, then, the numerical 
dominance of Chinese managers allowed workers to couch their demands in the 
language of national pride and the rights of Khmers to be treated respectfully in their 
own land (Hughes 2007:842). 
In surprising ways, then, the disembeddeness of the garment industry increased the 
power of garment workers relative to managers, and provided a foothold for 
independent union organising. It also paved the way for the intervention of the ILO and 
other international actors in ways that further encouraged the formalisation of garment 
sector work. The garment industry largely operated according to different principles 
from the rest of the economy: enterprises were larger, generally registered and mainly 
formal. 
Managers and executives were initially drawn from China. Interviewees to our study told us 
that recent relative wage increases in China have made it more difficult to attract skilled staff, 
and managerial employees are being increasingly drawn from other producing countries such as 
the Philippines. 
AthThun, President of the Coalition of Cambodian Apparel Workers Democratic Unions 
(CCAWDU) said, 'In the past, I acknowledge that it was fair to choose Chinese as supervisors 
because at the time we didn't have enough skill. But now, we have enough skill, the same as the 
Chinese. Today, even when they select Cambodian supervisors, they are still paid less than the 
Chinese. I think it is racism': Lo, N. (2006). The Chinese/Khmer Divide in Factories. The Phnom 
Penh Post. 
7.3.3 UCTA Labour Conditionalities and the Better Factories Cambodia Programme 
A critical feature of the U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement which contributed to the 
formalisation of the garment workforce was the provision for implementation of labour 
standards in Cambodian garment factories. It enabled Cambodia to earn extra quota 
each year if it could demonstrate that it was making progress towards improving 
working conditions and supporting workers' rights in the garment industry.^" Though 
such clauses are not unusual for bilateral agreements - the U.S. has been incorporating 
labour rights into trade agreements since 1993 (Hecker 2007-2008) - UCTA is one of the 
'most creative experiments in linking trade privileges to the respect of labor rights in 
trade agreements' (Kolben 2004: 439). 
The labour provision read as follows: 
Cambodia shall support the implementation of a program to improve the 
working conditions in the textile and apparel sector, including internationally 
recognized core labor standards, through the application of Cambodian labor 
law...The Government of the United States will make a determination...whether 
working conditions in the Cambodian textile and apparel sector substantially 
comply with such labor law and standards (1999). 
The clause created a regulatory "carrot" for labour improvements. In 2000, for instance, 
which was the first year of UCTA's implementation, the US government granted a 5 per 
cent increase (Kolben 2004: 90). 
Both parties agreed to a regulatory compliance regime to be handled by a non-
interested third party (Hecker 2007-2008). After lengthy discussions, the Cambodian 
and US governments agreed that the most credible and independent organization for 
taking on such a role would be the ILO. The ILO would run an independent monitoring 
program run and capacity building and technical assistance by training a core group of 
Cambodian labour inspectors. It would also provide technical assistance in drafting 
Though much is often made of this feature of the trade agreement between the US and 
Cambodia, such arrangements were not unusual. United States' Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) provided tariff preferences to some 140 countries and territories, giving them 
greater access to the U.S. market that were conditional on the beneficiary country "taking steps" 
to achieve internationally recognized worker rights, including freedom of association and the 
right to organize and bargain collectively, and prohibition of forced and child labour. See Compa, 
L. and J. S. Vogt (2000-2001). "Labor Rights in the Generalised System of Preferences: A 20 Year 
Review." Comparative Labor Law & Policv Journal 22: 199. 
regulations and labour laws (Kolben 2004: 101). On 4 May 2000, the ILO signed an 
agreement to run the BFC operations. It began work in 2001. 
The project was funded largely by the US government from the years 1999 to 2004 
(Polaski 2009). UCTA ended in 2004. Today, BFC earns nearly 70 per cent of its annual 
budget through non-donor support including contributions from: the Garment 
Manufacturers Association in Cambodia (GMAC), the Royal Government of Cambodia, 
and income from paid services such as the sale of factory assessment reports, training 
programs and advisory services (Better Factories Cambodia). From 1 January 2009, BFC 
was placed under Cambodian supervision. From March 28 2001, the Ministry of 
Commerce required registration with the program as a condition for granting an export 
license, (Hecker 2007-2008). The idea was that the programme would become a largely 
Cambodian programme rather than a purely ILO one (Hall 2010: 430). As the next section 
discusses, this process of localisation has been slow and dislocated. 
Participation, Monitoring and Reporting 
By 2014, the BFC monitored the working conditions of 437,181 workers and 428 
factories (Better Factories Cambodia 2013-2014:11). By 2014, 362 garment factories and 
nine footwear factories were participating in the BFC programme (Better Factories 
Cambodia 2013-2014). Monitoring of factories occurs against a checklist which consists 
of 156 items, developed by the Chief Technical Advisor of the programme. These 
indicators are primarily based on the Cambodian Labour Code. In this sense, it 
strengthens the force and legitimacy of these domestic laws (Polaski 2009). 
BFC releases three different types of reports based on factory visits and data provided 
by factories. Firstly, it publishes publicly available synthesis reports twice a year. These 
reports contain an overview of compliance, providing statistics on overall adherence to 
BFC indicators. They do not provide data on individual factories. Secondly, it produces 
assessment reports. These reports are provided to factories and are available to 
subscribing brands for a fee. Twenty-seven brands had subscribed to receive 
assessments reports from 299 factories by April 2014, up from 18 brands and 213 
factories in the same period in 2013 (Better Factories Cambodia 2013-2014:10). Thirdly, 
it produces a transparency database. These are a form of naming and shaming, a version 
of which started in 2001, halted in 2006 and has resumed since 2013 (Interview with 
Chea Sophal 2014). There are two categories of reporting for factories: "critical issues" 
and "low compliance". 
Education 
The BFC offers an advisory service to factories. It also conducts worker education to 
enhance knowledge of labour laws using a variety of platforms. 
Buyer power 
By selling factory assessments to buyers, the program effectively calls on leverage from 
these powerful players. However, these reports are only available with the authorisation 
of the factory (Interview with Chea Sophal 2014). There is some evidence that foreign 
buyers are placed under pressure by consumers not to source from factories with poor 
labour standards according to BFC indicators. This forces foreign buyers to pass on this 
pressure to the factories themselves, which are in turn forced to improve their 
performance in order to obtain contracts for work. For instance, Nike stopped sourcing 
in Cambodia after a BFC report showed child labour was being used in one of the 
factories its products were made in. It agreed to return to Cambodia only after an 
assurance that the factories would share monitoring reports (Kolben 2004: 105). 
7.4 Assessment 
BFC is respected for its thoroughness and integrity. The numerous studies that have 
assessed the BFC all attested to its reliability (these include (Kolben 2004, Wells 2005-
2006, Hecker 2007-2008, International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and 
Worker Rights Consortium 2013) as did interviewees for the present study. This chapter 
hopes to contribute to the literature by focussing on broader structural issues related to 
the political economy of Cambodia and global buyer practices. This section asks how 
much the transnational labour regulation innovation redresses dynamics of 
informalisation described in Part one of this chapter, and further, how much it responds 
to the experiences of workers and the deficits in working conditions. Is this response 
adequate to the task of improving the conditions of informal garment workers in 
Cambodia, or acting as a model for addressing informality more broadly? 
7.4.1 Functional rivalry with the Ministry of Labour 
A number of interviewees raised concerns tliat BFC acts as a functional rival for the 
Ministry of Labour's Inspectorate, rather than acting as a complementary and capacity 
building institution (Interview with Tola Moun 2014). Close coordination with the Labour 
Ministry might help to overcome the problem of lack of enforcement powers and the 
limited deployment of other potential sources of leverage (discussed below). However, 
such coordination has not been forthcoming, other than Labour Ministry presence on 
the governing body of BFC, despite many overtures to the Ministry of Labour being made 
over the years of BFC's operation, and a Memorandum of Understanding being signed 
in 2013 calling for further cooperation (Un-attributable interview, 2014). 
This failure to coordinate was often attributed by some interviewees to the lack of 
capacity held by the Inspectorate (Interview with Chea Sophal 2014, Interview with Liv 
Sovanna 2014). Other interviewees suggested that the reason was because joint 
monitoring of factories with BFC would alter patrimonial relations between the factories 
and patrons. Interviewees consistently reported that it is expected that when Ministry 
of Labour Inspectors arrive at the factory they will be provided a meal and a small 
payment. In return, they will not go past the administrative offices and onto the factory 
floor (Interview with Morm Nhim 2014). Personnel from the Labour Inspectorate 
corroborated that they place an emphasis on checking that factory paper work is in 
order (Interview with Tor Bon Thorn 2014). 
If Labour Inspectors attended the factories with BFC personnel, it is likely that they 
would have to step onto the factory floor more frequently, and they might be compelled 
to take action against companies based on shared evidence collected. The greater 
barrier to coordination between BFC and the Labour Inspectorate may lie with the 
patrons who receive far bigger payments from the factories than the Labour Inspectors 
(Interview with An Nan 2014). After receiving these payments, the patrons promise the 
factories that they won't have any problems with the government. If the Labour 
Inspectorate begins to enforce the law in earnest, patrons won't be upholding their side 
of the bargain, and this could result in a breakdown of the system of patronage. Further, 
some interviewees who had been involved in discussions with government suggested 
that the government wishes to avoid funding the Labour Inspectorate, favouring, 
instead, the joint funding model of BFC (Interview with Basirun Nabi Khan 2014). 
This places BFC and those with an interest in promoting labour rights in a difficult 
position. In the interests of humanitarianism, BFC cannot leave. But, in the meantime, 
the functional rivalry of BFC for a local regulatory system places rule-enforcing authority 
in the hands of the ILO, predominantly western transnational brands and western 
consumers.^^ The evidence collected for this study suggests that Cambodia's local 
institutions are not a great deal closer to being able to regulate the garment industry 
independently of international assistance than when the BFC was first initiated. This high 
dependence on international expertise and interventions reduces the long-term 
sustainability of the formality of the garment industry. 
7.4.2 Focus on factory level standards detracts from addressing flaws in labour laws 
Although the UCTA allowed Cambodia to earn extra quota each year if it could 
demonstrate that it was making progress towards improving working conditions and 
supporting workers' rights in the garment industry, the structure of BFC has meant that 
its focus is on factories rather than the state. Yet many of the gravest industrial relations 
problems stem from government policy. The grievances raised repeatedly in interviews 
were first, low wages, second, short term contracts and third, union oppression. 
Workers suffered a 16.6 per cent drop in real wages for regular work, that is, work hours 
excluding overtime from 2000 to 2010 (International Human Rights and Conflict 
Resolution Clinic and Worker Rights Consortium 2013: 7). This decrease was projected 
to grow to 30 per cent by 2014 without an increase in the legal minimum.'^ The setting 
of minimum wages occurs through the politicised process of the Labour Advisory 
Committee, a government-led tripartite group. Low wages have become one of the 
major sources of social conflict in Cambodia. After protracted negotiations and protests, 
The Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training increased the industry's minimum wage 
to US$100 per month starting on 1 February 2014. ILO and World Bank analyses in 2014 
confirm that the recent increase marked the first time that the sector's inflation-
adjusted minimum wage has risen above its 2001 level (Better Factories Cambodia 2013-
2014: 3).Yet this level is widely accepted to be very low. 
" Tola Moun proposed that BFC should be further localized based on the Arbitration Council 
model: Interview with Tola Moun (2014). Tola Moun, Community Legal Education Center, 
Cambodia, 27 March 2014. 
^^  Figures differ between sources. 
A second problem addressed by many interviewees is that of tine deployment of short, 
fixed term contracts in order to avoid labour law obligations to workers. These short 
term contracts are precarious and semi-formal and are renewed every three to six 
months. When the contracts end, the workers lose the rightto maternity leave, seniority 
bonuses and a range of other benefits (Interview with Liv Sovanna 2014, Interview with 
Morm Nhim 2014, Interview with Tola Moun 2014). The dismissal of union leaders 
without notice to the Labour Ministry and subsequent inspection is against the law 
(Interview with Ann Vireak 2014). To circumvent this law, interviewees reported that 
union leaders are placed on short term contracts, and their contracts are not renewed 
if they are active (Interview with Morm Nhim 2014). In a number of factories, all new 
employees are now being placed on short term contracts, contributing to the re-
informalisation of the garment sector (Arnold and Toh 2010). 
Despite personnel within the organisation perceiving this as problematic, BFC has 
difficulty addressing the rising incidence of fixed term contracts because the 
government interprets their use to be within the law (Interview with Chea Sophal 2014). 
Again, this discord highlights the weakness of using the BFC program as a means to 
achieves the ends enunciated in the UCTA: as BFC deals primarily with factory-level 
compliance, no change of governmental labour policy is advanced by the program. 
A third problem which receives considerable international news coverage and was 
addressed in many interviews is the continuing repression of independent union activity. 
Despite the well-established formal legal framework allowing for independent unions, 
state-backed repression of unionists has often been harsh and violent. There are 
continuing problems with the registration of unions, with the office responsible for 
registration finding small problems with the forms and stalling registration (Interview 
with Ath Thorn 2014). The military are sometimes deployed to break up strikes and 
enforce forced overtime (Interview with Tola Moun 2014). In February and March 2014, 
workers were locked into factories to stop them from joining strikes (Interview with Tola 
Moun 2014, Kunthear and Teehan 2014). The shooting and death of five protestors in 
January 2014 has also not resulted in prosecutions of police (Interview with Tola Moun 
2014). 
The institutional preference provided to pro-CPP unions is a means of furthering neo-
patrimonial power in a variety of ways. Pro-government unions deliver votes to the CPP 
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at election time, receiving gifts in return (Interview with David Welsh 2014). The 
presence of these unions gives legitimacy to government industrial relations policy, and 
confuses the messages of independent unions, making it appear as If there Is simply in-
fighting between unions (Interview with David Welsh 2014). Morn Nihm, President of 
the National Independent Federation Textile Union of Cambodia (one of the only female 
led unions) complained that pro-government unions were the only unions consulted by 
the Labour Advisory Committee in the determination of the minimum wage (Interview 
with Morm Nhim 2014). 
These three problems give rise to the question whether BFC should be monitoring 
compliance with legally stipulated standards or ensuring that standards are fair and 
accord with core ILO conventions. BFC personnel interviewed for this study expressed 
frustration that the programme does not address these serious labour breaches. This 
frustration is sometimes communicated in the press releases made by the programme 
(see for example (Better Factories Cambodia 2014)). Under the current arrangements, 
there is little that BFC can do to address these significant labour rights and humanitarian 
concerns that originate at a state level. 
7.4.3 Limited scope 
A further major structural limitation of the initiative is that it only addresses labour 
compliance in the export sector of the garment Industry (Interview with Morm Nhim 
2014). Because the scope of the UCTA was limited to textile trade, the Labour Code was 
developed with this sector in mind. The initiative excludes those parts of the industry 
that do not produce for export. 
There are a number of small and medium sized factories that subcontract work from the 
larger, export factories. In theory then, these factories should be made to abide by the 
same labour standards demanded of the garment industry by the initiative. However, 
BFC personnel interviewed for this study knew little of these small and medium sized 
factories. Most union representatives were also largely Ignorant of these peripheral 
factories, also, with the exception of the National Independent Federation Textile Union 
of Cambodia, which is attempting to organise these workers (Interview with Morm Nhim 
2014). Representatives of other industries have approached BFC to request coverage. 
Chea Sophal proffered that because of the source of its leverage, BFC can only operate 
effectively in export sectors (Interview with Chea Sophal 2014). This only accounts for a 
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small amount of economic activity outside the garment industry. The risk, when the full 
range of labour rights are only enforced for the core workforce, is that incentives are 
created for work to shift increasingly to these smaller enterprises, or to workers on short 
term contracts. 
Because the Labour Inspectorate is also ineffectual in monitoring these enterprises, 
Daniel Adier summates, '[i]n practice, the current regulatory system neither protects 
workers' rights as individuals, nor does it extend to vulnerable workers, such as those in 
small and medium sized enterprises producing for local markets' (AdIer 2007). In 
contrast to the export garment industry, work in these enterprises remains informal. 
Slow gains towards unionization in other sectors is being made. Union membership 
among rubber and tobacco workers in 2009 was at 25 per cent of over 309,000 workers, 
around 5 per cent of over 100,000 construction workers and around 30 per cent of 
10,000 Tuk tuk drivers (Nuon and Serrano 2010:70). New unions have been founded in 
other industries, such as the services sector, after organisers first accumulated 
organizing skills in the garment industry (Interview with Sony 2014). There has also been 
transmission of knowledge through "informal networks of politicized individuals" 
(Buechler 1990), such as when garment workers return to their home villages (DiCaprio 
2013). This suggests that the benefits of international labour regulation may be having 
some spill over effects. 
7.5 Conclusion 
BFC was created to remedy a regulatory gap. Under the UCTA, the U.S. government 
needed information about labour conditions in order determine whether to increase 
quotas. The Cambodian Ministry of Labour was not a reliable source of information for 
these purposes. Though it was not a perfect solution to substitute the Ministry of Labour 
with an international body, it seemed to be a fair trade off: a growing apparel sector 
that created jobs and profits was part of the solution to the problem of government 
capacity, as it would increase the tax base and resources for essential government 
functions (Polaski 2006). It was hoped that with this increased tax base, the government 
would one day be able to afford to invest in increasing the capacity of the Ministry of 
Labour, and to pay wages that would reduce the need for augmenting wages with bribes. 
BFC was envisaged as a "second best" (Rodril< 2008), short term regulatory solution. 
The garment industry owes its growth to the trade arrangements of UCTA and 
subsequent bilateral and multilateral agreements have made Cambodia a favourable 
trading partner and investment destination. The growth of the garment industry has 
transformed the Cambodian economy, creating employment and allowing for the 
growth of large, formal enterprises based on the fordist model. This has marked a swift 
and drastic shift, at least within the garment industry, from the underdeveloped, poor, 
agrarian and mostly informal economy that was a relic of French colonisation, the 
destructive tendencies of the Khmer Rouge and years of civil war. 
However, this chapter has shown that because the garment industry is structured in 
accordance with the neo-liberal principles contained in the agreement between the US 
and Cambodia, and encouraged as part of early structural adjustment programs of the 
World Bank and the IMF, the industry is almost 100 per cent foreign owned and 
contributes little to the tax base of the country. This has meant that the government has 
less capacity to collect sufficient funds to allow it to invest in a bureaucracy that would 
inspect and enforce compliance with labour laws. This could be seen in purely 
detrimental terms, were it not for the dynamics of neo-patrimonialism. 
Instead, the disembeddedness of the garment industry in ownership and regulatory 
terms has provided opportunities for formalisation that might not have otherwise been 
present. International labour rights influences including the ILO, international trade 
unions and workers' rights groups such as Solidarity and international brands have 
enjoyed enhanced levels of influence. Workers are freed from the scrutiny and networks 
of patronage that dominate village life and informal sectors. BFC has been allowed to 
operate relatively unimpeded by government interests, to thoroughly monitor and 
report on labour conditions in exporting garment enterprises, encouraging gradual 
improvement in the respect of labour laws. All these factors have contributed to the 
flourishing of independent, opposition and ruling party-aligned unions, and its 
maturation into confederations that are now beginning to organize other sectors of the 
Cambodian economy, demand higher wages and taking to the streets in great numbers 
in 2013/14. 
In other respects, it might be said that UCTA and BFC have been sl<ilfully manipulated by 
the Hun Sen government to support its neo-patrimonial interests. It has managed to 
house an internationally renowned transnational mechanism at the same times as 
avoiding undertaking reforms which would threaten the political economy of neo-
patrimonalism. The bilateral trade agreement between the US and Cambodia aimed to 
encourage Cambodia to enact and apply adequate public labour regulation (Kolben 
2004: 81). Instead of keeping a check on the government this way, BFC operates at an 
enterprise level. However, many of the gravest labour standard breaches are caused by 
laws that are weakly implemented or poorly drafted. As An Thorn said in interview, 
'Cambodia has strong laws that are weakly implemented' (Interview with Ath Thorn 
2014). By focussing on factory-level monitoring in the export sector of the garment 
industry, the structural logic of BFC has allowed the government to avoid certain 
responsibilities and exercise patrimonial power - often with violent force - without 
suffering formal sanction. 
The Hun Sen government and the Cambodian elite have slowly sought to benefit from 
the garment industry and reassert their patrimonial power in the following notable 
ways: Firstly, because the industry is almost entirely foreign owned, Cambodia's elite 
has not had to assume the risks of investment, yet it has found various ways to benefit 
from the UCTA and the arrangements that were put in place once the agreement ended. 
We can see this in a number of respects. It has captured the system of export licenses 
to Its advantage. The provision of export licenses gives elites power over an industry that 
it is otherwise disembedded from. It also provides a means for extraction. Factories 
make gifts to the officials in charge of doling out discretionary licenses. The withholding 
of export licences might have been a source of punitive authority over factories - the 
apex of the regulatory pyramid, were it not for its regulatory capture by the Hun Sen 
government. Instead, the licences are a source of patrimonial power. 
Secondly, the government has also been saved from investing in its own Labour 
Inspectorate and instead depends on foreign expertise (in much the same way as under 
the French protectorate). BFC acts as a functional rival for the Labour Inspectorate 
instead of a complementary and capacity building mechanism. As a consequence, the 
Ministry of Labour continues to operate in much the same way as it has since the Paris 
Peace Accord of 1991. Labour inspectors are underpaid. In fact, garment workers are 
paid more than labour inspectors. Labour inspectors are forced to supplement their 
wages with bribes or second jobs - either way they are ineffectual in enforcing labour 
standards and do not impede the patron-client relations between factories and high 
ranking officials. 
Thirdly, BFC does not inhibit what is viewed as the most important factor in production 
for investors in Cambodia - low wages. The minimum wage has been judged to be below 
a living wage by the government's own committee, allowing Cambodia to remain as a 
remarkably low unit labour cost country. A human resource manager interviewed for 
this study explained that the reason buyers source from Cambodia is due to 'labour cost, 
compared with other countries. For example, the labour cost in Thailand is about $300, 
so the buyers shifted to us. Our minimum wages are about $100, and we have stable 
politics. That's why some buyers come to us instead of Pakistan, where labour cost is 
low but politics are not stable' (Interview with Buth Rithy 2014). By providing low wages 
and political stability, Cambodia's elite upholds its implicit bargain with factory owners 
who are obliged to pay considerable sums to patrons. The existence of BFC has allowed 
buyers to benefit from the BFC's goodwill, and to fulfil the buyers' promises of corporate 
social responsibility by sourcing from an "ethical location". This gives Cambodia a 
competitive advantage in the global garment export market. BFC delivers two things that 
buyers want, according to Ken Loo, head of the body that represents factories: 'Buyers 
want low costs but also compliance with labour laws': (Interview with Ken Loo 2014). 
None of this detracts from the achievements of BFC. BFC is in most respects an 
exemplary monitoring and reporting institution. It has trained and employs a large 
number of Cambodian professionals who conduct monitoring without any suggestion of 
corruption. Although the head of BFC is an American, other senior staff are Cambodian. 
Like the Arbitration Council of Cambodia, it has demonstrated (most importantly to 
Cambodians) that Cambodians are capable of acting with integrity as regulators 
(Interview with An Nan 2014). The culture of widespread corruption can be displaced 
with the right incentives and oversight. 
Further, BFC has helped to stamp out child labour and many of the worst human rights 
breaches that plagued factories in the early years of Cambodia's garment industry. 
Without BFC, bolstered by the vocal presence of international labour rights groups, it is 
easy to imagine that the Cambodian garment industry would be more like that of 
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Bangladesh. The combination of UCTA, subsequent trade arrangements and BFC has 
contributed a great deal to the formalisation of the garment industry, with emerging 
flow on effects for other sectors. In many ways, then, the study of BFC provides a case 
study of the complexity and slipperiness for transnational mechanisms of achieving 
regulatory goals in a context of widespread and entrenched corruption due to the 
dominance of neo-patrimonial interests. In turn, it also provides a case study of the 
constrained capacity of such initiatives to contribute to the formalisation of the entire 
workforce or to expedite the transformation and long-run sustainability of local 
regulatory institutions. 
8 FOUR EXPERIMENTS IN REDUCING INFORMALITY: REALISABLE MODELS OF 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
8.1 Introduction 
This study has examined four regulatory experiments in reducing informality in work and 
improving labour standards. The purpose of this chapter is to compare these innovations 
and draw out lessons about the way that institutional change has occurred. Regulatory 
agents have found novel ways to address the unresponsiveness of traditional methods 
of state-based labour regulation identified in Chapter Two. The initiatives have in 
common that they (a) expand or sidestep the employment relationship so as to 
encompass broader forms of work (with the exception of the Cambodian initiative); and 
(b) increase the strength of regulation in order to push against countervailing pressures 
which lower working conditions. However each initiative has achieved this in different 
ways and to different extents. This comparative chapter provides an opportunity to 
compare these different methods and explore why some levers are stronger than 
others. 
None of the models entails comprehensive reform of the way work is regulated in a 
nation. Nor do they fundamentally challenged the international institutional 
arrangements which have altered and undermined the power of national-institutions to 
regulate work that were seen to be at play in each of the case studies. They have instead 
sought solutions which were politically feasible and improve the conditions of a specific 
group of workers - homeworkers, headload workers, garment workers. They arose out 
of particular political moments and institutional trajectories. This not to downplay in any 
way the effort that was required by the agents of change in each case. Labour activists 
died in the struggle for improved labour conditions in more than one of the cases, and 
the changes were a consequence of years of strategizing, mobilising and campaigning. 
None-the-less, the reforms attained in the cases were achieved over a period of a 
decade or so. They may therefore represent realisable models of purposeful institutional 
change for those hoping to replicate them. 
It is the contention of this chapter that the innovations were realisable because they 
added to or augmented traditional labour laws. Each is a type of co-regulation, entailing 
234 
the combining of two or more regulatory systems. The Cambodian experiment involved 
the combining of an international trade preference and monitoring system, overseen by 
the International Labour Organisation, with the existing state based labour law system. 
The Australian innovation entailed the combining of private monitoring and labelling 
with the state based labour law system. The Indian regulatory development created a 
new state-orchestrated system, which adds to and sits aside from the existing labour 
law system. The Bulgarian expansion of employment law was the consequence of social 
dialogue processes through which private industrial relations parties negotiated an 
outcome before it was enacted into law. The case studies give us an opportunity, then, 
to explore and compare the dynamics of co-regulation in practice. 
The idea of collaborative governance or co-regulation has received a great deal of 
attention in the regulatory literature in recent years, particularly when it entails the 
combination of private and state-based regulation - also known as New Governance. It 
represents an emerging alternative to traditional command-and-control approaches to 
making, implementing, and enforcing policy (Blomgren Bingham 2010: 300). It is seen as 
a way to overcome a number of the limitations of traditional state-based regulation by 
bringing in new regulatory techniques and regulatory agents to bolster existing state-
based systems (Haufler 2001, Utting 2005, Kolben 2007). 
It often assumed that co-regulation will lead to new synergies and complementarity 
between the two systems, where one system bolsters the strength and efficacy of the 
operation of another. However, an emerging literature suggests that when regulatory 
systems are added to each other, they can interact in a range of different ways. The 
combination can lead to regulatory expansion in the sense that a broader range of 
regulatory targets are reached and/or a broader range of tools are deployed. They can 
lead to rivalry, seen in cases where one system Is viewed as an alternative to the other, 
and the two systems operate in competition (Trubek and Trubek 2006: 543). Sometimes, 
one system displaces the other. For example, private governance systems can create 
network or ensemble regimes with the capacity to substitute government entirely 
(Roberts 2011:69). Indeed, in living, "actually-existing" experiments In co-regulation, 
relationships between combined systems are by no means stable. They are prone to 
changing loyalties and priorities amongst the actors involved. Sometimes, what was 
intended as a complement acts as a rival to the existing regime. In the Cambodian 
example studied, for instance, the Better Factories Cambodia project was designed to 
complement and bolster the local system of labour inspectors, but due to domestic 
dynamics, has ended up as a rival. Literature on the relationship of state and private 
regulation tends to neglect a very common insight in institutional theory - that 
institutions evolve (Thelen 2003, Mahoney and Thelen 2010, Zajak 2014: 5). The 
literature tends, instead, to assume static relationships and treat the systems as 
functionalist w/holes. By adopting a historical institutionalist approach, this study has 
shown that taking time and institutional evolution more seriously can help to better 
clarify how one form of co-regulation might be transformed from complementarity to 
rivalry and displacement, and so on. 
This chapter hopes to perform two tasks, then. First, it aims to describe and compare 
different schemes for regulating work. Second, it hopes to contribute to the literature 
on co-regulation by comparing the evolution and interaction of the combined systems 
in each case. 
8.2 Institutional evolution: expansion, complementarity, rivalry and displacement 
Each of the cases augmented traditional labour law in different, but overlapping ways. 
The regulatory strategies observed in the case studies can be characterised in the 
following terms drawn from the regulatory and institutional literature: 









The section adopts surgical metaphors to explain the strategies. The particular form of 
augmentation or co-regulation is described, and the extent to which it adds levers and 
regulatory incentives is accessed. 
8.2.1 Bulgarian - Expansion 
In Bulgaria, the sole regulatory strategy observed was the expansion of the employment 
relationship to include home-based workers. This entails widening of the scope of 
regulation so that a broader group of people are regulated. Adopting a medical 
metaphor, this strategy can be compared with the widening of arteries as a solution to 
narrow or blocked arteries, known as angioplasty. 
Image 1: Stent Angioplasty 
Source: http://gallervhip.com/stent-insertion.html 
In Image 1, a stent is inserted into the artery to keep it open and allow blood to flow 
through freely. The regulatory strategy of expanding the employment relationship is like 
an angioplasty in the sense that it allows more people to flow through this regulatory 
channel and enjoy its benefits and protections. 
This regulatory strategy reflects a view that the cause of informalisation is that the scope 
of regulation is too narrow. This view has been adopted by the International Labour 
Organisation, and is reflected in Convention No. 177 and Recommendation No.l84. 
Convention No. 177 is an attempt to ensure that homeworkers across the world are 
treated equally with other workers and have the same rights. 
From a regulatory perspective the strategy pursued to tackle informality Is quite limited. 
It does not challenge the basic logic of the employment relationship, or bring in more 
regulatory agents to increase the power of the primary regulator. Just as, in the case of 
an angioplasty, the surgeon determines that the artery has sufficient integrity, this 
strategy assumes that the employment relationship is still the right regulatory channel 
for workers' rights. The locus of responsibility in this form of regulation lies with the 
employer. Thus, to flow through this regulatory channel, workers need an identifiable 
primary employer on whom they are dependent or who subjugates them in some way. 
The strategy excludes those who cannot identify a primary employer or who are not 
sufficiently dependent on the employer. Because of this, it does not deal with the 
broader dynamics of the supply chain and global trade by targeting other parties in value 
chains in even a limited sense. 
8.2.2 Australia - Expansion and Complementary layering 
In Australia, the regulatory strategy entails both expansion, similar to that seen in 
Bulgaria but in all but one state, limited to clothing workers. It also entails layering of 
new instruments and regulatory agents which complement and bolster the existing 
rules. Adopting the medical metaphor, once again, we could say that first an angioplasty 
was performed, and subsequently a pacemaker was added. 
Image 2: Pacemaker 
Source: http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/imagepages/19566.htm 
For Mahoney and Thelen, layering occurs when new rules are attached to existing ones, 
thereby changing the ways in which the original rules structure behaviour (Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010: 16). "Complementary layering" can be thought of as adding a pacemaker 
to a heart. A pacemaker uses low-energy electrical pulses to overcome faulty electrical 
signalling in a heart. Likewise, a complementary institution strengthens and/or alters 
the signalling or incentives in an existing institution where that institution was sending 
imperfect or contradictory signals. The layered institutions complement formal 
government at key junctures, creating a networked or ensemble regime (Roberts 2011). 
The regulatory signal is strengthened by adding new actors as well as additional 
regulatory levers. In this complementary networked regulatory system, the state draws 
on the power of non-state actors who are allies in increasing compliance, including the 
relevant Union and Fair Wear, and aims to build consent from industry bodies through 
incorporating them into processes such as the Ethical Clothing Australia committee 
which oversees the operation of the Code. By adding actors, traditional regulatory 
agents in labour market regulation which were struggling to have influence (state labour 
bodies and the union) become stronger by networking with other weaker actors 
(FairWear, churches and community groups). 
A particularly strong feature of the Australian innovation is that it addresses supply chain 
dynamics operating at a national level. This occurs through the involvement of actors 
who have influence at different stages of the supply chain. The power of actors at the 
top of the supply chain - consumers and retailers - is enrolled against those lower in the 
supply chain - manufacturers (Braithwaite 2006). A weakness is that it only addresses 
supply chain dynamics within the bounds of Australia and does not redress more 
globalised influences. 
The regulatory signal is also strengthened by adding new regulatory levers to the existing 
penalties that could be meted out against non-complying employers through traditional 
labour law techniques. These include transparency, the capacity of the union to trace 
the entire supply chain, redress against parties higher in the supply chain and market 
based incentives and disincentives. Instead of seeing hard laws and market based soft 
laws as alternatives, the strength of this system is that it sees different mechanisms as 
being best used in combination - as complements to each other (Cunningham and 
Grabosky 1998: 14). 
As explored in Chapter 5, this strategy was pursued in the social context of Australia in 
the 1990s and 2000s. The layering strategy fitted with the rise of consumer rights and a 
preference for voluntarism over mandatory regulation. The market-based system that 
has been layered on the existing labour laws is consistent with a particular form of 
capitalism that is generally referred to as neo-liberalism, though Australia's variety of 
capitalism is quite mixed (Mitchell, O'Donnell et al. 2011). The size of large apparel 
retailers and brands, and the amount that they spend on advertising, leaves them 
particularly vulnerable to naming and shaming strategies. At the same time as labour 
rights have been declining in strength and as an idea, consumer rights have gained 
prominence. The labelling system has been argued for on the basis of brand 
transparency: consumers have a right to know how the products they buy are made, 
and make decisions about what they buy on this basis. Without a labelling system, they 
cannot make informed choices. 
Unions and allied groups used the increasing purchase of consumer rights, as an idea, to 
legitimize the creation of a new institution which would be layered on the old. This usage 
of legitimated ideas - "transparency" and "consumer rights" - allowed the unions and 
community organizations to experiment without encountering absolute resistance. In 
the process, they also legitimated their own place as regulatory agents. 
8.2.3 Cambodia - Complementary layering evolves into rivalry 
Like Australia, the strategy pursued in Cambodia has entailed a type of complementary 
layering. New institutions and regulatory agents, as well as new levers, have been added 
to the existing labour market regulation institutions, like adding a pacemaker to 
strengthen the regulatory signal. Here, this has occurred without expanding the scope 
of regulation. (No arterial widening, or angioplasty, was conducted in this case.) Labour 
market regulation in Cambodia continues to be based on the employment relationship. 
In Cambodia, the layering has entailed the adding of levers and agents. First, the US-
Cambodia trade agreement (UCTA) added an important lever which provided a 
particularly strong incentive for Cambodia to improve labour standards in export 
apparel industry. Under the UCTA agreement, Cambodia received preferential trade 
access to the U.S. if it could demonstrate that it was incrementally improving the 
conditions of garment workers and increasing adherence to the Cambodian labour code. 
This was a particularly crucial step in a political context of corruption and neo-
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patrimonialism where the state was more focussed on extraction than implementing 
industrial policy and structural adjustment aimed at upgrading industry and formalising 
work. The trade preferences contributed greatly to the growth of the apparel industry. 
The ILO's Better Factories Cambodia (BFC) project was developed to conduct 
monitoring. The BFC became an important regulatory agent in the process of 
formalisation of Cambodia's labour force, ensuring that industrialisation was 
accompanied by improvements in labour standards. Buyers were added as regulatory 
agents, also, as BFC reports were sold to them and became the most legitimate measure 
of factory labour standards. 
Streeck and Thelan anticipate that new layers may gradually empower an unintended 
group, and thus sow the seeds of radical institutional transformation (Thelen and 
Streeck 2005). The analysis conducted in Chapter 8 shows that this is indeed the case, 
though currently, this institutional transformation is moving in two contradictory 
directions. Firstly, although the purpose of UCTA and BFC was to complement and 
bolster existing labour laws and labour market institutions, the BFC has in some respects 
acted as a rival to the Cambodian Labour Inspectorate in the garment industry. It has 
greater legitimacy and integrity in the eyes of the international community, and efforts 
to work with the Labour Inspectorate have largely failed. The Labour Inspectorate 
continues to monitor garment factories, but its capacity has not been greatly enhanced 
by the operation of BFC in the country. It continues to operate at a low capacity on a 
predatory basis, collecting bribes and rarely reporting or penalising factories for 
breaches of labour standards. 
Secondly, in a contradictory development, the combination of UCTA trade incentives 
linked to labour conditionalities and BFC have encouraged the development of a 
dynamic union movement. An active union movement has matured as the garment 
industry has formalised, resulting in the birth of a strong democratising force which is 
now acting as a countervailing influence to the extractive tendencies of the government. 
In this sense, the operation of UCTA and BFC contributed to the growth of an indigenous 
democratisation movement which has been focussed on raising the minimum wage and 
more fairly distributing the benefits of Cambodia's impressive economic growth. 
8.2.4 India - Experimental displacement 
Unlike the other cases, in IVIaharashtra, regulation of Mathadi (head load) work has 
occurred through creating an alternative institution, rather than building on existing 
institutions of labour market regulation. It bypasses the employment relationship in 
favour of a triangular relationship, regulated through Mathadi Boards. This is a form of 
"displacement", which, for Mahoney and Thelen occurs when existing rules are replaced 
by new ones. Often, displacement occurs when there is a revolution or regime change 
(Collier and Collier 1991). The Mathadi boards were developed in the wake of Indian 
independence and with the threat of communism looming. 
"Experimental displacement" is a useful strategy when an existing institution is failing, 
but there are political economy reasons that mean that full displacement Is difficult.^^ 
These reasons can include investment in the existing, older institution by interest 
groups, path dependency and so on. In the case of complementary layering, the existing 
institution remains in the long term, but is reinforced by the layering of additional actors 
and instruments. In the case of experimental displacement, the existing institution stays 
in the immediate term, but may be replaced as it is demonstrated through the 
regulatory experiment that alternative, more efficacious means of attaining regulatory 
goals is possible. 
The core institution is displaced by a new institution that provides largely the same 
functions in a different way. Experimental displacement can be thought of as being 
similar to a coronary bypass. Prado, from whom this concept is borrowed, refers to it as 
an "institutional by-pass"(Prado 2011: 3): 
Like coronary bypass surgery, in which transplanted blood vessels are used to 
create a new circulatory pathway around clogged or blocked vessels, an [it] 
creates new pathways around clogged or blocked institutions. Unlike other 
procedures that try to unblock clogged arteries, or expand narrow ones, the 
institutional by-pass simply ignores the existence of the unhealthy artery and 
creates a new pathway for blood flow. An institutional bypass uses the same 
strategy: it does not try to modify, change or reform existing institutions. Instead, 
it tries to create a new pathway in which efficiency and functionality will be the 
The idea of "experimental displacement" was inspired by Mariana Moto Prado's idea of an 
"institutional bypass" which she identifies as a stand-alone institution that is set up to act as an 
experimental alternative to an existing, deficient institution: Mariana M. Prado, 'Institutional 
Bypass: An Alternative for Development Reform' SSRN eLibrary. 
(To be clear: the organ in this metaphor that is being by-passed is the artery, not the 
heart.) 
Experimental displacements are useful when problems in an existing institution seem 
intractable, despite attempts at reform. It helps to overcome extreme institutional 
inertia and path dependency. The idea is that if the experiment is successful, it will 
demonstrate that it is possible to break with existing detrimental and non-virtuous 
patterns of behaviour within the existing institution that are hampering its efficient 
conduct. 
Image 3: Coronary Artery Bypass 
Coronary Artery Bypass 
Source: 
http://mvcardiacwebsite.com/Coronarv%20Arterv%20Disease/treatment for cad.htm 
1 
Image 3 shows that in a coronary artery bypass, a new artery is added to bypass a 
blocked one. In the case of Mathadi workers, the employment relationship as a vessel 
for protection was blocked to them. It seemed politically implausible to argue for its 
expansion, so instead, it was bypassed or displaced. 
The Mathadi Board system which displaced labour laws for these workers performs all 
the functions of a normal labour law system, as well additional features, including health 
and education services, which have made great differences to the human development 
of Mathadi workers and their families. The Act that creates the Mathadi Boards and 
these various regulatory functions is neat and succinct. All the rules are in one place. 
This is a clear benefit of displacement over layering. 
A further advantage is that the displacement strategy has allowed regulators to 
experiment with different tools and levers from those traditionally used in labour law. 
The Boards gain their power by modifying the operation of the market. Rather than 
using the usual command and control model of sanctioning non-complying labour users 
seen in most employment law systems, the Boards ensure that compliance occurs by 
acting as an intermediary in the hire and payment of workers. The Boards are an 
effective model of regulation because they have a monopoly on the supply of labour. 
Normally, labour relations systems impact on labour supply and demand indirectly 
through regulating occupational training, qualifications and pay rates. Most labour 
relations systems do not impede on the operation of labour markets beyond these 
means. Controlling the supply of labour is a stronger lever than the tool kit of 
enforcement mechanisms normally available to regulators. Indeed, it might be 
considered a small scale "governance" mechanism, like tariffs, as opposed to 
"regulatory" mechanism, strictly speaking (Braithwaite, Coglianese et al. 2007). 
Controlling the supply of labour is a particularly important strategy in a context in which 
informalisation is exacerbated by the over-supply of labour due to the circulation of 
within-country migrants in India. As we saw in Chapter 7, the circulation of labour has 
been exacerbated by colonial land laws which expelled certain castes and classes from 
land tenure or left them with insufficient land to live from. State-based land reform 
processes which followed independence in India did not generally provide adequate 
land packages to those who had been dispossessed to allow them to stay on the land, 
leading to the circulation of millions seeking work in India's cities. 
An additional benefit of displacing or bypassing the normal industrial relations system is 
that a localized strategy has been made possible. Boards are organized around the target 
populations - on the docks, in the markets - and respond to the particular needs of 
those populations. Hospitals have been created in response to community demand for 
health services, for instance. Further, because the system is imbued with a sense of 
experimentation and freed of path dependency. Boards have felt at liberty to try out 
new strategies to achieve improved health and human development of Mathadi 
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workers. If the system was part of the normal labour relations system, the provision of 
health services might not be seen to be a role of the institutional complex. 
This regulatory strategy reflects political economy of Maharashtra in the 1960s. The 
threat of communism and the desire for industrial peace following rioting on behalf of 
Mathadi workers provided strong incentives for policy makers to develop this system. 
Mumbai was rivalled only by Calcutta as the centre of trade union based Marxist politics 
in India in the 1950s and 60s. The riots had caused considerable social and financial 
losses, and a number of workers had been killed, inciting further rioting. Social reformers 
such as Annasaheb Patil, in memory of whom a public holiday is held in Maharashtra, 
were able to broker peace, and stop rioting, by negotiating for the establishment of 
Mathadi Boards. Although the brokered deal created a labour monopoly system, this 
was seen to be worthwhile to stop the violent deaths and resume work on the docks. 
(Though labour users complain about these characteristics of the system today) 
(Government of India 2002: 129). 
8.3 Conclusion 
Some authors have proposed features which make co-regulation or New Governance 
mechanisms more likely to succeed. Cristie Ford, for example, suggests that such 
characteristics include broadly framed goals, stakeholder participation, flexibility, 
revisabillty, monitoring and peer-review, transparency, a data-based approach, 
learning-oriented approaches and multi-level governance (Ford 2010). These attributes 
may describe an ideal-type. However, the analysis conducted in this study would warn 
away from functionalist check lists of this type. 
What explains why regulatory innovation occurs? The case studies suggest that 
innovation tended to occur around labour concerns that were prevalent and politically 
salient in the national or international context. We saw this in the case of India, where 
Mathadi workers gained political purchase in connection with anti-Brahmin tendencies 
of India's independence movement. In the Cambodian example, a number of factors 
converged at once. The coincidence in timing of Cambodia's emergence from state 
socialism and Cambodia's desire to gain trade access to the U.S. converged with a new 
experimental spirit in international labour organising in the U.S. labour movement and 
the Clinton administration's openness to influence from peak labour organisations. At 
the same time, also, the ILO was searching for relevance in a changing international 
landscape. This led to an experiment that has since been replicated in a number of 
additional countries - known as the Better Work Program. Without the convergence of 
these political and institutional dynamics, the original experiment would never have 
occurred. 
Regulatory change in all instances was a consequence of the persistent strategies of 
certain social and political actors. Understanding the effect of these agents' ideas and 
the context in which they were acting is essential for explaining the way in which these 
actors have bought about institutional change, and the form and orientation this change 
has taken (Beland 2007). For the creation of Mathadi Boards the agents of change were 
worker associations and anti-poverty campaigners. Here, instead of building on existing 
labour laws, the protagonists created a new labour market regulation institution. This 
strategy was made possible by the change sweeping India in the wake of independence. 
In Australia, in contrast, the push for institutional reform came from the relevant union 
and a coalition of community organizations. In the Australian case, rather than putting 
aside the standard labour market institutions, new regulatory agents and instruments 
were added to it to bolster its impact and widen its scope. This strategy was consistent 
with the rise of consumer rights and anxieties about ill-managed refugee resettlement 
policies. In Bulgaria, the innovation entailed expansion of the employment relationship 
to include home-based workers in keeping with a European Union recommendation, 
reflecting Bulgaria's desire to demonstrate normative alignment with values seen to be 
dominant in central. Western Europe. 
Instead of approaching public-private regulatory complementarities as functional 
synergies that emerge automatically, or through technical design, this study has found 
that they are political processes that are closely connected to national institutions and 
national and international political economy dynamics. In some respects, this points to 
the futility of designing functional ideal-type co-regulations or New Governance. 
Actually-existing institutions are always "second best" outcomes that result from 
complex dynamics (Rodrik 2008). On the other hand, as the efforts of the next chapter 
exemplify, it is sometimes the job of regulatory theorists to imagine and design new 
models. The impetus for such imagining is particularly strong when the prob lem is as 
vast and devastat ing to human wel l -being as precarious and insecure informal work. 
9 A LONG T E R M VISION: SCALING UP EXPERIMENTS A N D O V E R C O M I N G 
ORCHESTRATION DEFICITS TO REDUCE INFORMALITY 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter canvasses a long term vision for regulating informality. The four initiatives 
described in the case studies, and compared in the previous chapter, provide a clue to 
techniques for regulating for formalisation in the immediate term. This chapter 
proposes a bolder, transnational, netw/orked initiative that aims to promote a global 
living wage and regulate supply chains. The chapter puts forw/ard three interrelated 
regulatory pathways out of informality. First, the promotion of International Living 
Wages through an international instrument such as an International Labour 
Organization (ILD) Convention or United Nations treaty, which would also establish an 
International Living Wage disputes mechanism for enforcement of these minima; 
second, the setting up of National Supply Chain Tribunals empowered to hear disputes 
concerning non-payment of living wages due to supply chain dynamics, and to hold 
parties in the supply chain responsible for non-payment; third, the fostering of local 
pathways out of informality. 
Sabel, O'Rourke and Fung issued a challenge when they wrote (Sabel, O'Rourke et al. 
2000); 
[T]he ILO's "Declaration of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work" -
express the public's moral convictions about the respect due to labor as a partner 
in global production, and its determination that these convictions be honored. 
The open and crucial question, then, is how to construct a regulatory framework 
that protect vulnerable groups against the abuses identified in core labor 
standards? 
Approaches to reducing informality and protecting vulnerable workers against abuses 
of core labour standards tend to focus either on international supply chain dynamics or 
solely on domestic strategies. The former focus is seen in the global supply chain 
governance literature and transnational labour campaigns. The latter focus is evident in 
the current approach of the ILO in its two year standard-setting process on informality.^" 
" At its 317th Session (March 2013) the Governing Body decided to place a standard-setting 
item on the agenda of the 103rd Session (June 2014) of the Conference on facilitating transitions 
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Its key policy document that presents its solution to informality, 'Transitioning from the 
informal to the formal economy' (ILO 2014), for instance, lists a large number of 
domestic policy approaches, while completely disregarding transnational supply chains 
or international institutional factors.^^ Rejecting the limits of these two approaches, this 
chapter argues that in light of the global scale of many of the causes of informality, 
greater orchestration is required at the international level to address the transnational 
pressures on national labour markets, and to coordinate between regulators operating 
at different levels. 
This chapter responds to the challenge put forward by Sabel et al, addressing the mixed 
and diffuse national, regional and transnational aspects of the regulatory problem. It 
offers new regulatory initiatives that could be put in place to address the causes of 
informalisation, taking the lead from emerging regulatory developments tracked in the 
case studies. The approach also considers additional participant observation and 
interviews, and draws upon broader literature. In each of the case studies, there were 
numerous causes of informalisation or factors exacerbating and compounding 
informality. Global, structural change compounded localised, endogenous causes. 
Within the transnational supply chains observed in the case studies, complex power 
relations operate among the various parties, that is, between global corporations and 
their suppliers, between state labour departments and the managers of the factories 
they inspect, and between workers and factories or contractors who give them work 
(Locke, Amengual et al. 2009). These power dynamics that undermined the capacity of 
state-based regulation. 
Though these power dynamics have often been used as a justification for normative 
claims about the inadequacies of the state and the need for non-state regulation, an 
alternative approach would focus on the scale and scope of state regulation and 
opportunities for complementary state and non-state-based regulation. Indeed, the 
analysis conducted in the case studies of the dynamics of informalisation suggest that 
from the informal to the formal economy, under the double discussion procedure, which means 
that this item was dealt with in the 2014 session and will again be addressed at the 104th Session 
of the Conference (2015). 
^^  The document makes reference to 'global production networks, migration, global economic 
cycles and variations in global commodity and food prices which affect: the level of vulnerability 
of economic units and workers in the informal economy' but fails to propose any policy 
strategies to address these dynamics. 
diverse and multi-level regulatory responses are required to respond to different causes 
of informality, based on the scale and nature of the dynamics observed. 
One of the aims of the approach of this dissertation has been to deepen our 
understanding of the social relations underpinning supply chains, and the interaction of 
relations of production w/ith national institutions, with the objective of developing a 
more nuanced framework for understanding and regulating responsibility. The chapters 
have sought to do this in great detail, however, we can also understand these social 
relations through examining a shorter example which contrasts abuse and overtime as 
instances of labour injustices. In the case of a factory in which there is verbal, sexual and 
physical abuse conducted by a manager, for example, we might say that the manager at 
the factory who is carrying out the abuse is primarily responsible. The manager has a 
duty to refrain from abusing workers. Some responsibility, however, may lie with supply 
chain factors or stem from larger structural inequalities depending on the nature of the 
abuse. The abuse may derive from the pressure the manager feels to deliver goods to a 
particular schedule, but it may also have gendered aspects, be related to ethnic 
prejudices, and so on. 
In the case of overtime, certain drivers are linked with supply chain pressures from 
buyers. These include late inputs, inaccuracies in order specifications, tight deadlines 
and so on. However, there may also be factory specific and local factors driving overtime 
including poor management, inconsistent energy provision which can delay production. 
The low enforcement of overtime laws by state inspectorates — which mean that 
factories can meet tight deadlines without incurring additional costs - may also be an 
important permissive factor. Such low enforcement means that managers can require 
that workers stay and work for extra hours without pay, without fear of labour laws 
being enforced. In any one case, unreasonable and unpaid overtime may have mixed 
causes. It may often be the case that buyers could cease imposing these conditions, and 
should thus be held primarily responsible. However, at other times, reducing the 
incidence of forced unpaid overtime requires local solutions. The proposal outlined in 
this chapter provides a way to differentiate between the responsibilities of different 
players in supply chains in accordance with their contribution to harm in any given case. 
Developing a more nuanced understanding of the social relations underpinning 
informality in supply chain contexts also allows for the more effective design of 
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regulatory incentives. The case studies illustrate that the most powerful methods of 
changing business behaviour are not necessarily traditional legal sanctions, such as 
fines. Regulators must consider what will have the greatest leverage over businesses, 
and bring about long term change in business behaviour. When it comes to the question 
of enforceability in relation to large and powerful transnational corporations, fines may 
be the least effective tool at hand for regulators, due to the small size of the fine in 
relation to overall company assets and income. For medium and small sized businesses 
who supply these large brands, and whose future depends on securing contracts with 
buyers, paying a fine may be less detrimental in economic terms than losing the work of 
a large buyer. There is a growing body of evidence that shows that, as rule takers, small 
and medium suppliers are being forced to bear the cost of ethical supply chain 
requirements (Knudsen 2013). This indicates a need to find more effective incentive 
setting and enforcement tools. The uneven distribution of risk and the particular 
interests of different parties throughout the supply chain suggests that enforcement 
tools should be more alive to the structural place of parties in supply chains. It also 
presents a strong impetus to search for new, more powerful penalties and incentives. 
The chapter canvasses the suspension of intellectual property rights where appropriate, 
such as the suspension of trade marks for brands, as a targeted penalty. 
The proposals pitched in this chapter for a Living Wage treaty, an International Living 
Wage dispute mechanism and National Supply Chain Tribunals are bold ambitions. Their 
articulation was made possible by putting questions of political feasibility largely to one 
side. The hard-headed realist would be rightly sceptical about the probability of the 
visions sketched in this chapter being realised, in view of the likely barriers to their 
establishment. Even with support by key countries and concerted campaigning by 
relevant coalitions, it could easily take decades to bring such a scheme to fruition. 
Specific concerns regarding the feasibility of the vision are briefly addressed in the 
course of the outline. A final section of this chapter anticipates and addresses key likely 
objections. 
9.2 Overcoming the global orchestration deficit 
A significant gap in the terrain of transnational labour governance is the absence of an 
international authority with the power to steer and coordinate regulation. Abbot and 
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Snidel have argued that a key problem is that the international system lacks a central 
"state" (Abbott and Sindal 2006: 553). Following Abbot and Snidel's cue, this chapter 
proposes a new role for international organisations (lOs) as orchestrators of 
decentralised regulation. The benefit of expanding the role of existing lOs is that they 
are seen as relatively independent of individual states, and even more so of firms. This 
allows them to act as "honest brokers" acceptable to multiple stakeholders. Further, 
because lOs provide neutral forums with strong legitimacy and expert support, they 
have significant authority to convene multi-stakeholder groups and reap the benefits of 
the increased participation - including a range of civil society organisations in 
transnational governance that soft law initiatives have fostered (Abbott and Sindal 2006: 
575). This chapter proposes that lOs can act as bridges between local, national and 
international regulatory scales. 
Because the focus of this study is on labour informality, the proposals herein primarily 
advocate an expanded role for the ILO. To date, the ILO has largely failed to deal with 
globalised causes of labour problems: the ILO's standards were designed for national 
systems of regulation, allowing for national interpretations and selection of standards 
to ratify or to ignore (Standing 2008: 357). Despite going beyond mere inter-
governmentalism, thanks to its tripartite dimension (comprising government, employer 
and worker representatives), the ILO's capacity for setting standards considerably 
exceeds that for ensuring their implementation and compliance with them (Meardi and 
Marginson 2014: 656). In the rare cases where a country has been condemned for 
breaching one of its core labour standards, the ILO itself cannot enforce any sanctions. 
The schemes canvassed in this chapter thus suggest an expanded and revamped role for 
the ILO in orchestrating transnational labour governance. This vision is aimed at 
restoring the ILO's capacity to act as an agency mediating the more negative 
consequences of globalisation. 
9.3 First Pathway: Promoting an International Living Wage 
9.3.1 Justification 
The primary normative justification for regulatory intervention is to stem the trend 
towards increasing numbers of working poor and precarious workers worldwide, and 
also, to reduce inequality. Research on poverty shows that many workers in low income 
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countr ies do not receive a wage rate sufficient to support a family of four at a poverty 
line (even when they can f ind work full t ime, which is often not the case). Hence, the 
term "the working poor" (Anker 2005: xi). Poverty is one of the primary drivers of 
informality. Families of low wage workers, especially in low income countries, have to 
employ an array of strategies to survive, as seen in the case studies. Take, for example, 
Bulgaria, where unemployment produced by the transition to capitalism necessitated 
famil ies engaging in their own production of food, forcing most family members to work 
including, often, chi ldren. Real wages have fallen rather than increased in the past two 
decades across much of the world. In Mexico, for example, real wages fell 25-40 percent 
in the 1990s, and the min imum wage, when it was paid, fell to forty-five cents an hour 
(Engle Sr, Elbert e t a l . 2003). 
Empirical research conducted within the ILO suggests that living wage rates are around 
2-3 t imes the median wage rate in low income study countries, and around 2/3rds the 
median wage rate in high income study countries (Anker 2005: xi). In many countries, 
government-set min imum wages fall far short of what many estimate to be a living wage 
(Ethical Trading Initiative 2008: 1). Frequently, it is not just a problem that minimum 
wages set too low, they are often not enforced: 
Min imum wage policies, to be useful, need to be well enforced... Unfortunately, 
in many countries, labour inspection services are understaffed and penalties are 
too weak. As a result, min imum wages too often remain a 'paper tiger' rather 
than an effective policy (ILO 2008:52). 
At the heart of the informality problem lies the question of how to induce developing 
and developed countries alike to raise min imum wages and enforce labour laws. This 
d i lemma is particularly stark in relation to poor countries whose main competit ive 
advantage is perceived to be low unit labour costs. These countries lack the incentive to 
raise wages, and other nations lack the ability to force them to do so.^^ They fear that if 
unit labour costs increase, work will move to another country with lower wages. 
The case studies conf irm that it is difficult for single countries to act alone to increase 
m i n i m u m wages. Networks of suppliers and factory owners often put pressure on 
^^  This dilemma has a strong analogy in the area of climate change: how to create incentives for 
the major developing countries to reduce carbon emissions: Vandenbergh, M. P. and M. A. 
Cohen (2010). "Climate Change Governance: Boundaries and Leakage." NYU Environmental Law 
Journal 18: 221. 
governments not to raise wages or extend rights to peripheral workers, so as to maintain 
low labour unit costs through functional flexibility. There is strong evidence from all case 
studies of pressure of this type being exerted. In Cambodia, pressure of this type 
resulted in minimum wages only being raised by small increments in 2013 and 2014, 
despite broad public support for increases and mass protests. In Australia, Ethical 
Clothing Australia had its funding revoked in early 2014, despite strong evidence of its 
success, following complaints of capital flight from producers. Even where minimum 
wages are increased, or rights are extended to informal workers through various means, 
there are strong incentives for non-compliance or capital flight for buyers and factory 
owners. Interview evidence collected for this study shows that factory owners often 
believe that increases in wages will result in a loss of orders. Factory owners in Bulgaria 
stated in interviews that orders from their suppliers had shifted to Asian producers. They 
had not lost work altogether, but the volumes of orders had decreased as Asian 
producers became more competitive thanks to lower unit labour costs and changes in 
trade rules. 
The Declaration concerning the aims and purposes of the ILO (Declaration of 
Philadelphia) stresses the 'solemn obligation of the ILO to further among nations 
programmes that will achieve...a minimum living wage to all employed and in need of 
such protection.' The right to a living wage is, in addition, established in several ILO 
declarations and conventions: 
• Constitution of the ILO, 1919: Preamble of the Charter 
• ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 2008 
• Convention 131 and 156 (indirectly) and Recommendations 131 and 135 
(indirectly). 
Despite this broad rhetorical support, the ILO has been unable to deliver living wages to 
date. This section proposes one possible mechanism for fulfilling the obligation to 
ensure a living wage to all workers. 
Historians trace the concept of the living wage evoked in the ILO's Declaration of Aims 
and Purposes back to the 1870s, and the onset of industrialisation in the UK (Brenner 
2002). In the USA, also, during the transformation into a "wage labour society", workers 
and their unions increasingly rejected their traditional hostility towards "wage slavery" 
and began to integrate wage labour into their visions of social justice and civic 
participation. Living v^^ages were the key to this transformation, as they provided the 
economic f reedom necessary to exercise political liberty and participate in civil life 
(Ciscel 2004). Indeed, living wages formed a cornerstone of the New Deal legislation 
implemented by President Roosevelt in the US b e t w e e n l 9 3 3 - 3 8 (Kochan 2007). 
M i n i m u m wages have been used in powerful ways by informal workers in India, where 
they apply regardless of employment status. Localised living wage movements have 
been documented around the world as a way to realise economic justice (Figart 2004).^' 
Today, there is growing movement for international f loor wages. The Asia Floor Wage 
All iance, for example, is an alliance led by trade unions in the key garment producing 
countries in the Asian region (Alliance; 2009). Central to their demands is the call for a 
living wage to be paid to all garment workers. This has led to the development of the 
Asia Floor W a g e calculation (Bhattacharjee, Gupta et al. 2009). The group proposes that 
a Living W a g e calculation across the region is key in ensuring workers receive a decent 
wage, but also that wage differences do not mean companies pull out of one country to 
move manufacturing to a country with lower costs - thus avoiding the so called race to 
the bottom (Harbour 2014, Participant Observation: Living wage benchmarks workshop 
2014). An additional contemporary model for the generation of an international floor 
wage comes from the ILO's Joint Marit ime Commission, which has been determining 
international min imum wages for this most international category of workers -
seafaring marit ime workers (Barcellona 2014). 
There is a long history of the application of nation-specific living wage calculation 
methods (Brenner 2002). In line with the contemporary focus on international floor 
wages, more recent work of this type has been directed at calculating internationally 
comparat ive living wages. The Clean Clothes Campaign is working on defining and 
calculating living wages garment producing regions (Clean Clothes Campaign 2014). 
Similar efforts have occurred within the ILO's research arm to develop internationally 
" There is evidence that minimum wages may coordinate development at the high wage 
equilibrium in which formal employment increases and informal employment decreases in 
response to the minimum wage, and local product demand also increases: Magruder, J. R. 
(2013). "Can minimum wages cause a big push? Evidence from Indonesia." Journal of 
Development Economics 100(1): 48-62. 
comparative living wage metrics, with major advances in recent years (Anker 2005, 
Anl<er2011).5^ 
This section canvasses a concrete regulatory mechanism for achieving international 
living wages. The proposal was originally developed in conversations and email 
exchanges with John Braithwaite, and is built on in substantial ways here.^' The 
importance of such a development is not only that it would reduce informality, but also 
that it would address the problem of growing within country equality and, eventually, 
between country inequality (Pogge 2001, United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development. 2010, United Nations Development Programme 2013). As Chapter 1 of 
this study showed, inequality and informality are intimately linked, both causally and 
empirically. 
9.3.2 How it could work 
One way that the strong disincentive for individual governments to increase minimum 
wages can be overcome is to put in place regulatory strategies to increase minimum 
wages across regions and internationally. 
This chapter proposes that the logic of the Asian Floor Wage campaign is sound. 
However, such a movement requires the support of lOs. It is suggested, then, that a key 
ultimate objective would be an ILO Convention or UN Treaty for signatory nations to 
increase statutory living and minimum wages. It is proposed that this could occur in 
three stages. The first stage would be for all countries to provide a living wage. Here, the 
ILO's recent work calculating a living wage based on food and service baskets is 
particularly important for setting minima. 
The next step would be to move countries towards a global average minimum wage, 
based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP is employed as a measure to compare the 
It is beyond the scope of this study to compare methods. The method is clearly set out in 
Anker, R. (2005). A New Methodology for Estimating Internationally Comparable Poverty Lines 
and Living Wage Rates. Geneva, Policy Integration Department Statistical Development and 
Analysis Group International Labour Office, Anker, R. (2011). Estimating a Living Wage: A 
Methodological Review. Geneva, International Labour Office. Conditions of Work and 
Employment Series. In any case, it is assumed that agreement on the method of calculation is 
to be reached through multi-party negotiation, since it is, at heart, a political decision. 
The author is extremely grateful for John Braithwaite's generosity in sharing his idea, being 
open to various modifications, and his comments on the development of this first pathway out 
of informality. 
income levels across different countries. It Is used to determine the adjustments needed 
to be made In the exchange rates of two currencies to make them at par with the 
purchasing power of each other. If a country had a below average minimum wage, It 
would be required by the Instrument to Increase wages on average by an agreed 
quantum - say 2 per cent per annum In real terms - until it became above average (after 
which its obligation would fall to 1 per cent average annual Increases). As minimum 
wages are the bare "minimum". It would be up to national Industrial relations processes, 
such as collective bargaining agreements, to increase wage packages to reflect 
appropriate rates of pay, including additional benefits appropriate to that country 
system. 
The final step would be for all countries to agree to increase minimum wages by an 
agreed quantum, such as 1 per cent In real terms on average each year, if that nation 
had a minimum wage above the global average. Once a nation's minimum wage had 
reached 60 per cent of the median Income for that nation, its only obligation under the 
instrument would be to maintain that target. The reason for proposing the 60 per cent 
target Is because this is approximately the current average for high income countries 
(Anker 2005: xl). The targets proposed here are merely suggestions. The exact figures 
would be a question for further empirical research, public debate and negotiation. For 
Instance, the over time, the target of setting the minimum wage at 60 per cent of the 
medium Income may shift in order to further reduce inequality In advanced economies. 
9.3.3 Role for the ILO and other International Organisations 
The proposal conceives of a strong role for the ILO, perhaps In concert with UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on Business and Human Rights and other key 
lOs. One option would be for a Convention to be generated through the conventional 
ILO tripartite process, whereby the ILO's technical advisors draft a recommendation and 
that recommendation Is debated at the ILO's conference. The tripartite process provides 
a strong role for government, employer organisations and trade unions in negotiating 
conventions. A second option would be for the generation of an International treaty, 
perhaps through the Human Rights Council of the United Nations. 
The ILO and other companion lOs would then have the following responsibilities: 
1. Overseeing the process of ratification. It Is suggested that that an Equality List and 
Inequality List could be publicised (see below) to encourage ratification. 
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2. Determining globally comparative living wages and globally comparative minimum 
w/ages. As discussed, the ILO has already made considerable progress towards this 
aim in empirical terms (Anker 2005, Anker 2011). 
3. Monitoring compliance with the Convention or Treaty. 
4. Overseeing the establishment and running of the International Living Wage dispute 
mechanism. 
5. Setting up domestic tribunals and training national tribunal members (outlined in 
the following section). 
6. Convening forums for information sharing and learning amongst stakeholders 
regarding enforcement in the International Living Wage dispute mechanism and 
national tribunals. 
7. Compiling data on complaints and orders made by national tribunals. 
8. Coordinating the advancement of enforcement strategies with other lOs and 
relevant national government bodies. 
9.3.4 Incentives for compliance 
Incentives for states to participate and comply 
The political strategy at first would be to build up an "Equality Promoting List" of 
countries that have ratified the Convention or Treaty. Governments that signed up for 
the Equality List of early joiners would most likely gain two key benefits: (a) enhanced 
domestic campaign contributions and mobilisation of voter support from unions and the 
domestic social movement in support of equality; (b) preferential treatment in Fair 
Trade certification schemes and other ethical production schemes. 
Likewise, an "Inequality List" of countries with the lowest minimum incomes (as a 
percentage of their median income) would then be compiled. This would allow for 
greater mobilisation to target listed states. Multinational firms with upstream and 
downstream trading with Inequality List countries could also be targeted with strikes, 
consumer boycotts, adverse publicity and Fair Trade decertification, in keeping with the 
campaign currently underway by groups like the Asian Floor Wage Alliance 
(Bhattacharjee, Gupta et al. 2009). The global trade union movement and allied NGOs 
could be energised to build a fund to support those who went on strike for higher wages 
in Inequality List countries. The global social movement for equality could experiment 
with all manner of creative strategies which might bring the economies of Inequality List 
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countries and Inequality List businesses to grief. Such strategies are currently being 
generated by groups such as the Clean Clothes Campaign in relation to garment Industry 
workers (Clean Clothes Campaign 2014). 
Countries that ratified the Convention or Treaty, but subsequently failed to implement 
or enforce it, could be relegated to the "Inequality List" based on ILO monitoring. 
Incentives for unions to take action 
The case studies conducted in this study have shown that often trade unions are 
reluctant to, or lack knowledge about representing the poorest and most marginalised 
workers, including informal workers. This finding was particularly stark in the Bulgarian 
case study. In Cambodia also, unions are only just beginning to organise peripheral and 
informal workers. They are clinging to an industrial or Fordist model of capitalism, 
focussed on trying to stop further outsourcing and vertical disintegration. A significant 
minority of the trade union movement is reimagining itself and becoming more 
international in its focus. However, even for these innovative trade unions, the focus still 
tends to be on core industrial workers. 
There is a risk that governments could cultivate support from trade unions and social 
democratic publics by ratifying the Convention or Treaty, while assuring their private 
sector that they would do nothing to enforce its terms. This could certainly lead to the 
failure of the global living wage proposal. It is therefore of crucial importance to note 
that state enforcement of a global living wage cannot be assumed. 
Therefore, a strong role for trade unions to be built into enforcement mechanisms 
warrants consideration. A model could be the US False Claims Act qui tarn provisions."" 
Such qui tarn provisions were primarily designed for whistle-blower enforcement with 
fraud against the government, but also exist for money laundering, tax evasion and 
bribery in the US (Engstrom 2014). Under that system of enforcement, whistle-blowers 
receive a quantum of the fine or damages awarded against a wrongdoer: 
Qui tam is a unique mechanism in the law that allows citizens with evidence of 
fraud against government contracts and programs to sue, on behalf of the 
government, in order to recover the stolen funds. In compensation for the risk 
"" Qui tam is a shortened form of Qui tam pro domino rege, quam pro se ipso in hoc parte 
sequitur, which means 'He who brings an action for the King as well as for himself: Braithwaite, 
J. (2013). "Flipping markets to virtue with qui tam and restorative justice." Accounting, 
Oreanizations and Society 38(6-7): 458-468. 
and effort of filing a qui tarn case, the whistleblower or "relator" may be awarded 
a portion of the funds recovered, typically between 15 and 25 per cent (TAF 
Education Fund 2015). 
Qui tarn provisions have been credited as a highly effective regulatory tool."^ Braithwaite 
argues that the networked governance quality of the qui tarn enterprise creates a circle 
of accountability in which whistle-blower, NGO, law firm, relevant state department and 
judge are each checking abuse of process by one another (Braithwaite 2008: 69). It is an 
expedient way of enlisting knowledgeable insiders to the public interest (Bucy 2002, 
Bucy 2004). 
Enforcement: International Living Wage Dispute Mechanism 
The enforcement strategies could have an international and national component. One 
reason it may be preferable for the multilateral instrument to take the form of a treaty 
is so that it could give rise to an international enforcement mechanism - an International 
Living Wage dispute mechanism. It is envisaged that this mechanism would allow unions 
and other interested parties to bring claims, at an international level, against states on 
behalf of worker-citizens for failing to enforce living wage laws, and be awarded a 
portion of any of the funds recovered. The primary remedy would be the recovery of 
unpaid remuneration. The state would be ordered to pay unpaid entit lements to those 
workers who had not been paid the living wage. 
Higher penalties might be exacted against states where evidence was presented of 
corruption such as the taking of bribes by labour inspectors, which is common in 
countries like Cambodia (see Chapter 7)."^ Not only Is this justifiable on justice grounds, 
but also, anti-corruption enforcement might be the domain where it will prove easiest 
to mobilise transnational political support for qui tam, outside of the labour movement. 
It is also in keeping with a broader trend towards the global harmonisation and 
" See for example Brief Amicus Curiae of AARP in Support of Respondent at 4-6 , Schindler 
Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885 (2011) (No. 10-188), 2011 WL 288888 
which sites 'FCA is the single most effective tool in the fight against fraud perpetrated against 
the government' and crediting qui tam provisions with achieving large recoveries for federal 
treasury while also combating substandard healthcare. See also Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 
76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 53 (2002) who describes FCA's qui tam regime as 'extraordinarily successful 
as a regulatory tool'. 
The exact portion of funds to be recovered by the trade union whistle-blower, and the 
question of whether it would be paid by the state on top of the quantum for unpaid wages, 
would be a matter for debate. 
transnational reach of corruption laws: a potent set of legal mechanisms now permits 
legal institutions in one country to regulate and provide redress for corrupt acts 
involving public officials from other countries backed by the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (Doc. A/58/422) (Machado 2014). 
Via the National Supply Chain Tribunal, the state would then be open to recover these 
funds from the relevant employers or other parties within the supply chain, who are 
found to have practices that affect the employer's or contractor's ability to provide a 
living wage, legal remuneration or related conditions to the worker. This pathway is 
discussed further in the next section of this chapter. This would create an incentive for 
states to make claims against employers and other parties in the supply chain through 
the National Supply Chain Tribunal. This would trigger action by labour inspectorates to 
monitor and collect evidence in supply chains. It would also act as an incentive to ensure 
that the tribunals were active and did not only represent the interests of capital. 
The potential of being awarded a portion of funds recovered through the International 
Living Wage dispute mechanism would provide an incentive for trade unions to dig out 
whistle-blowers against states who fail to enforce living wages. The award of a portion 
of the amount recovered could provide a major source of funding to unions, 
underwriting expanded transnational activities. This would boost recruitment of new 
union members, particularly from sweatshops and home-based workers. 
An example of the process is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Example process in the International Living Wage Dispute Mechanisms and 
National Supply Chain Tribunal 
•state brings claim in 
domestic Supply 
Chain tribunal against 
employers, 
contractors and other 
responsible parties in 
the supply chain 
There is no reason why trade unions and other labour organisations should not pursue 
claims against businesses using anti-corruption laws of this type today, where there is 
evidence that a business has paid bribes to avoid the enforcement of labour laws."^ Such 
claims could be initiated in the country in which the corruption occurred, or in the home-
country of the transnational business. The latter is useful as foreign institutions are likely 
to be less impeded by local political obstacles. Where qui tarn provisions exist, as in the 
US, such cases would be financially beneficial for the international trade union 
movement, as well as an innovative method of encouraging the enforcement of labour 
laws. 
There is also a shift towards the privatisation of transnational corruption law enforcement, in 
keeping with the proposal here: Hall, K. (2013). "Strategic Privatisation of Transnational Anti-
Corruption Regulation." Australian Journal of Corporate Law 28(1): 60. 
9.3.5 Ratcheting up domestic supply chain enforcement strategies 
It would be the responsibility of the ILOto compile data regarding complaints and orders 
made by National Supply Chain Tribunals (whose functions are outlined in the 
subsequent section of this chapter) regarding the practices of parties in supply chains. 
Where there was evidence of particularly egregious practices by parties in the supply 
chain, the ILO and companion lOs would have responsibility for ratcheting up 
enforcement strategies. Here, there are opportunities for experimentation. The ILO may 
bring parties together to create Global Framework Agreements or new global industry-
wide performance standards. 
Figure 2: Ratcheting up domestic supply chain enforcement strategies 
I Domestic supply chain tribunal claims S g M y s i s by ILO of all ^^mtlonal claims -*icepeat/egregious '^practices identified 




9.4 Second Pathway: National Supply Chain Tribunals 
The second pillar of the strategy would create national tribunals which are able to 
remedy disputes over unpaid living wages (ex post remedies) and create positive 
obligations for those with power in supply chains, including buyers and financers. This 
section examines existing initiatives which provide ex post remedies and positive duties, 
before outlining a proposal for national-level tribunals. 
9.4.1 Ex Post Remedy: Joint and Vicarious liability of buyers, parent companies and 
financiers 
Justification 
The capacity to bring claims against buyers and parties high in the supply chain is a vital 
step in reducing downwards pressure from within value chains. Chapter 6 illustrated 
how right of recovery of unpaid remuneration from parties upwards in the supply chain, 
developed in the Australian initiative, offers the opportunity to address the uneven 
distribution of risk throughout the supply chain. The right of recovery of unpaid 
remuneration from parties upwards in the supply chain helps to overcome a significant 
limitation of traditional employment regulation. While the employment contract makes 
only those who directly contract with the worker responsible for their rights and 
conditions, joint and vicarious liability provisions target a wider array of responsible 
parties. 
The method found in the Australian Textile Clothing and Footwear (TCF) regulation is 
just one technique. Other examples drawn from elsewhere in the world are Law No 20 
123 in Chile - which establishes vicariously liability for "recipient companies" for the 
obligations of contract workers, and the "Hot Goods" provisions in section 15(a) of the 
U.S. Fair Labour Standards Act."" During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the US 
Department of Labour creatively leveraged hot goods injunctions to compel apparel 
buyers to participate in a Department of Labour program, in which the buyers agreed to 
monitor (typically through contract monitors) and assure compliance at their contract 
facilities (Anner, Bair et al. 2013-2014: 38). The US state of California now holds apparel 
brands strictly liable as guarantors for wages owed by their domestic contractors 
(California Labor Code (2013) s 2673.1). Similarly, the state of New York does so when 
the manufacturer knew or should have known of the contractor's violations {New York 
Labor Law, s 345a(l)) (Anner, Bair et al. 2013-2014: 41). These examples show that 
vicarious liability can be achieved by various means. 
"" 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) (2012) ('[l]t shall be unlawful for any person to transport, offer for 
transport, ship, deliver, or sell in commerce, or to ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge tiiat 
shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended any goods in the production of 
which any ennployee was employed in violation of section 206 [statutory minimum wage] or 207 
[maximum hours] of this title[.]'). 
There are historical precedents for mechanisms of this type. Indeed, de Lagerle argues 
that improvements to the conditions of outsourced labour have historically occurred 
w/hen legislatures have recognised the necessity of regulating the entire integrated 
productive chain, rather than just the direct employer-employee relationship. Changes 
to articles L. 721- l f f . of the French Labour Code in 1957 extended liability for home-
based worker conditions to principal employers (Barraud de Lagerie 2013: e8) in a 
manner similar the Australian expansion of the definition of employer. 
More broadly, the expansion that has occurred in the area of torts in a number of 
jurisdictions points to an increasing w/illingness of courts to recognise a duty of care 
where a third party wrongfully harms another person, even absent a special 
relationship."^ Under the principle of "enabling torts" an actor who "sets the stage" for 
a third party's bad acts with a foreseeable expectation that another person will suffer 
harm is responsible alongside the primary wrongdoer if that harm in fact occurs (Rabin 
1999:442-3) . 
Additionally, a number of initiatives place obligations on investors. The OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Corporations allow claims to be brought against banks and investors 
in National Contact Points, the dispute resolution bodies established under the 
Guidelines."^ The Guidelines are recommendations addressed by governments to 
multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering countries (the OECD members 
plus Argentina, Brazil and Chile). Such claims have been brought against banks^^and 
investment funds."® 
For examples from the US, see Rabin, R. L. (1999). "Enabling Torts " DePaul Law Review 49: 
435, Abraham, K. S. (2012). The Forms and Functions of Tort Law, Foundation Press. 
http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_2995. 
" For example, specific Instances (claims) have twice been brought against ANZ bank in the 
Australian national contact point. The most recent claim was EC and IDI vs. Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group, filed 6 October 2014, see Equitable Cambodia and Inclusive 
Development International (2014). Specific instance under the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises submitted to the Australian National Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD 
Guidelines: Inclusive Development International (IDI) and Equitable Cambodia (EC) Against 
Australia New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ), concerning financial services provided to Phnom 
Penh Sugar Company.. 
For example, see the complaint brought against Dutch and Norwegian Pension funds regarding 
investments in South Korean company, POSCO, Netherlands National Contact Point (2013). inal 
Statement ABP/APG - Lok Shakti Abhiyan, KTNC Watch, Fair Green and Global Alliance, Forum 
for Environment and Development. Amsterday, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
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9.4.2 Positive duty of due diligence for buyers, parent companies and financiers 
Justification 
The duties outlined in the earlier section are ex post options, in the sense that they 
extend the capacity of claimants to bring claims or recover unpaid wages and conditions 
against parties who are not the direct employer once losses have already occurred. An 
ideal supply chain regulation regime would strive primarily to prevent violations and 
promote a higher standard of behaviour within supply chains, subsidiaries and 
borrowers (Farrell 2013: 1507). There are two problems with relying on liability regimes 
alone. Firstly, unless there is strict liability, if candidates for responsibility can 
successfully show that their action was not voluntary or that they were excusably 
ignorant, then their responsibility is usually mitigated if not dissolved (Marion Young 
2006). Secondly, such regimes fail to address structural or systemic causes of injustice. 
The justification for the imposition of a positive duty is that parties bear responsibility 
for structural injustice because they contribute, by their actions, to the processes that 
produce unjust outcomes. Responsibility derives from belonging together with others in 
a system of interdependent processes of cooperation and competition, through which 
parties seek benefits and aim to realise certain goals (Marion Young 2006:119). 
One model for sharing responsibility amongst players in the supply chain comes from 
the United States in the first half of the 20th century, where triangular collective 
agreements were formed between unions, the contractors who gave the work to home-
based and sweatshop workers and lead firms in supply chains (Barraud de Lagerie 2013: 
e8). In 1923, the union negotiated collective bargaining agreements with both the 
apparel contractors that directly employed the union's members as well as with the 
jobbers that, as clients of the contractors, "indirectly employed" garment workers 
(Anner, Bair et al. 2013: 20, Anner, Bair et al. 2013-2014). The agreements contained a 
number of provisions that promoted long term, stable relationships between buyers and 
contractors. The aim was to preclude jobbers from constantly switching between 
contractors to secure a short-term advantage on price. These agreements had a marked 
impact on the conditions of employment for unionised garment workers. Time series 
data presented by Anner et al (Anner, Bair et al. 2013-2014) indicate that gains on the 
wage front were indeed significant. During the middle decades of the twentieth century, 
the earnings of garment workers - a heavily feminised and, at least in New York, largely 
immigrant worl<force — kept pace with general manufacturing wages (Anner, Bair et al. 
2013-2014: 18). Sadly, the jobbers agreements did not survive the globalisation of 
production in the TCF industry (Anner, Bair et al. 2013-2014: 20). 
The most similar contemporary example is the Framework Agreement between 
IndustriALL Global Union and Inditex, the apparel giant, which was renewed in 2014 
(Participant Observation: Jenny Holdcroft 2014). This is the first of its kind to cover an 
international retail supply chain (Mayer and Pickles 2014: 27). Under the agreement, 
both parties undertake to collaborate to ensure the sustainable and long-term 
observance of all international labour standards across Inditex's operations, including its 
suppliers (Industriall 2014). Further useful models which regulate employment security 
come from the global approach currently pursued by groups such as the Workers' Rights 
Consortium (Participant Observation: Conversation with Scott Nova 2014, Participant 
Observation: Conversation with Yannick Etienne 2014)"® and the International Union 
League for Brand Responsibility,^" such as the agreement between the Central General 
de Trabajadores Union of Honduras and retailer Fruit of the Loom which provides for 
employment security (Anner, Bair et al. 2013: 34, Participant Observation: Winning and 
enforcing brand and employer commitments workshop 2014). 
In addition to establishing an ex post right of recovery, the Australian example explored 
in this study also established a range of positive duties on apparel businesses at different 
levels of the supply chains. These include providing "work records", establishing 
whether suppliers are contracting to home-based workers and ensuring that those 
workers are being provided with their lawful pay and registering to use home-based 
workers. These duties only apply to domestic supply chains, however. Another example. 
The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (SB-657), approved in October 2010 
provides a model for imposing positive duties on companies that operate transnationally 
The Workers' Rights Consortium was developed in 1999 by the United Students Against 
Sweatshops (USAS) in cooperation with the Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile 
Employees (UNITE); the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO); and a number of human rights, labor, and religious NGOs: O'Rourke, D. (2003). 
"Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of Labor Standards and 
Monitoring." Policy Studies Journal 31(1): 1. 
^ The International Union League for Brand Responsibility is a global organisation of workers 
who make products for multinational brands, such as clothing, footwear and textiles. It is 
running a concerted campaign to encourage multinational brands to take responsibility and 
guarantee living wages, safe factories and stable jobs. 
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(Darragh 2011). Though the name of the law would suggest that it is primarily aimed at 
eliciting reporting on social performance, it goes further than this. The law requires all 
apparel and footwear retailers as well as manufacturers with global sales of more than 
USD $100 million a year to make the disclosures. The disclosures must specify if an audit 
was conducted by a third party or through a company's internal department to evaluate 
and address risks of human trafficking and slavery within the business's local and 
international supply chains.^' Training must also be provided employees and 
management on slavery and human trafficking risks mitigation. The Act also contains an 
enforcement provision (Eastham and Danzig 2012). 
Encouraged by the Californian Bill, a group of Congressional members proposed a similar 
Bill at the Federal level in the US, which would require companies to make similar 
disclosures in their Annual Reports (Darragh 2011).^^ Denmark has also mandated 
similar social reporting (Buhmann 2011). 
A further indication of a growing willingness to impose positive duties on businesses is 
the principle of "due diligence" developed by Professor John Ruggie, UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on Business and Human Rights. The central goal 
of the UN Special Representative's (UNSR) mandate has been to clarify the direct 
obligations of private business enterprises under international human rights law (UN 
OHCHR 2005: para 1(a)). Ruggie and his team have developed a 'Protect, Respect and 
Remedy' Framework, the basic principles of which were presented in the UNSR's 2008 
Annual Report (Ruggie 2008)." The UNSR has developed a "due diligence" framework 
which provides a way for businesses to put in place internal planning and management 
processes which take into account human rights. This is consistent with "management-
" A key flaw in this model is its reliance on auditing. The fundamental limitations of audits, in a 
variety of settings, has been well documented, see Kelman, S. (1981). Regulating America, 
Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy. Cambridge 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, Power, M. (1997). The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification. New York, 
Oxford University Press, Strathern, M. (2000). Audit Cultures. London, Routledge. 
" A similar Bill was introduced into UK Parliament titled the 'Performance of Companies and 
Government Departments (Reporting) Bill. Although more than 300 MPs signed an Early Day 
Motion supporting the Bill's aims, the government blocked further consideration of the Bill on 
January 30, 2004. See Woods, N. and D. Graham (2006). "Making Corporate Self-Regulation 
Effective in Developing Countries." World Development 34(5). 
" A detailed analysis of the vast array of documents produced by Ruggie's team are beyond the 
scope of this chapter. 
based regulation", as opposed to say, performance-based regulation which is more 
concerned with outcomes (Braithwaite and Drahos 1999, Cunningham 1999, Woods 
and Graham 2006). 
The UNSR has thus far taken a cautious approach to recommending state intervention 
in the area of imposing a positive duty of due diligence on businesses. However, there 
is a clear shift away from accepting a voluntary approach, evidenced by the recent 
passing of two resolutions in June 2014 at the 26"" Session of the UN Human Rights 
Council in support of exploration of 'legal and practical measures to improve access to 
remedy, judicial and non-judicial, for victims of business-related abuses, including the 
benefits and limitations of a legally binding instrument'.^" 
9.4.3 How it could work 
Each country that has ratified the International Living Wage instrument will be under an 
obligation to set up a tribunal with powers to (a) adjudicate disputes that arise as a 
consequence of breaches of worker's rights within supply chains, and (b) create positive 
duties for parties within the supply chains. Under the international instrument, tribunals 
would have powers to make orders in relation to parties within supply chains who are 
domiciled either inside the jurisdiction, or outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal as long 
as the matter concerns a worker within the national jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
Rather than becoming bogged down in arguments about legal doctrine in relation to 
strict and vicarious liability or the duty of care, the proposal here is to adopt the 
approach taken by the Australian Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth). The Act 
creates a labour tribunal with power to make orders concerning various matters in 
relation to safety and remuneration within the transport supply chain. The Act employs 
concepts and terminology that are particularly helpful in addressing the commercial 
pressures that emanate from parties in supply chains that impact working conditions. 
The tribunal would have the power to: 
• make living wage orders where matters concern supply chain parties 
• approve and assist with negotiations for supply chain collective agreements 
^^  See UN Human Rights Council (2014). Human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises A/HRC/26/L.1. HRC, UN Human Rights Council (2014). Elaboration of an 
international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights A/HRC/26/L.22. HRC. 
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. deal with certain disputes relating to participants in the supply chain and enforce 
existing orders 
. conduct research into supply chain dynamics that impact pay, conditions and 
related matters 
Redress 
The tribunal would be charged with adjudicating disputes in relation to remuneration 
and related conditions about practices of one or more participants in the supply chain 
(including employers, contractors, buyers, agents, financiers and so on) in relation to a 
worker if:^^ 
(a) the worker contends that the practices affect the employer's or contractor's ability 
to provide a living wage, legal remuneration or related conditions to the worker; 
(b) the employer or contractor of the worker contends that the practices affect the 
employer's or contractor's ability to provide a living wage, legal remuneration or related 
conditions to the worker; 
(c) the labour inspectorate contends that the practices affect the employer's or 
contractor's ability to provide a living wage, legal remuneration or related conditions to 
the worker. 
As explained in the First Pathway above, where claims have been made against the state 
at the International Living Wage dispute mechanism for unpaid remuneration, the 
National Supply Chain Tribunal would have jurisdiction to hear disputes regarding 
recovery of such funds from parties in the supply chain. Amounts would then be 
awarded against different parties in the supply chain based on their contribution to the 
problem. 
Positive duties 
The National Supply Chain Tribunals could also impose positive duties, which could 
include ways of reducing or removing remuneration-related incentives, pressures and 
practices that contribute to payment of remuneration that is less than a living wage, 
breaches of labour laws and unsafe work practices. Such orders may impose 
requirements, in relation to:^® 
" The language proposed here reflects that of Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) s 43. 
^^  The language proposed here reflects that of Road Safety Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) s 27. 
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(a) an employer or hirer/contractor of a worker to whom the order applies; 
(b) a participant in the supply chain in relation to whom the order applies, including 
financiers, buyers, agents and so on. 
Extraterritorial powers 
The tribunal would have the power to make orders against parties in the supply chain 
domiciled outside of the country in which the work was occurring, as long as sufficient 
evidence was present concerning the manner in which the practices of the entity impact 
working practices and conditions, and the complaint concerned one or more workers 
within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
Workers not employees 
The powers of the tribunal would not be limited to employees, allowing a wider range 
of workers to bring claims than under most labour law systems which base labour 
protections on the employment contract. The provisions will explicitly refer to workers 
and empower the tribunal to make orders in relation to living and minimum wages in 
accordance with the International Living Wage instrument (the first pathway). 
Benefits of a specialist tribunal 
It is recommended that the tribunal be created as an adjunct to existing labour relations 
tribunals or social dialogue institutions, and existing institutions be given the power to 
refer matters to the specialist tribunal where the matter concerns parties within a supply 
chain. The reason for this is that it is important that tribunal members have and build 
specialist knowledge in the field of supply chain dynamics. It is particularly crucial that 
they develop specialist knowledge of work relations that sit outside the traditional 
employer-employee relationship. Participant observation of Australian Fair Work 
Commission (the Australian industrial relations tribunal) hearings concerning the 
outwork provisions of the relevant clothing collective agreement suggest that tribunal 
members can be limited in their thinking about supply chain dynamics, as they are 
accustomed to dealing with employment matters without such attendant dynamics 
(Participant Observation: Fair Work Commission 2013). 
The creation of new tribunals, and the selection of independent tribunal members with 
the assistance of the ILO, can help to overcome problems of bias and corruption that 
mar the delivery of justice in many developing countries. This follows the insights of the 
previous chapter which discussed the benefits of "rivalry" or "displacement" as a means 
of achieving institutional change. The chapter expounds the benefits of "experimental 
displacement" as a strategy when an existing institution is failing, but there are political 
economy reasons that mean that full displacement is difficult or undesirable. An 
example of experimental displacement or rivalry which is relevant to the development 
of tribunals is the establishment of the Cambodian Arbitration Council as an industrial 
relations tribunal. It was set up with the assistance of the ILO and other international 
bodies, is staffed by local professionals who were selected through a painstaking process 
which aimed to ensure their independence, and has thus far avoided the corruption 
charges regularly levelled against judges in the Cambodian court system (Interview with 
An Nan 2014, Interview with Ann Vireak 2014, Interview with Ing Sothy 2014, Interview 
with LivSovanna 2014). 
There is a great deal of literature expounding the benefits of tribunals as "deliberative 
arenas" {Posner and Yoo 2005, Cooney, Howe et al. 2006, Bogdandy 2012). Such benefits 
include cheapness and ease of accessibility; freedom from technicality: simplified rules 
of evidence and procedure reduce legal costs, and allow people to represent 
themselves; expert knowledge of tribunal members of their particular subject. 
Regardless of these flexibilities, tribunals still offer reasoned judgments which allow for 
both sides to make amendments, for appeals, and for justice to be seen to be done. They 
provide a means to achieve enforced self-regulation in which social actors devise their 
own standards and implementation methods subject to public oversight and, frequently, 
mandatory criteria. The members of industrial relations tribunals tend to draw equally 
from labour and employers, with an independent chair. 
The tribunals envisaged here would be empowered to make consent orders where the 
parties have reached settlement before hearings, or through the negotiation process 
facilitated by the tribunal. Where there is no agreement reached between the parties, 
the tribunal will reach a decision, publish the reasons for the decision on the internet, 
and make an order. It will be able to enforce or modify existing orders where a dispute 
is notified to the tribunal. It is envisaged that such a dispute notification will occur when 
a representative organisation fills in a simple form with a brief outline of the matter in 
dispute, making the tribunals highly accessible. 
9.4.4 Incentives for compliance activities 
By giving state labour inspectorates the riglit to recover unpaid remuneration and 
entitlements from employers and other parties in the supply chain, the Tribunal creates 
an incentive for state labour inspectorates to be more active in inspecting, collecting 
evidence and prosecuting both employers and non-employer principals. Where claims 
have been made against the state in the International Living Wage dispute mechanism, 
the incentive will be particularly strong, as the state will desire to recover funds already 
paid to workers. It is hoped that this will assist in overcoming the barriers against action 
by state inspectorates seen, for example, in the Cambodian case study, where the 
inspectorate rarely enters the factory floor. 
By granting employers and principals the right to contend that the practices of other 
parties in the supply chain have affected the employer's or contractor's ability to provide 
a living wage, legal remuneration or related conditions to the worker, an incentive is 
created for employers and contractors to effectively "join" other parties to the claim 
and provide evidence regarding the practices of these parties. Other parties in the 
supply chain, including buyers, financiers, agents and so on, will then be in the position 
of defending their practices, and providing contrary evidence. 
The Tribunals will also give workers, employers, contractors, other parties in the supply 
chain and their representatives significant opportunities for participation in remediation 
and problem-solving processes in relation to supply chain problems. Importantly, the 
tribunals will operate as forums through which remediation efforts are incorporated into 
collective bargaining processes (O'Rourke 2006: 910). The approach to enforcement 
proposed here would meld traditional compliance and commitment approaches (Locke, 
Amengual et al. 2009: 344). The aim would be to foster stability, mutual respect, trust, 
and even reciprocity throughout supply chains. 
Collective agreements 
The Tribunal will have the power to approve and assist with negotiations for supply 
chain collective agreements between buyers, producers and unions. Such agreements 
may take a form similar to those of the "jobbers agreements" in the early 20"^ century 
in the USA, or global framework agreements (both discussed above). The content of 
these collective agreements would be subject to negotiation, and thus would vary in a 
way that would respond to the national Institutional setting, industry and supply chain 
dynamics in which the dispute and subsequent negotiations took place. 
Other orders 
The Tribunal will be empowered to make a wide range of orders in relation to disputes 
bought before it in order to reduce or remove remuneration related incentives, 
pressures and practices that contribute to payment of remuneration that is less than a 
living wage, breaches of labour laws and unsafe work practices. Such orders can be 
requested by the parties to the dispute. The idea is that the international instrument 
would encourage experimentalism, and the ILO shares learning across countries about 
the benefits of different orders. Three standard orders that could be made include (a) 
payment of unpaid remuneration, (b) orders for supply chain parties to provide training 
and (c) assistance to their suppliers and orders for the implementation of performance 
standards or industry codes of conduct. Where non-compliance is particularly stark or 
repeated, the tribunal could order more stringent penalties such as (d) suspension of 
intellectual property rights. 
Payment of unpaid remuneration and entitlements 
The Tribunal will make orders for payments of unpaid remuneration and other 
entitlements to workers or to the state, where the state has paid through the 
International Living Wage dispute mechanism. Based on the evidence presented to it, 
and its own inquiries, it will determine the share to be paid by different parties in the 
supply chain. If responsibility for non-payment is found to be shared between different 
parties, for example, by the direct employer/principal and also the buyer, amounts will 
be apportioned between the parties. 
Training and assistance 
Where the evidence suggests that non-payment of proper remuneration is a 
consequence of the information asymmetries or low-levels of competence of certain 
parties in the supply chain, tribunals will be able to make orders for supply chain parties 
such as buyers and financiers to provide training and assistance to suppliers. This will 
encourage processes of root-cause analysis, joint problem solving, information sharing, 
and the diffusion of best practices throughout the supply chain (Locke, Amengual et al. 
2009: 321). As Locke et al (Locke, Amengual et al.: 327) document: 
[T]here now exists an extensive body of literature on regulatory effectiveness (or 
lack thereof) in an array of arenas that indicates that companies comply w/ith 
laws, regulations, and standards not simply because these "amoral calculators" 
have been "deterred" by the threat of sanctioning but instead because many of 
them have been assisted and/or educated to comply with regulations and 
standards. 
Without such assistance, the tribunal risks rejection by small and medium-sized entities, 
as seen in the Australian case study where such businesses feel unfairly targeted and 
burdened by supply chain regulations. 
Performance standards and industry codes of conduct 
The tribunal will be empowered to make orders for the implementation of performance 
standards and industry codes of conduct. Such orders may be the consequence of the 
tribunal's research activities or may be ordered at the request of parties to a dispute. 
Such orders will be made where sufficient evidence has been provided that the 
performance standard or industry code of conduct has produced, or will produce, 
improved compliance with labour standards through changed practices throughout the 
supply chain. 
Suspension of inteilectual property 
Where breaches are particularly egregious, or parties refuse to adhere to orders, more 
powerful incentives may be necessary. There is significant evidence that large 
businesses are frequently willing to write off fines as a cost of doing business. There are 
also examples of transnational business ignoring court and regulatory orders made 
developing countries." As John Braithwaite argues: 'More punishment translates to less 
crime only at those points on the deterrence curve where deterrence effects exceed 
defiance effects' (Braithwaite 2013). This points to the need to search for new and 
creative enforcement methods. Perhaps the most potent penalty for brands, whose 
greatest value adding comes from brand recognition, would be the temporary or 
permanent loss of intellectual property including trademarks, copyright, patents and so 
on. If Nike, for example, lost its trademark on the "swoosh" for a fixed period, this would 
" One of the most high profile examples is Shell's failure to pay fines ordered by Nigerian 
regulators. The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency imposed a USD $5 billion fine 
for environmental damage, which Shell refused to pay. The fine was subsequently reduced to 
$4 billion by the Nigerian parliament. However, Shell still refused to pay. See Terngu, A. (2014). 
Nigeria's parliament says Shell should pay $4 billion for 2011 oil spill. Reuters. Abuja. 
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be a very damaging sanction. It is acknowledged that penalties related to intellectual 
property would not be effective as against parties in the supply chain that do not rely 
on their brand for the success of their business. The suspension of intellectual property 
posited here provides only one creative example of the way new sanctions need to more 
effectively target various parties in supply chains. 
Such penalties are currently being imposed in other policy areas, so there is no reason 
for them not to be applied in the field of labour regulation. States, through the World 
Trade Organisation dispute resolution panels, have recognised that cross-retaliation 
based on intellectual property is legitimate. Cross-retaliation is the suspension of 
concessions in a sector of trade different than the sector in which the trade injury is 
suffered. A WTO arbitration report in a dispute between the United States and Brazil 
over US cotton subsidies, for instance, gave Brazil the right to suspend intellectual 
property obligations.^® 
Intellectual property jurisprudence recognises that intellectual property is different 
from other forms of property, designed to serve public policy objectives - not merely the 
private interests of rights-holders." The granting of intellectual property rights is a form 
of state recognition of the value of the intellectual content of a good. This value, 
arguably, includes its ethical integrity. Where such ethical integrity is shown to be 
tarnished, through the evidence based system of the tribunals, the state is justified in 
suspending those rights. States could amend their intellectual property laws to 
incorporate a way of suspending intellectual property when breaches of living wage 
rights occur. This would provide a particularly strong sanction at the top of the 
^^  The arbitration arose from a request by Brazil to tal<e countermeasures against the United 
States for its failure to comply with the rulings of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in US -
Upland Cotton DS267. See Guan, S. (2014). '"WTO Retaliation Rules in Subsidy-Related Cases: 
What Can We Learn from the US-Upland Cotton Arbitration?" Journal of World Trade 48(4): 815. 
See for example, British American Tobacco Australasia Limited v Commonwealth of Australia 
[2012] HCA 43 (5 October 2012) in which British American Tobacco and others argued the case 
against the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth). They argued that in effect, the laws 
extinguish their ability to benefit from statutory intellectual property rights (such as trademarks 
and copyright images) as well as established goodwill and reputation. A majority of the High 
Court (Justice Heydon dissenting) rejected these arguments on the basis that there had been no 
acquisition of property. The judgements stressed that intellectual property law is designed to 
serve public policy objectives - not merely the private interests of rights-holders. See also the 
dispute at the World Trade Organisation on this matter, WTO (2014). Australia — Certain 
Measures Concerning Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging: Dispute DS434. 
regulatory pyramid, which ought to increase compliance with more collaborative or 
softer orders. 
9.4.5 Role for the ILO 
Here, again, an orchestration role is envisaged for the ILO, contributing to a virtuous 
cycle of enforcement. 
The ILO would play a role in helping to set up tribunals. It would assist with the selection 
of tribunal members, in a manner similar to that which occurred in the establishment of 
the Cambodian Arbitration Council. It would also be charged with providing training to 
Tribunal members following their appointment. 
Once a number of Tribunals were running, the ILO would be responsible for collecting 
and sharing information about the types of orders that have been developed across the 
tribunals. It would also run training and information sharing on claim-making within the 
tribunals, for unions and civil society groups with an interest in representing workers. 
Additional training should be provided for employers and principals on joining other 
parties to supply chain claims and the presentation of evidence about the commercial 
pressures placed on them from buyers and other parties in the supply chain. 
The ILO may also have a role in providing specialist evidence in claims where disputes 
arise over whether the amount paid by a buyer is adequate to allow a supplier to pay 
living wages to its workers. Miller proposes a method for calculating a "standard minute 
value" that can be used in the labour costing of garments. The method measures the 
time It takes to sew a garment, and calculates the labour cost based on minimum wages 
(Miller 2014: 122). 
Figure 3: Virtuous circles of enforcement and international orchestration 
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9.5 Third Pathway: Local bridges out of informality 
Local bridges out of informality are also required for precarious workers. Not all of the 
informal workers examined in this study were linked to international supply chains. 
Own-account informal workers in Bulgaria often produce only for domestic markets, for 
example. Even for those who were linked to international supply chains in some way, 
the causes of their informality often had local as well as international dimensions. 
Another example is drawn from the Mathadi workers in India, who load and unload 
international goods. The factors that contributed most to the informality of this group 
of workers, however, seemed to be primarily local. 
It is the contention of this study that domestic strategies should follow from the type of 
analysis conducted in the case study chapters, as opposed to choosing from a "drop-
down menu" of approaches to mitigating informality. Local strategies need to respond 
to the particular histories and political economy dynamics that produce and entrench 
inequality and informality. For example, the trauma identified as a cause of Vietnamese 
refugees becoming trapped in informal, home-based work in the chapter on Australia 
can only be identified through population specific studies. 
Nonetheless, the range of local bridges out of informality which have been 
experimented with world-wide provide useful lessons for policy-makers searching for 
new policies and strategies. This section briefly mentions a few important strategies. 
Local pathways are well developed in policy documents such as the ILO's 'Transitioning 
from the informal to the formal economy' {ILO 2014) which articulates domestic 
strategies, and thus are not the focus of this chapter. 
9.5.1 Extend definitions of "employee" and decouple labour rights from 
employment status 
The case studies presented here provide useful models for extending definitions of 
"employee" or decoupling labour rights from employment status. The extension of 
minimum wages to "workers" rather than "employees" is one example of this. The 
provision of social protections, including pensions and social safety nets through welfare 
boards and means other than as a condition of employment is another (Stone 2006, De 
Gobbi 2007, Vandenberg 2008, Gundogan 2009, Participant Observation: Homebased 
workers struggle workshop 2014). There are many proposals for the decoupling of 
labour rights from employment status that are too numerous to discuss in detail here 
(Supiot, Meadows et al. 2001, Vosko 2002, Arthurs 2006, Davidov and Langille 2006, 
Trebilcock 2006, Vosko 2009). Instead, the aim has been to observe examples in 
practice. 
9.5.2 Mobilisation 
The case studies suggest that a first, vital step is to foster the capacity of local worker 
organisations to mobilise and organise workers for the improvement of labour 
standards (Huws 1995, Sabel, O'Rourke et al. 2000: 31, Raval and Team 2001, Burchielli, 
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Delaney et al. 2009). Unions cannot rely on the methods developed in Fordist settings. 
It is hoped that the proposals canvassed here will increase incentives for unions and 
other worker organisations to monitor and organise informal work. 
9.5.3 Control of the supply of labour 
Two interrelated causes of informality are the oversupply of labour and the lack of 
training and support provided to informal workers. Several countries have seen the 
emergence of workers' cooperatives as a means of supplying labour and providing 
training (Pascual and International Labour Organization. Subregional Office for South-
East Asia and the Pacific. 2008, Participant Observation: Worker Cooperatives in Action 
2014). In Colombia, for example, workers join workers' cooperatives to produce goods 
or perform work or services.®" The Mathadi boards examined in the chapter on India 
also show that associations of workers were a prerequisite to the effective function of 
these tripartite boards which act as a monopoly on the supply of this category of labour 
(Shankaran 2005). 
9.5.4 Land reform 
The Indian example studied shows the importance of land reform to stopping or 
reducing the "circulation of labour" described in the chapters on India and Cambodia -
whereby workers leave the country-side and flood cities in search of work, contributing 
to oversupply and vulnerability (Peek, Standing et al. 1982, Breman 2010). 
9.5.5 Insurance and tax incentives 
Various temporary incentives can be used to shift enterprises from informality to 
formality, and encourage formal employment. One example is provided by the Shanghai 
Municipal Government. In 1996, the Shanghai Municipal Government introduced a 
policy and regulatory regime to facilitate the development of the informal economy as 
a means of providing employment for unemployed workers (Howell 2002). The policy 
encourages individuals to establish individual ventures or small firms in certain types of 
activities. The enterprises established under the policy are called "informal labour 
™ However, the ILO notes that there have been reports that this system has given rise to 
fraudulent employment relationships, which have attracted penalties. In Colombia, news 
reports referred to an investigation involving 200 workers cooperatives, which found that 'some 
temporary work agencies were operating under the guise of cooperatives in order to evade tax 
and social security contributions': ILO (2005). The Employment Relationship, Report V(l). 95th 
Sesssion. I. L. Conference. Geneva. 
organisations". The Shanghai Labour Bureau encourages these "informal labour 
organisations" to develop to a point where they can register with authorities and 
transfer to the formal economy. 
Some of the preferential policies enjoyed by "informal labour organisations" include: 
• social insurance (employers and employees pay a lower base rate and lower 
contributions); 
• free training opportunities; 
• an exemption from local taxes for a period of 3 years. This exemption continues to 
apply to enterprise that have converted during the 3 year period into registered 
individual households or small enterprises; 
• support for credit; 
• the subsidy and employment of informal labour organisations that provide public 
works; 
• risk insurance; and 
• voluntary provision of advice and assistance by experts. 
By September 2001, a survey by the Shanghai Bureau of Labour and Social Security of 
500 "informal labour organisations" found that 25 per cent of such entities had entered 
the formal economy (Howell 2002:13). This points to the importance that incentives are 
temporary and show clear evidence of transitions from informality to formality. 
9.6 A defence of the proposal 
The author acknowledges that the proposal canvassed here is bold, and is likely to take 
a number of decades to bring to fruition. Part of the proposal is a practical path to 
building social movement momentum towards the gradual construction of reforms. 
Specific objections to the feasibility of the vision have been briefly addressed in the 
course of this chapter. The following broad additional defences are made to objections 
that are likely to be raised in relation to the proposal: 
Sceptics might argue that the approach recommended here marks a significant 
digression from current arrangements. In response, this chapter has shown that the 
vision is consistent with the direction of the explosion of non-state, co-regulation and 
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state-based initiatives aimed at regulating social harm within supply chains. The 
proliferation of initiatives of particular types suggests a growing shared understanding 
of transnational labour standards and to a common discourse around it (Meardi and 
Marginson 2014: 656). The simple growth of the system must be explained by some sort 
of function, whether the declared ones, tacit ones, or even unintentional ones (Meardi 
and Marginson 2014: 656). It is for this reason that the proposals in this chapter have 
taken, as their departure point, trends emerging in the experimental field of soft law 
and New Governance initiatives. 
Indeed, there are many components of the network of regulations in place. The ILO is 
already experimenting with transnational regulation and monitoring through its Better 
Factories Cambodia and Better Work projects. It has been searching for international 
relevance, and this would provide it. Transnational deployment amongst unions 
searching for a way to improve work across nations is growing. Worker organisations 
with the capacity to organise and mobilise informal workers are developing. A campaign 
for international living wages is already underway. National industrial relations tribunals 
exist in many or most countries around the world. The model for the supply chain 
tribunal is an existing tribunal in Australia with authority to regulate the entire chain of 
transport — the Road Safety Tribunal and language used by the Road Safety 
Remuneration Act 2012 (Cth) — which enjoys a strong reputation and support across 
the industry. The crucial thing is to coordinate the network that is already in place and 
bolster its functioning so as to create a virtuous cycle of incentives and enforcement. 
A second objection may be that the proposal, by allowing for claims against states for 
living wages, is against state interests, and therefore states are unlikely to support the 
creation of a binding international instrument such as a treaty. Why would they support 
a mechanism that allows for claims to be made against them? This realist argument has 
merit. However, the process outlined offers a means to muffle the strength of this 
argument by allowing states to recover any funds paid from business in national Supply 
Chain tribunals. Thus, while the proposal does require deeper engagement by state 
parties, the distribution of risk does not fall wholly on the state. Increasing numbers of 
states are showing an interest in finding new ways to bring transnational business to 
account for breaches of human rights within their borders. There may be those amongst 
them, who, under sufficient domestic and international pressure, would take the lead in 
developing a framework agreement for a treaty of the type envisaged in this chapter. 
The strongest indication of this is UN Human Rights Council resolution (A/HRC/26/L.22), 
drafted by Ecuador and South Africa, establishing an open-ended intergovernmental 
working group on a legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights. The resolution was supported by 
China and India, amongst the 20 countries that voted for the resolution. If these 
powerful BRICS could be convinced that a mechanism of this type was practically feasible 
and in their interests, it may have legs. In a conversation with South African Human 
Rights Commissioner Janet Love, she suggested that South Africa's willingness to push 
for a treaty was driven by the fact that its constitution places direct positive duties on 
corporations to uphold human rights. Current international practices therefore lag 
behind South Africa's (Conversation with South African Human Rights Commissioner 
Janet Love 2015). 
An additional defence against this objection is the fact that the International Living Wage 
dispute mechanism has a parallel in the world of state-investor relations, where claims 
can be made by investors against states. Over the last decade there has been a massive 
increase of cases of investor-state dispute settlement under arrangements that provide 
foreign investors with considerable legal protection and access to international 
arbitration. As of the end of 2013, the total number of known cases was 568. By then, 
98 countries had responded to one or more claim (UN Conference on Trade and 
Development 2014: 1). One example is the dispute that arose after Australia introduced 
legislation in 2011 that requires that all tobacco products be sold in plain brown 
packaging. Health warnings would still be included on cigarette packets, but logos would 
disappear. Several companies unsuccessfully challenged the legislation as an 
expropriation of their Intellectual property in Australia's High Court. Philip Morris 
International then pursued arbitration under a bilateral trade agreement between Hong 
Kong and Australia which provided for investor-state arbitration. The company was 
familiar with these processes, having already launched a dispute against Uruguay for 
similar tobacco packaging requirements. 
From a normative perspective it could be argued that if investors can make claims of this 
type against states, then why not labour? The fact that investors - who are likely to 
oppose the development of labour-state dispute settlement mechanisms - already reap 
the benefit of its own analogue may render objections of this type less legitimate. From 
a political economy perspective, there is no doubt that the rise of claims by business in 
investor-state dispute settlement procedures is evidence of the increasing strength of 
capital vis a vis the state. None the less, these claims do give rise to new potential 
normative claims by labour for similar procedures. 
The primary, overall defence of the proposal is the impetus for its creation. This is 
primarily a normative and justice-based argument. Inequality is rising and precarious 
work is growing. This Is unacceptable. It is hard, under current conditions, to reduce 
inequality, informality and poverty in single countries. It is a hazardous undertaking for 
states to raise wages in light of the risk that certain kinds of production will move to 
lower labour unit cost countries. Economies are so interlinked that globally orchestrated 
solutions to these grave social problems are required. 
9.7 Conclusion 
Capacities to improve labour standards 'must be built up from diverse and scattered 
sources', as Sabel, O'Rourke and Fung put it {Sabel, O'Rourke et al. 2000: 29). This 
chapter has pitched a novel, multi-level regulatory scheme for tackling Inequality and 
reducing informality. The scheme bridges governance gaps at the national and 
international levels in relation to breaches of labour-related human rights. It addresses 
significant cracks in current regulatory strategies, which tend to focus either on domestic 
or transnational labour regulations models, and not on how to coordinate and layer 
regulatory strategies at different levels. It Is hoped that the proposals canvassed in this 
chapter overcome a number of the inadequacies in competencies of single actor, 
voluntary schemes which dominate global supply chain regulation, on the one hand, and 
the singularity of strategies that characterise national institutions, on the other. 
This chapter contends that the proliferation of supply chains is not an insurmountable 
policy challenge. Rather, the case studies show that opportunities already exist to adopt 
the best aspects of past regulatory frameworks and combine these with chain of 
responsibility innovations that regulate beyond the traditional employment 
relationship, in order to provide better outcomes for supply chain labour (Rawling and 
Kaine 2012: 257). The scheme canvassed here builds on the Innovations of the four 
initiatives studied, as well as the ever-expanding number of soft and New/ Governance 
initiatives worldw/ide, mining the insights they provide into how to produce institutional 
change. The International Living Wage dispute mechanism provides a way to reduce 
inequality and promote higher remuneration for the poorest workers, at the same time 
as minimising the risk of capital flight as this occurs. Importantly, it provides incentives 
for national labour inspectorates to become more active in pursuing higher 
remuneration for poor workers, thereby facilitating institutional reform and the national 
level. The National Supply Chain Tribunals offer a means to redress downwards pressure 
within supply chains - something national institutions are currently failing to do. This is 
a major gap in the current regulatory environment, given the scale and severity of 
problems caused by supply chain dynamics for working conditions. The Tribunals posited 
here are designed in such a way as to allow sensitivity to the structural standing of 
different parties in the supply chain, recognise the separation of control and ownership, 
be responsive to the nature of influence and control wielded by different parties, and 
bridge asymmetries in information and trust between parties. They are institutions of 
enforced self-regulation, based on internationally and nationally agreed minima. 
The deployment of new penalties and incentives are crucial to the success of this 
scheme. The scale of the problem and the extent of social harm caused by informality 
calls for maximum strength regulatory levers. The imposition of fines has been shown 
to be a weak disincentive against non-compliance with laws for transnational business. 
Sometimes, creative enforcement methods are right under our noses. The suspension 
of intellectual property is proposed as the sanction at top of the enforcement pyramid. 
This sanction takes aim at the most vulnerable area for brands. Its strength should 
increase compliance with other types of orders, contributing to the virtuous cycle of 
compliance at the heart of the design of this novel regulatory initiative. 
It hoped that by creating a form of networked regulation, drawing in expertise of several 
kinds, offering concrete operational capacities (including resources) and acting 
independently from the targets of regulation (Abbott and Sindal 2006: 549), these new 
mechanisms will provide strong pathways out of informality and towards high labour 
conditions for vulnerable workers. Ultimately, however, their prospect for success 
depends on the extent of mobilisation of workers and their allies in utilising them, and 
the beneficence of forward-thinking industry leaders in seeing them as opportunities for 
reducing governance risks and promoting greater cooperation within supply chains 
(Anner, Bair et al. 2013-2014: 42-43). 
10 CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 Introduction 
This dissertation has addressed the question of what regulatory strategies can best improve 
the conditions of the growing "precariat" or informal workforce. Informality and 
precariousness is linked with inequality, poverty, low job quality, low productivity, low 
revenue for the government, and it shows no signs of disappearing in many countries 
around the world. It is linked with inequality, poverty (Kucera and Xenogiani 2009), low job 
quality (SEED 2003), low productivity (McMillan and Rodrik 2011), low revenue for the 
government, and it shows no signs of disappearing in many countries around the world. 
Indeed, in many countries the informal economy has been the main source of employment 
growth in recent years, particularly in developing and transition economies (Bacchetta, 
Ernst et al. 2009). According to the most recent estimates, non-agricultural work in the 
informal economy represents 82 per cent of total employment in South Asia, 66 per cent in 
sub-Saharan Africa, 65 per cent in East and South-East Asia (excluding China), 51 per cent 
in Latin America and 10 per cent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (International Labour 
Organization and WEIGO 2002, International Labour Organization and WEIGO 2012). It was 
a main source of support for many affected by the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (Torres 
2009). It goes without saying that employment creation policies and those that foster 
industrial growth are crucially important for improving their working conditions and 
livelihoods. This dissertation has not aimed to address these types of policies, however. It 
has been concerned with the realm of regulation - hard laws, soft initiatives and other 
institutions that shape behaviour. Given the extent of the problem, it is clear that the 
deployment of maximum strength levers is required. 
Four case studies of informal work were conducted in this dissertation, using a historical 
institutionalist approach to studying changes in the context in which labour regulation has 
occurred over time, reform of labour regulation and the proliferation of forms of work. 
Spanning poor, middle income and developed countries, the cases studied head load 
(Mathadi) workers in India, immigrant industrial clothing outworkers in Australia, garment 
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workers in Cambodia and workers in Bulgaria who rely on a range of home-based work to 
survive. The cases were selected for their insights into the causesof informality and because 
innovative regulations have been developed to Improve the conditions of the workers in 
each country. The dissertation has compared these advances in the regulation of work, 
asking what can be learned for purposeful institutional change elsewhere in the world. 
Since the 1970s international organisations have been grappling with the problem of 
informal work, recommending different remedies in keeping with policy trends of the time. 
The focus was mainly on the economic South until the US financial crisis when precarious 
and unregulated work increased dramatically in the North. Informal work is now a major 
focus for the ILO, with its chief governing body dedicating two sessions (103"' and 104"' 
sessions of the Conference) to the question of how to bring workers under the scope of 
formal regulations and improve working conditions. The recommendations before the ILO 
are primarily national in scope. The studies conducted in this dissertation have found that 
many of the causes of informality are transnational in scope. As a consequence, even if the 
policies recommended are efficiently implemented, they are unlikely to address the 
growing problem of precarious work. 
Based on the evaluations of existing innovations an ambitious transnational, networked 
initiative that aims to promote a global living wage and regulate supply chains have been 
canvassed. The proposal includes the establishment of an international disputes 
mechanism for enforcement of global wage minima, combined with tribunals that operate 
at national levels empowered hold parties in the supply chain accountable. The approach 
suggests novel tools and incentives for unions and state labour departments to become 
more active in mobilising and regulating this precarious workforce, and for businesses to 
change their behaviour. 
10.2 Overlapping dynamics of Informalisatlon 
Historical institutionalism was selected as the primary method for the empirical study 
presented in this dissertation as it pays attention to the ways in which institutions structure 
and shape political behaviour and outcomes over time. This dissertation employed a 
historical intuitionalist approacli to studying changes in the context in which labour 
regulations operate, changes to labour regulation itself, and changes in the nature of work 
in each case study country. A broad account of the factors that have put pressure on or 
changed the nature of the labour market in each case was made possible by this approach. 
By deploying a historical institutionalist approach, this study has shown that the dynamics 
that shape the lives of informal workers today are structural consequences of decisions and 
aggregated local and international economic processes beginning a number of decades ago, 
and possibly far further back in history. Persons stand in systematically different and 
unequal social positions due to the way institutions operate together (Marion Young 2006: 
114). Rather than being a static condition, the factors that constrain and enable individual 
possibilities are ongoing processes in which many actors participate. 
There are a number of causes of informality that more than one of the case studies have in 
common. These can be identified in short hand as follows: 
1. Mass migration or circulation of labour within countries and between countries; 
2. Large scale macro-economic and institutional liberalisation; 
3. Integration of previously separate economic systems as socialist and capitalist systems 
were combined following the fall of the Eastern bloc and the opening to global trade; 
4. New organisations of production resulting in the vertical disintegration of productive 
units (firms) and the expansion of supply chains; 
5. The explosion of new, non-employee forms of work; 
6. The complexity and scale of production outstrips national labour regulation systems; 
7. Lack of transnational orchestration in labour regulation results in gaps in the scale of 
labour regulation. 
The case studies have shown that the experience of these dynamics by populations has 
varied based on the mediation of these forces by local institutions and cultures. And yet, 
similar dynamics were found to be at play across the cases. Each of these dynamics is now 
described in greater detail. 
10.2.1 Mass migration and circulation of labour 
The migration and circulation of labour was identified in all but the Bulgarian case as a cause 
of informality. In the Indian and Cambodian cases, internal circulation was, in the earlier 
periods of the studies, caused by colonial land and taxation laws that expelled people from 
their land. Having little or no land to cultivate, people become redundant in primary 
production and were converted into a huge reserve army of labour. Subsequent upheaval 
of the population in Cambodia was caused by civil war. Later, the dynamics of 
industrialisation caused further internal migration in both countries. In the case of 
Australian outworkers, Vietnamese emigrants were driven by poverty, political oppression 
under socialist rule and civil war to leave their home country, arriving as refugees in 
Australia. The years spent in refugee camps shaped their capacity to take up employment 
once they finally reached Australia. 
These internal and international migrants failed to become absorbed in steady, permanent 
employment, creating a precariat class (Standing 2011). The populations of workers studied 
became stuck in informal work with low wages, payment by piece rate or job work, insecure 
work, erratic working hours, no written labour contracts, and an absence of institutional 
representation (Breman 2010: 2). Because of the difficulties of finding steady employment, 
this migrant labour often remained unsettled. Mathadi workers circulate back to their 
villages. In the cases of India, this circulation is encouraged by labour laws which sought to 
maintain the links of migrant workers with their villages so as to avoid burdening the social 
security system. Young, female Cambodian garment workers return to their villages to 
marry and raise children. These case studies observed the continual circulation, rather than 
the permanent outmigration, of workers from the countryside before the implementation 
of labour regulation to target these problems. 
Further, the informal economy has not been shown to have an infinite capacity to absorb 
surplus workers. Migrant workers often find themselves crowded out of the job markets 
with which they are familiar, forced to re-circulate and search for work elsewhere. Though 
circulation may not have caused informality in Bulgaria it was still present as a dynamic. 
Workers hoped to find new sources of earnings by traveling to other parts of the European 
Union in search of work. Conditions of insecurity have left these workers in a state where 
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they are continually in search of new prospects for income generation and in a constant 
state of vigilance with little assistance and poor information about opportunities. 
10.2.2 Large scale macro-economic and institutional liberalisation of economies 
A further dynamic driving the informalisation of work evident across all of the case studies 
was the large-scale macro-economic and institutional liberalisation of economies which 
took place across the world in the 1980s and 1990s. There was trend towards the disbanding 
of collective institutions designed to facilitate price coordination, privatisation of state 
owned companies, accompanied by broader processes of both price liberalization and trade 
liberalisation. Such changes were facilitated by the design of regional and international level 
policy regimes and institutions in which global production and trading relations (and 
associated investment regimes) are constituted. Liberalisation of labour regulation also 
occurred across many countries. Indeed, as Adams and Deakin observe, the trend in non-
standard working, particularly as embodied in precarious forms of work, has been 
exacerbated by 'conscious policy choices that have privileged casualization, wage 
suppression, and the fiscalization of employment over the promotion of stable work and a 
living wage' (Adams and Deakin 2014: 780). 
The effects of liberalisation were most stark in the Bulgarian case, where the transition from 
state socialism to capitalism which catapulted the working population from full 
employment to entrepreneurism and informality, and exposed it to great market instability 
seen in hyperinflation and the eventual loss of over 50 percent of citizen's savings. Though 
not on the same scale or with the same impact across the entire population, Australia 
undertook a program of liberalisation over a similar period that included the floating of 
currency and the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff protections amongst a suite of other 
measures. Trade protections had not just acted as an element of industrial policy to that 
point, they had very explicitly been part of the arsenal of labour protections aimed at 
providing job security and boosting domestic employment. The sections of the Australian 
workforce who were most exposed to this liberalisation experienced the end of this 
employment security. Those who were unable for various reasons to take up the 
opportunities of structural adjustment and employment programs - such as the new 
Vietnamese immigrants studied in the case study in this dissertation - were left stranded in 
this state of insecurity. 
10.2.3 Integration of previously separate economic systems 
This liberalisation of economies, and the fall of the Eastern bloc, resulted in the integration 
economic systems on a scale not previously witnessed. Prior to this integration. Eastern bloc 
countries had primarily traded amongst themselves, for instance. There was some trading 
with countries external to the bloc, but the rules of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance guided the countries towards highly specified internal trade. After the transition 
to capitalism, these countries opened themselves to investment and trade with countries 
across the world, competing for trade access. The case studies of Bulgaria and Cambodia 
document the types of trade deals made, and the way that these agreements influenced 
the economy and the nature of work. Bulgaria's integration was shaped by the multilateral 
Europe Agreements, amongst others, while Cambodia's was greatly influenced by bilateral 
agreements such as the US-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement. These agreements 
created preferential arrangements for the more powerful parties to the agreements, and 
encouraged further liberalisation. Though the US-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement 
included a labour clause which put in train the creation of Better Factories Cambodia, in 
return for quotas, Cambodia agreed to reduce tariffs on its apparel and textile imports, and 
not to exercise non-tariff restrictions, such as import licensing. This restricted the use of 
industrial policy and techniques for upgrading which might have assisted with the 
promotion of higher wage employment and increased job quality. 
Both countries entered the global economy with the rest of the Eastern bloc and much of 
Asia, and at a time when the global rules of trade were encouraging the greater integration 
of economies across the globe. The merger of economic systems that were once largely 
separate produced a global oversupply of labour without a significant increase in the global 
stock of capital (Polaski 2006). Capital poor transition countries competed for a share of 
existing global investment, offering favourable terms to attract finance. Not all investment 
is created equally. While some capital, supported by supportive institutional frameworks, 
encouraged high value added production, investment in Cambodia and Bulgaria was 
concentrated in low value added areas. For the garment industry, both countries saw their 
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production reduced to the cut, make and trim or outward processing sector of the 
industries, where competition on the basis of low unit labour costs is highest. This promoted 
flexibilisation and put great pressure on wages, fostering informality. 
The availability of this new pool of cheap labour for countries like Australia encouraged the 
outsourcing of production to cheaper production countries. Australian manufacturers saw 
their orders drop markedly, with enterprise after enterprise folding or adapting by 
outsourcing work to informal home-based outworkers. 
10.2.4 New organisations of production resulting in the vertical disintegration of 
productive units and the expansion of supply chains 
As a consequence of the large scale macro-economic reform and integration of economies, 
during this period, production of apparel and textiles, toys, footwear, home electronics and 
other consumer goods destined primarily for consumer markets in the industrialised world 
spread throughout the world, with manufacturing tending to cluster in a range of 
developing countries (Collins 1990, Appelbaum 2006 (draft)). Cambodia, for example, was 
a major beneficiary of the relocation of garment production. 
Businesses in industrialised countries vertically disintegrated: that is, large, multi-function 
corporations broke up into smaller units. The outsourcing of production, or vertical 
disintegration, occurred in a significant number of industries, as producers recognised that 
they could not themselves maintain cutting-edge technology in every field required for the 
success of their product (Gilson, Sabel et al. 2009). Businesses sought the benefits of 
lowering overheads and cheaper labour by passing risks and costs onto others in the supply 
chain. Complex and lengthy supply chains emerged, with risk being passed down the chains 
to workers, further exacerbating informal conditions. 
10.2.5 Explosion of new forms of work 
As competitive pressures were passed down supply chains, the size of the "precariat" class 
swelled (Standing 2011: 969). To survive, these workers needed to be flexible in terms of 
type of labour. The workers studied in Bulgaria were continually in search of sources of 
income and performed a wide range of odd jobs within a particularly short time period. 
These activities sometimes appear to be characterised by self-employment, sometimes 
waged labour, sometimes a blurry combination of both. The necessity not to specialise in 
one occupation, but rather to pursue a range of diverse activities arises from the seasonal 
fluctuations which are inherent to the informal economy (Breman 2010: 218). Industrial 
outwork in the clothing industry, for examples, comes in spurts, associated with fashion 
seasons. Cessation of production in countries such as Bulgaria and Cambodia is also caused 
by a shortage in raw materials, cuts in the electricity supply or availability of transport. 
Though self-employment is described, in a large part of the literature, as the backbone of 
the informal economy (Hart 1973: 66-70) many workers of this type are either conducting 
camouflaged or open form of waged labour. The patterns of work of populations studied in 
the case studies show that there is no reason to describe waged labour as a phenomenon 
that is bound with the formal sector. Waged labour does not always take the form of an 
unequivocal and direct employer-employee relationship, however. There are different 
intermediaries - those who provide raw materials and then collect semi-finished or finished 
products from home-based industrial workers in the Australian study, or the middle people 
who recruit and supervise Mathadi workers, who function as agents for the eventual labour 
users. 
The workers in all case studies had in common that they carry a high burden of risk in 
production. They need to remain available for as long as there is a need for their labour, not 
only in daytime but also in the evening and night. Overtime pay has been a big issue for 
Cambodian garment workers since the late 1990s. Australian industrial outworkers 
frequently work through the night to finish a job. These periods of overemployment are 
often followed by periods of unemployment for all except the Cambodian workers studied 
for this dissertation. They receive no continued payment for wages or compensation for 
hours, days or seasons without work or little of it. 
The characteristics of working relations observed in the case studies indicate that it is more 
accurate to describe the workforce as fragmented rather than dualist. The world of work 
cannot be divided into formal and informal sections. The research conducted for this 
dissertation suggests a more graduated and varied model that draws attention to the 
enormous diversity of work conditions within both the formal and informal economies. 
10.2.6 The complexity and scale of production outstrips national labour regulation 
systems 
State capacity has been weakened by the increasing complexity and informality associated 
with post-Fordist processes of capitalist development (Harvey 1990). Such increasing 
complexity and informality operate to make regulation increasingly difficult in large part 
because the organisation of production has simply become more complicated. The broad 
trend towards vertical disintegration has resulted in: (a) a proliferation of corporate forms 
and relations; and (b) a proliferation of people who would previously have been employed 
inside a firm being engaged in alternative ways, including as dependent contractors, 
independent contractors, employees or contractors of labour hire agencies, or as part of 
their own businesses (Marshall 2006). Labour relations have become far more convoluted 
as the structure of labour markets has changed both within industrialised and developing 
economies. This was particularly evident in the Australian and Bulgarian cases where work 
has retreated into homes. 
The structuring of supply chains in organisationally complex and pluralised ways can make 
it very difficult for state-based regulators to identify a clear locus of power ar)d control, and 
thus to determine appropriate regulatory subjects and agents. Who should be held 
responsible for the poor conditions of workers, when so many parties are involved in 
passing work down the supply chain? Where production occurs in transnational, integrated 
supply chains, control is wielded in a diffuse, multipolar manner. These changes have 
created problems for labour law, which has increasing difficulty in defining an "employer" 
and an "employee"; yet these remain the parties between whom the bilateral employment 
relationship is assumed to have taken place (ILO 2005). Without the changes in the scope 
of the regulation of work of the type seen in the regulatory innovations studied in this 
dissertation, increasing numbers of workers are left outside the reach of labour regulation 
and the social protections and welfare benefits which are most often attached to this legal 
relationship. 
In addition, the scale of production across and between countries has outstripped the scale 
of state-based labour regulation. It is increasingly difficult for national regulations to deal 
with increased cross-border movement of labour and services and with multinational 
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companies (Meardi and Marginson 2014: 655), According to U.N. Special Representative for 
Business and Human Rights John Ruggie (Ruggie 2008): 
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the 
governance gaps created by globalization - between the scope and impact of 
economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse 
consequences. These governance gaps provide the permissive environment for 
w/rongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. 
10.2.7 Lack of transnational orchestration 
Though production has increasingly globalised, there is an absence of an international 
authority with the power to steer and coordinate regulation across states. The international 
system lacks a central "state" (Abbott and Sindal 2006: 553). The ILO plays an important 
role in setting standards and reporting on the application of these standards in member 
states. However, the ILO cannot enforce any sanctions against countries that fail to 
implement and enforce labour standards. Though institutions that orchestrate, enforce and 
hear disputes concerning the application of transnational regulation exist in other areas, no 
such institution exists in the area of the regulation of work. 
10.3 The impetus for a New Global Regulatory Deal 
The dynamics that have caused and exacerbated informality identified across the cases, 
summarised in this chapter, provide a strong impetus for the type of initiative proposed in 
the previous chapter. The strength and scale of these dynamics implies that there is little 
chance that precarious work will be replaced by decent and dignified work without strong 
regulatory intervention. There are two main reason for this. First, the fact that Informality 
remains a stable feature of labour markets across much of the developing world defies the 
idea that economic transformation in the Economic South is essentially a delayed repetition 
of the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation that laid the foundations for the 
western welfare state in the early twentieth century. The standard account of economic 
development — often attributed to Simon Kuznets — has inequality rising during the early 
stages of industrialization but then falling steadily as incomes converge and over-all living 
standards rise. No convergence of incomes is evident across many developing countries 
where precarious work is prevalent. A convergence is not arising from market dynamics, 
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nor is it being encouraged by the embedding in marl<ets in social regulation which would 
encourage the redistribution of wealth. Workers in the Economic South have never enjoyed 
a New Deal, and there is no sign of one on its way. Second, the prevalence of informality in 
the Economic North indicates that the forms used to harness the capitalism of old no long 
work. The great social pacts of the 20"^ century are dead. Why? Because the dynamics of 
capital accumulation have changed. 
What is called for, then, is a New Deal which responds to these new dynamics. The proposal 
for a new form of global labour regulation put forward in the previous chapter has a number 
of features which make it a candidate as a New Global Regulatory Deal: 
1. It overcomes important limitations in labour law by establishing enforceable rights to 
minimum pay regardless of employment status AND providing rights and obligations 
against non-employer parties in supply chains; 
2. It induces developing and developed countries alike to raise minimum wages and 
enforce labour laws; 
3. It moves countries towards a global average minimum wage, based on purchasing 
power parity; 
4. It fosters a renewed role for the ILO as an orchestrator of this system of regulation; 
5. It provide incentives for trade unions to mobilise and monitor the conditions of 
precarious, peripheral workers, facilitating the reinvention of the union movement as 
a movement for representation of the precariat and a progressive force for all 
workers; 
6. It provides incentives for states to monitor and enforce minimum wage laws, and 
punishes those states that are particularly corrupt in their non-enforcement of 
minima; 
7. It proposes new, powerful incentives to encourage compliance and behavioural 
change amongst business. 
What will happen if we fail to develop a New Global Regulatory Deal of this type? New 
patterns of capital accumulation are promoting increased inequality and a growing 
precariat class. As Picketty writes: the 'forces of divergence can at any point regain the 
upper hand, as seems to be happening now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century', 
and if current trends continue, 'the consequences for the long-term dynamics of the wealth 
distribution are potentially terrifying' (Cassidy 2014). The great social pacts of the 20th 
century were adopted to promote industrial peace. Standing calls the precariat the 
"dangerous class". 'The biggest dangers', declares Standing, 'are social illnesses and the risk 
that populist politicians will play on their fears and insecurities to lure them onto the rocks 
of neo-fascism, blaming 'big government' and 'strangers' for their plight'(Standing). 
Whether such dangers are accurately identified, it is clear that the churning of labour under 
global capitalist development is producing collateral damage in society (Munck 2013: 757). 
Under such circumstances, a new vision for the decommodification of work is urgently 
required. 
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